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ABSTRACT
During the 1983 season, two U.S. longline vessels initiated
the first attempts at the commercial exploitation of sword-
fish in the Eastern Caribbean. In 1986, the number of u.s.
vessels participating in the fishery surpassed 40 with
landings of nearly two million pounds per season.
The sudden influx of participants and technology to the
region has resulted in a variety of user conflicts and
associated policy issues. Major areas of concern involve
the conservation of a heavily exploited resource and the
distribution of benefits which accrue from resource exploi-
tation among the resource-adjacent island states and U.S.
fishing operations.
This study examines principles of fisheries management, the
international legal framework for highly migratory species,
and regional responses to highly migratory species manage-
ment. These experiences are then applied to the Eastern
Caribbean situation. Management alternatives which are
discussed for. the Eastern Caribbean include: regional
management; fees and conditions of foreign vessel access;
compliance and enforcement; local development; and related
issues such as stock conservation, recreational species and
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by-catch landings. The study indicates that government
fisheries treaties may involve issues far removed from
fisheries such as strategic interests of the super powers.
The island nations of the Eastern Caribbean have the right
to the benefits associated with the fisheries resources
which occur in their zones of ocean jurisdiction. However,
the realization of this goal will depend on regional
cooperation, the wise use of scarce resources and long-
term commitment.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge the following individuals whose
assistance and support were both essential and greatly
appreciated.
First, thanks go to my parents who were patient, supportive
and understanding throughout this project. I would like to
make special mention of Dr. Edward Towle of Island Resources
Foundation who is responsible for suggesting the subject and
for supporting my initial research efforts. I would also
like to thank the many people I interviewed in the Carib-
bean, especially Mr. Blok, Fisheries Officer of the British
Virgin Islands, Mr. Miguel Rolon of the Caribbean Fisheries
Management Council, Mr. Edward Carty, Master Fisherman of
Anguilla and Mr. Daven Joseph, OECS Fisheries Desk Officer.
I deeply appreciate the advice and exchange of ideas I
gained through conversations with students, former students
and faculty of the University of Rhode Island, especially to
Gil Sylvia for discussions concerning the use and con-
straints of resource economics.
Finally I would like to thank the faculty of the Marine
Affairs Department, especially the members of my thesis
committee for their time, assistance and patience.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
The Problem l
Objectives of the Study 4
Methods 5
Chapter
I. THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN 9
The Region Defined 9
History 13
The Contemporary Eastern Caribbean 14
II. EASTERN CARIBBEAN FISHERIES AND MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS ...........•........................... 23
Eastern Caribbean Fisheries ....................•.. 23
Physical and Biological Constraints 23
The Fishing Industry 26
Nearshore Demersal Fishery 27
The Deepwater Demersal Fishery 28
The Pelagic Fishery 29
Fishing Gear 30
Status and Development of the Industry 31
RegionalOrganizations 34
CARICOM ...•..•••.....•.••......••.•..•••...... 36
WECAF and FAO ..............................•.. 40
ICCAT .....•...•......•..•... 11 ••••••••••••••••• 41
OECS ••.••••••••••••..•••••••.••••.•••••...•••• 42
Other Organizations .........•...•..........•.. 44
III. SWORDFISH FISHERY BACKGROUND .....................•.• 46
Swordfish Biology 46
History of the Fishery •.......•.....•.........•••. 49
Fishing Methods Cl •••••••••••••••••••••• 51
Status of the Swordfish Resource and Fishery .•.•.. 57
United States Swordfish .Management .•••............ 59
IV. THE SWORDFISH FISHERY IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN .....• 63
Issues in the US VI and Puerto Rico ....•........... 67
Local Marketing of Incidental By-catch .•.......• 68
Recreational Concerns ........•......•..•......•• 75
Conclusion 79
Illegal Swordfish Longlining in Eastern
Caribbean States' Waters ....•...•..•••••.••....•.. 8 1
The Case of the British Virgin Islands ..•..•.... Bl
Illegal Fishing in Other Parts of the Region •... B4
v
Local Development of a Pelagic Longline Fishery 86
Other Considerations 88
V. MANAGEMENT OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES 92
General Principles of HMS Management 92
Management Objectives 92
Stock Management 94
Economic Efficiency 97
Distribution of Benefits lOO
Resource Adjacent Nation Fishery
Development 102
Incidental Impacts on Related Stocks 104
The Legal Regime for Highly Migratory Species .. lOs
VI. HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES MANAGEMENT EFFORTS •....... 117
Management Alternatives 117
Management in the Pacific Islands Region 120
The Reg ion 121
Fisheries of the Region 123
Tuna Management in the Reg ion 127
Fisheries Forum Agency 127
The Nauru Group 133
Individual Coastal State Approaches 138
The United States Case 146
Regional Comparisons 153
VII. SWORDFISH MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES IN THE EASTERN
CARIBBEAN .••.•....•................................ 158
Maintenance of Swordfish Stocks 159
Benefit Distribution 168
International Legal Aspects ...........•.....•.. 169
The Role of OECS 170
Access Agreements .........•.................... 178
Regional Registry 178
Access Fees 179
Other Benefits ....••.................•....... 189
Conditions of Access ......•..............•..•.. 193
Compl iance ' 197
The U.S. Factor ...........•.................... 203
Local Development of a Swordfish Fishery ........• 207
Economic Eff ic iency .........•..............•..... 210
Multi-species Character of the Fishery ....•...... 212
Further Considerations ......•...................• 213
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 214
Backg round ......•...•......................•....• 214
The Eastern Caribbean Situation ..........•..... 214
vi
Problem Investigation Findings and
Constr ain ts ..........................•••....... 217
Swordfish Stocks 217
Management Institutions .........••....•........ 218
International Legal Aspects 219
Management in the Pacific Islands Region 219
Recommendations .....•............................ 221
Conservation of Stocks ................•........ 221
Benefit Distribution ..................•........ 222
Other Areas of Concern .................•....... 227
Summary ...............................•.•...... 229
Applicability Beyond the Caribbean Swordfish
Fishery ..........•...............•............... 231
BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................•........ 234
vii
LIST OF TABLES
1. Political Status of Islands of the Eastern
Caribbean ........................•................... 11
2. General Characteristics of Eastern Caribbean
Islands 12
3. Economic Indicators of the Eastern Caribbean
Reg ion 16
4. Economic Indicators of Selected Eastern Caribbean
Nations 20
5. The Eastern Caribbean: Imports as a Percentage of
Gross National Product; Exports as a Percentage of
Imports 22
6. Nominal Catch by Country in the Eastern
Caribbean 33
7. Fisheries Statistics for Eastern Caribbean
Nations 35
8. Participation of Eastern Caribbean States in Regions
Organi zations 37
9. Caribbean 1985 Swordfish Landings and Size
Composit ion .' 64
10. Caribbean 1986 Swordfish Landings and Size
Composi tion 65
11. 1986 U.S. Longline Landings and Value of Swordfish,
Tuna and Billfish 70
12. Longline Catch Composition, USVI Development
Project 71
13. Basic Data of the South Pacific Region 124
14. FFA and Nauru Group Membership in South Pacific
Organizations 135
15. Eastern Caribbean Jurisdictional Claims 172
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Map of the Eastern Caribbean .••........•...••..•..... 24
2. Swordfish Longline Effort Distribution .....•.....•... 52
3. Longline Gear Types of Swordfish ......•.............. 54
4. Species Composition from Longline Fisheries in the
Western North Atlantic ...•.......................••.. 78
5. Surplus Yield Model ..•............•........•..•...... 96
6. Bioeconomic Model ...........•....•.....•......•...•.• 99
7. Map of the South Pacific Region ............•.. ~ ..... 122.
8. EEZs of the Nauru Group •.•.......................... 134
9. 200 nm Zones of Jurisdiction in the Eastern
Car i bbean 155
10. Swordfish Exploitation in the Caribbean and
Adjacent Areas ........•......••.•.•..•.....•........ 164
11. FAO Statistical Areas.~ ~ ~ .. 165
ix
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
The swordfish longline fishery is one of the most recently
developed and controversial fisheries of the Eastern
Caribbean. The Eastern Caribbean Region, as used in this
paper, will include the island nations of the Lesser
Antilles, including their respective zones of ocean
jurisdiction, extending from Puerto Rico to Venezuela. In
the winter months of 1983 the commercial fishery was
initiated by two U.s. mainland vessels (Campos et aI, 1985).
In 1986 the number of U.s. vessels operating in the region
had grown to at least 40 with landings approaching two
million pounds of swordfish annually (Rolon per. corn. 1987,
SAFMC 1987). The sudden influx of foreign participants and
technology have resulted in a number of disputes and
associated policy issues (Martin and Woods 1986a).
The swordfish resource of the North and Western Central
Atlantic is highly migratory with a range extending from
Canada to South America. Stocks pass through the high seas
and at least 15 zones of national jurisdiction. There are
six major participants in the fishery, the largest of which
are the United States and Canada. Management of the
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resource is further complicated by incomplete knowledge of
its biology and population dynamics (Hoey per. com. 1987).
Meanwhile average age at first capture has been dropping
throughout the species range during the 1980s (Conser et aI,
1985a). It has been determined that the stock exhibits
growth overfishing, a drop in the average size of individu-
als which make up the stock. However, recruitment over-
fishing, the decrease of spawning stock biomass below levels
which can sustain the level of recruitment req~ired to-
maintain stock levels, has not yet occurred (Conser et al,
1985a). Of particular importance is the increased effort
which has taken place throughout its range, especially in
the Eastern Caribbean. It has also been determined that the
Eastern Caribbean is one of the major spawning grounds for
swordfish (Grall et aI, 1981). The effects of increased
fishing effort in the Eastern Caribbean on the Western
Atlantic swordfish stock are currently unknown although
concern over the health of the resource is growing.
Currently the fishery is not regulated within its range
either by international agreement or within respective zones
of jurisdiction.
The central problem hinges on two interrelated matters
involving international cooperation. Immediate concerns
focus on the distribution of benefits derived from resource
2
exploitation among foreign participants and resource
adjacent island states. Meanwhile, the absence of a
regulatory strategy directed toward stock management
throughout the range of the swordfish resource is a concern
of all interested parties for conservation and maximization
of benefits in the future. Therefore, there is a common
need among all concerned parties to work in concert while
attempting to reach individual goals.
Most small island states of the Eastern Caribbean lack the
resources required to exploit the highly migratory resources
which pass through their Fisheries or Exclusive Economic
Zones. Distant water fleets of larger and relatively
developed nations are more likely to target these species
because they possess a comparative advantage in respect to
capital, expertise and experience. Permitting and entry of
foreign vessels to resource adjacent nations' waters is
becoming more common, yet many distant water vessels con-
tinue to fish without permission or in a manner which is
inconsistent with entry requirements (San Juan Star 1986).
The island nations of the region lack the resources required
to adequately enforce fisheries law within their respective
200-mile zones.
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Objectives of the Study
The objective of this study is the development of a set of
potential management options for the swordfish fishery with
emphasis on the Eastern Caribbean Region. The recommended
alternatives are directed toward a distribution of benefits
accruing from resource exploitation, which is acceptable to
concerned parties, while promoting conservation of the
resource throughout its range.
The eventual management measures taken will depend on the
concerned island states, fishing participants and other
coastal states within the range of the species. Although
most concerned parties would agree that benefit maximization
and conservation are their goals, the definition of each,
and the means by which these goals can be attained, are
usually perceived differently by each interest group. The
intent of this study is to indicate the alternatives
concerned parties have at their disposal and the implica-
tions of each option in relation to the general goals stated
above.
Another principal goal of this study is to indicate where
gaps in information related to management of swordfish
exist. Research and management institutions will have to be
utilized and strengthened to allow the management process to
move forward. Yet it must be determined which research
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areas have priority, which institutions should be utilized
and how they should be strengthened and whether potential
gains outweigh the costs of undertaking these activities.
It should be recognized that the management options
suggested in this study are only the starting point of the
management process. In the future new information will
become available, society and its social and economic
institutions will change and fish populations will vary.
Therefore one of the most important goals of this study is
acknowledgment that flexibility is required in any manage-
ment scheme so that questions concerning its institutions,
makeup and direction continue to be asked.
Methods
The principal problems of this study revolve around factors
which include a growing foreign fishery, resource adjacent
developing states and a highly migratory resource. In other
parts of the world where similar circumstances exist,
management initiatives have evolved which deal with many of
the same factors. Management principles in areas such as
regional arrangements, permitting, enforcement, regulation
and development have been proposed or initiated in the South
Pacific, Eastern Pacific and the United States. The experi-
ences gained in resource management and allocation in these
regions offer valuable lessons which can be drawn upon
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during the development of potential management options.
These experiences can be studied within their regional con-
text for relevance and transferability to the pelagic long-
line fishery which is developing in the Eastern Caribbean.
The study is initiated with an investigation of elements and
issues associated with the swordfish fishery. Areas of
concentration include: the Eastern Caribbean Region, its
geography~ political entities and traditiona~ fisheries;
international and regional organizations involved in manage-
ment of fisheries resources; the biology of the resource,
including stock assessment, range and life history; issues
such as illegal fishing, impacts on recreational stocks,
impacts on the local industry, local development and impacts
on swordfish stocks.
The investigation then centers on principles and practices
of fisheries management which have been adopted or proposed
in other regions or EEZs such as the South Pacific, Eastern
Pacific and the United States. Major areas of concentration
will include: the international legal framework such as The
Law of the Sea Treaty and customary international law; per-
mitting of foreign fishing vessels; enforcement of national
and regional fisheries law; regional and international
management arrangements; local development of the fishing
industry; and resource conservation, involving data collec-
tion, assessment and regulation.
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These experiences and principles are analyzed with respect
to their possible transferability and adaptation to the
Eastern Caribbean Region. The case of the South Pacific
Fisheries Form Agency (SPFFA) is especially relevant due to
similarities such as the foreign fishing participants
involved, its general makeup of dependent and newly
independent small island states, and the target species
which is a highly migratory pelagic resource. Management
options will also be considered accordingtb the following
general criteria: they have been arrived at through the use
of the best available information; can be implemented with
available resources cost effectively; are reasonable to the
concerned user groups; they are flexible enough to be modi-
fied and built upon in the future. From these criteria and
investigations and comparisons of other region's approaches
directed toward highly migratory species management, poten-
tial management, options which are directed toward the
resolution of issues surfacing in the Lesser Antilles are
developed.
Resolution of the issues associated with the swordfish
fishery cannot take place overnight. Many of the answers do
not exist because we have failed or have not had the chance
to ask the right questions. The management options recom-
mended in this study are a starting point from which new
initiatives and questions must evolve. Principal elements
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of management such as conditions of foreign vessel entry,
enforcement, conservation and local development will vary in
significance according to particular points in time. Mana-
gers must recognize the importance of a management process
which allows for flexibility and reevaluation.
Ultimately this depends on the building and utilization of
management institutions for the collection of information,
assessment of data and adoption of new or revision of
measures as the process moves forward.
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CHAPTER I
THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN
The Region Defined
In this study the Eastern Caribbean Region will be defined
as the Islands of the Lesser Antilles stretching from Puerto
Rico to Venezuela. A "region as defined by L.M. Alexander
is:
"an intellectual concept, created by the selection of
certain features that are relevant to an areal interest
or problem. It is a geographic generalization whose
distinguishing criteria are chosen by the compiler of
the region in order to serve a stated objective" (cited
in Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).
The Eastern Caribbean Region was chosen because its
geography corresponds to a part of the range "of swordfish
where foreign fishing effort has increased dramatically
within the last five years. The islands of this area also
possess a number of common features such as geographic
proximity, colonial past and small size. The majority of
islands in the region perceive foreign fishing and the
issues associated with it as a common problem as they strive
toward management of their Fishing or Exclusive Economic
Zones.
The Eastern Caribbean is sometimes defined as the member
nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
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(OECS) (Palmer 1984, Goodwin 1985). It consists of inde-
pendent island states which were former British Colonies of
the Windward and Leeward Islands of the Lesser Antilles,
formerly called The West Indies Associated States Council of
Ministers (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983). Yet the picture is
complicated by: the remaining British dependencies of the
region; relatively large island states such as Barbados and
Trinidad and Tobago; French posessions or departments; Dutch
possessions or newly independent states; and Venezuela. In
additi6n, the u.s. territories of the U.S. Virgin Islands
and Puerto Rico exert a strong influence on the region. The
region's ocean geography consists of a puzzle of adjacent
zones involving all of the political entities cited above.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the region's diversity in respect
to colonial past and size.
This investigation concentrates on the former British
possessions which include both dependent and independent
states. Within the Eastern Caribbean these states have the
greatest potential to act as an independent entity within a
regional context while they exhibit the greatest degree of
political and economic integration within the region.
However, the other countries and-possessions noted above are
also important elements due to: their geographic proximity;
sometimes larger size both in respect to population and
economies; and fishing operations within the region.
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TABLE 1
Political Status of Islands of the Eastern Caribbean
Country
Puerto Rico
United States
Virgin Islands
British
Virgin Islands
Anguilla
Netherlands
Antilles
St. Christopher
and Nevis
Antigua and
Barbuda
Montserrat
Guadeloupe
I:xxninica
Martinique
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and
the Grenadines
Barbados
Grenada
Trinidad and
'Ibbago
Former or Current
Colonial Influence
United States
United States
Great Britain
Great. Britain
Holland
Great Britain
Great Bri tain
Great Britain
France
Great Britain
France
Great Britain
Great Britain
Great Britain
Great Britain
Great Britain
Status Year*
Commonwealth 1952
u.S. External
Territory 1954
British Dependent
Territory 1969
British Dependent
Territory 1980
Self-governing
Colony 1954
Independent 1983
Independent 1981
British Dependent
Territory 1960
French Overseas
Department 1946
Independent 1978
French Overseas
Department 1946
Independent 1979
Independent 1979
Independent 1966
Independent 1974
Independent 1962
*-year current status was attained, Source (Barry et al, 1984)
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TABLE 2
General Characteristics of Eastern caribbean Islands*
Population
Country Population growth rate
Puerto Rico 3,196,520 1.5%
United States
Virgin Islands 103,000 1.3%
Bdtish Virgin
Islands 13,000 1.6%
Anguilla 7,019 0.5%
Density
per sq kIn
370
291
87
73
Area
sq kIn
8,860
354
150
96
Windward Neth.
Antilles
St. Christopher
and Nevis
Antigua and
Barbuda
Montserrat
GJadeloupe and
I.J2eward Fr. Is.
I))rninica
Martinique
15,479
45,800
80,300
11,900
385,000
77,900
330,000
0.7%
1.3%
0.6%
1.4%
228
175
182
117
216
104
300
68
262
442
102
1,780
750
1,100
St. Lucia 136,800
St. Vincent and
the Grenadines 111,000
Barbados 253,500
Grenada 92,700
Tr inidad and
Tbbag0 1,199,000
2.0%
1.4%
0.2%
0.8%
1.5%
222
285
590
269
234
616
389
430
344
5,128
*Figures are as close to 1985 and 1986 as possible
Sources: The 1986 Caribbean Development Bank Report and
the U.S. Dept. of Commerce International Marketing
Information Series
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European domination began nearly 500 years ago with the
"discovery" by the Spanish. The Dutch, English and French
entered the region in the 17th century as Spanish power
declined (Lewis 1985). On most islands the colonial powers
established a sugar plantation economy based on European
capital and imported African slave labor (Palmer 1985). The
raw product was then exported for refinement and sale in
European markets. During this period, capitalism in the
Caribbean was totally exploitative since its only goal was
to increase the colonial nations' power and wealth (Palmer
1985). In social terms colonial powers put into place the
black-white-brown triangle with the white planter on top,
the black slaves on the bottom and the brown mulatto groups
in between (Lewis 1985). Indigenous peoples such as the
Caribs were forced off the land and driven to near extinc-
tion in many cases (Barry et aI, 1984).
Emancipation followed in the mid-nineteenth century during
which economic control was retained by the European planter.
Generally most of the choice land remained in the European
hands. Many former slaves had little choice but to continue
working for low wages or on their small plots (Lewis 1985).
As the twentieth century approached, agriculture remained
the economic mainstay of the islands. Although each island
is unique in respect to the historical progression of
events, the preceding summary gives a general view of the
events leading up to the twentieth century.
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The Contemporary Eastern Caribbean
The character of the contemporary Eastern Caribbean
continues to be dependent on both its history and outside
powers. Although most of the region's political entities
have gained independence, trade, economic systems, and
political and social institutions are subject to outside
influence. This is in part due to the character of small
island states and the general continental perception of
them. The attributes of insularity and small size relate to
the idea that islands are satellite appendages, frontier
outposts or recreational sites (Towle 1985). The island
states of the Eastern Caribbean also face constraints in
areas such as skilled labor, the natural resource base and
diversification of industrial and agricultural sectors.
The drive for independence gained momentum in the 1960s as
aspirations for sovereignty and economic development spread
among colonies which were also among the least developed
states of the world. As European influence waned in the
1960s North American influence grew in the Caribbean, es-
pecially that of the United States. Although most colonies
have achieved independence, it can be argued that dependence
on the former colonial powers and the United States have
continued to be a major constraint to self-sufficiency and
development (Barry et aI, 1985).
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Most of the Eastern Caribbean island nations, particularly
the small or micro-states, are still considered the least
developed of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the world
(Palmer 1984). Per capita GDP for the LDCs of the region
averaged only 1,110 in 1985 (CDB Report 1986) (see Table 3).
Again history has played a role in dictating the current
status of the region's economy. The early immigrants of the
Caribbean were colonizers, not settlers. Settlers tend to
build institutions which promote long~term development for
the future of their children in areas such as education,
transportation and indigenous industries. Colonizers build
institutions to exploit the region for profits which could
be returned to the metropolitan power (Palmer 1985).
Today foreign capital seeks cheap labor to produce for ex-
port, the function slave labor previously supplied (Palmer
1985). This takes place through Trans National Corporations
(TNCs) and a world economic order which allows for the
practice termed neocolonialism. The Caribbean is considered
as one of the most penetrated by TNCs in the world (Barry et
aI, 1984). It has been argued that foreign capital is
essential because the region's local economies cannot
generate the capital required for public and private
investment (Palmer 1985). It is also seen as strategy for
technology transfer, diversification and employment (Palmer
1985). Yet industries which have located factories in the
15
TABLE 3
Economic Indicators of the Eastern caribbean Region
GOP Per cap. Growth Largest Exports
Country ($rn) GOP rate (GOP) (H, #2, i3)
Puerto Rico 18,671 5,800 1.4% chem,lpetro
prod/pharrn
u.s. Virgin
Islands
British Virgin
Islands
Anguilla
(802) (7,700)
84.5 7,101
(20) (2,800)
0.6%
petro products
fresh fish/sand &
gravel/fruit & veg
lobster/livestock
St. Christopher 67.3 1,469
and Nevis
Antigua and 180.2 2,244
Barbuda
Montserrat 37.1 3,118
Guadeloupe (1,200) (3,500)
Dominica 88.2 1,132
Martinique (1,300) (3,800)
St. Lucia 170.3 1,245
St. Vincent and 102 933
the Grendines
Barbados 1,237 4,894
Grenada 96 961
Trinidad and 7,723 6,538
Tobago
1.0%
6.7%
4.6%
(14%)
3.0%
(13% )
5.8%
3.1%
0.3%
3.7%
3.0%
sugar
manufac goods/
machinery/chern
poly bags/trop
plant/elec parts
bananas/sugar
nnn
bananas/laundry
and toilet soap
petro prod/
bananas/n.un
bananas/coconut
oil/cocoa
bananas/coconut
arrowroot
sugar/elect camp
clothing
cocoa/bananas
nutrreg
petro prod/crude
petroleum
Sources: Caribbean Developnent Bank Report 1986, u.s.
Department of Commerce International Marketing Information
series and Barry et aI, 1984.
() Indicates estimation, all data is taken as close to 1985 as
possible.
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Caribbean are subject to the strength of the industrialized
economies, while a large portion of the profits are often
funneled off by their parent TNCs. The region still suffers
from chronic unemployment and few locally based firms,
resulting in continued dependence on the industrialized
economies.
The agricultural sector of the Caribbean has continued to
be linked to the export of commodities to developed nations
(Barry et aI, 1984). Meanwhile, world prices for commodi-
ties such as sugar declined relative to essential imports of
manufactured goods (Barry et aI, 1984). There has been a
decline in the prices of the 15 leading agricultural com-
modities over the last two decades according to the U.N.
Food and Agriculture Organization (Barry et aI, 1984).
Bananas, of special importance to nations of the Eastern
Caribbean, sold for prices 20 to 40 percent lower in 1980
than in 1960 (Barry et aI, 1984). Although there has been a
recent surge in banana prices, price volatility is another
characteristic of commodities which frustrates planning and
economic development.
Food production for local consumption is also in decline.
This is in part due to the colonial legacy associated with
it, a historical dependence on imports and better access to
retail and wholesale markets of imported foods than for
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local products (Barry et al, 1984). The majority of
Caribbean nations import over 50% of their food while
Trinidad, Barbados and Antigua import over 80% (Barry et al,
1984). In the Commonwealth Caribbean, food per capita
production has dropped in the last 15 years as the region's
population have moved away from farming (Axline 1984). The
stagnation of agriculture and continued low production has
led to dependence on imports of food to feed the local
population (Barry et al, 1984). Although it is arguable
whether the Eastern Caribbean can feed itself, the region
can certainly improve its present performance in domestic
food production.
Tourism has become one of the major strategies for de-
creasing unemployment and trade imbalances. Yet TNCs have
generally controlled development of the sector and the
industry's profits (Barry et al, 1984). The tourist
industry is heavily dependent on imports, taxes already
overburdened infrastructure, and produces impacts on the
physical environment while the employment opportunities it
produces are generally for low-pay and unskilled labor
(Barry 1984).
In addition to economic dependence, the industrialized
nations, especially the United States, have a direct polit-
ical influence within the region. This is evidenced by the
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remaining territories within the region, foreign aid pro-
grams and direct military intervention. The most explicit
illustrations of this control involve multilateral lending
institutions such as the World Bank, the Caribbean Basin
Initiative and the recent invasion of Grenada. The treat-
ment of the Bishop regime and the subsequent invasion of
Grenada in 1983 illustrate the willingness of the United
States to project power when it perceives its interests are
at stake.
Unfortunately the declaration of political independence and
actual economic and political independence are not synony-
mous in the Eastern Caribbean. The factors which were
previously cited illustrate that the region's current state
is a product of outside influences. The strength of these
influences is made more acute because of limited natural
resources in the region. Due to the sudden rise in oil
prices and the economic slow down in industrial nations,
most of the region's nations showed negative growth rates in
real per capita GNP during the 1970s (Palmer 1984). Table
4 illustrates the growth in percentage distribution imports
of food and fuels during this period. As economic health
returned to the industrialized nations during 1985, GDP
growth approached 5% in many of the nations in question (CDB
Report 1986). The region's economic fortunes are not only
tied to the industrial powers, but are subject to much
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TABLE 4
Economic Indicators of Selected Eastern caribbean Nations
GrCMth Rate Percentage Distribution
of real rnP of Imports
per capita Food Mineral Fuels
Country 1970-1978 1960-69 74-76 1960-69 74-76
Barbados 2.1% 24.3% 21.3% 8.0% 15.0%
St. Lucia 2.3% 23.7% 24.5% 2.6% 7.7%
Grenada -1.8% 27.6% *40.6% 4.8% *8.5%
St. Vincent -1.8% 27.5% 31.3% 3.2% 6.2%
Dominica -3.4% 27.5% 32.3% 2.8% 6.5%
Antigua -3.1% 19.0% 17.7% 17.7% 44.2%
*1974 only
Sources: Problems of Developnent (Palmer 1984)
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greater variance due to their peripheral status. Table 5
illustrates that imports have continued to be high relative
to GNP and exports in the 1980s. 'rhe region's external
resource dependence has resulted in a chronic balance of
payments crisis because each of the nations in question
imports more than it exports (Palmer 1985). The persistent
gap in relative economic wealth between the United States
and the region is in part the result of external dependence
and the peripheral economic status of the Eastern Caribbean
nations (Palmer 1985).
Foreign fishing is a specific example of continued exploita-
tion and dominance by outside influences in the region. One
of the major reasons for generally unobstructed foreign
fishing and the lack of a local swordfish fishery is the
economic status of the region. The management skills, in-
frastructure and institutions required for the development
and management of the islands' fishing zones are only now
being developed. The situation has resulted in a United
St~t~s perspective, rangin~ fro~ negl~ct on th~ part 6~th~
U.S. government to open exploitation by U.S. fishery
participants.
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'fABLE 5
The Eastern Caribbean: ~rts as a Percen~age of Gross
National Product; Exports as a Percentage of Imports
ImfOrts (CIF') EXfOrts of Goods
GOP at Market Prices ~ts of Goods
Country Year Year Year Year
Barbados 1977-79 62% 1986 52% 1977-79 33% 1986 41%
St. Lucia 1975-76 93% 1985 71% 1975-76 37% 1985 43%
Grenada 1974-76 68% 1986 80% 1974-76 51% 1986 34%
St. Vincent 1975-76 87% 1986 92% 1975-76 32% 1986 73%
DOminica 1975-76 69% 1980 135% . 1975-76 56% 1980 20%
Antigua 1975-76 108% 1982 77% 1975-76 39% 1982 19%
Sources: Problems of Development (Palmer 1984, pp. 50-54),
Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for
the United States U.S. Department of Commerce,
Fisheries Devel6pmeQtin borniriica (Mitchell and
Gold 1983)
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CHAPTER II
EASTERN CARIBBEAN FISHERIES AND MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS
Eastern Caribbean Fisheries
Physical and Biological Constraints
The geography of the Eastern Caribbean region is char-
acterized by a large ocean area and the Lesser Antillean
island chain. The relatively small and primarily volcanic
islands stretch 450 miles from the U.S. Virgin Islands to
Venezuela. These islands form the semi-enclosed eastern
boundary between the Caribbean Sea to the west and curve out
into the Atlantic Ocean to the east (Figure 1). These
characteristics might lead one to conclude that the magni-
tude of the region's fisheries resources is considerable.
Unfortunately this is not true due to a variety of physical
factors.
The physical factors which account for the high productivity
of the world's major fishing 9roun~s are largely absent from
the Eastern Caribbean region. Extensive shelf areas where
nutrients may accumulate and where light can penetrate to
the ocean floor to support primary productivity are not a
common feature of tropical island chains (Idyll 1971, Gold
et aI, 1984). The islands of the region are characterized
by narrow shelf areas that give way to ocean depths greater
23
Figure Hap of the Eastern Caribbean Source (Appeldoorn 1986)
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than 1,800 meters (Gold et aI, 1984). Another factor
involves the small degree of temperature fluctuation of the
region's tropical climate. This enables the thermocline,
which separates warm nutrient poor surface water from lower
nutrient rich layers, to persist throughout the year (Idyll
1983). Therefore seasonal mixing which triggers the bloom-
ing of plant life in temperate regions is absent resulting
in relatively unproductive waters (Idyll 1983). The Eastern
Caribbean also lacks zones of upwelling of deep nutrient
rich waters which is required for plant growth.
Finally, except on its southern perimeter, the region lacks
runoff of major rivers from major land masses which contain
the sediments and nutrients required for higher levels of
productivity (Kenny 1983). Primary productivity studies
yielded levels of 50 to 100 grams of carbon per meter per
year in the Caribbean Sea as compared to levels of 500 gm/m
in the major fishing grounds of the Atlantic (Kenny 1983).
These levels are comparable to the world's oceans most
barren areas·while it hasbeeri· report~d.byMargalefthatthe.
mean off-shore levels in the region may be lower (Kenny
1983). The United Nations Development Programme, with the
Food Agriculture Organization, undertook a major exploratory
fishing program from 1965 through 1971. The fisheries
resources of the Eastern Caribbean were reported to be
inadequate .for the development of large scale commercial
operations (Goodwin 1987).
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The physical environment further limits fishing due to the
strong northeast trade winds which affect the activity of
smaller fishing vessels during much of the year (Idyll
1971). Hurricanes which occur from June to October also
restrict fishing activities (Idyll 1971).
Ciquatera or tropical fish poisoning is yet another con-
straint of Eastern Caribbean fisheries development.
According to Olsen and Wood, ciquatera has been implicated
in 50% of fish species and 56% of landings by weight in the
u.s. Virgin Islands (Goodwin 1985). The problem is particu-
larly acute in the northern part of the region in large reef
fishes caught in areas less than 30 fathoms (Goodwin 1985).
The n.euroto.xin which causes the poisoning is synthesized by
a dinoflagellate which colonizes damaged coral surfaces
(Caddy 1981). The toxin is then transferred through the
food chain by herbivorous fish that feed on the reef (Caddy
1981). The potentially life-threatening symptoms constitute
a major obstacle to marketing of these species due to the
ri~k of poisoriing (G~odwin19$5).: ~urrentiy ther~ is no
field method which can detect the toxin in marine organisms.
The Fishing Industry
Although these factors illustrate the limitations associated
with the resource base, the fisheries resources which are
present can have significant impact on the small island
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scale (Goodwin 1985). A general breakdown of the resource
and associated environment include the nearshore demersal
reef fishes, the deepwater demersal fishes, pelagic fishes
and benthic bottom-dwelling invertebrates such as conch and
spiny lobster (Goodwin 1985).
Nearshore demersal fishery
The nearshore demersal fishery targets on bottom-dwelling
species which are concentrated in shallow reef areas.
Species diversity is very high in reef areas. The habitat
is among the most complex ecosystems in the world with a
rich web of interrelationships among its inhabitants. Over
300 species are associated with these areas, of which 180
species are utilized in the fishery (Goodwin 1985). Some of
the most common fishes found in reef and inshore areas
include: wrasses, triggerfish, snapper, grouper, angelfish,
jacks, mullet, grunts, croakers and many more. Although
coral reefs are some of the most productive marine areas in
the world, fishery production is limited by the usable
bioma~s present and the li~ited shel£ area~ of the islands.
The inshore fishery is difficult to assess in respect to
sustainable yields due to its multispecies character and the
lack of landings data from the region. Yet there is general
agreement that most of the region's inshore stocks are
beyond maximum exploitation levels (Goodwin 1985; Wilson
1987, Caribbean Fishery Management Council 1985).
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The conch fishery is second only to lobster in pound-for-
pound value and only second to fin fish as a component of
local diets (Goodwin 1985). Conch are seldom found in
depths below 30 meters. Its vulnerability to captur.e, high
economic value and the recent introduction of SCUBA as a
fishing method have contributed to its over-exploitation in
most parts of the region (Goodwin 1985).
The highest valued fishery species in the region is spiny
lobster (Goodwin 1985). It is heavily exploited throughout
the region necessitating management measures such as minimum
carapace size, restriction of berried lobsters and possibly
reductions in effort before over-exploitation becomes more
acute. R~gional cooperatioD may become an important factor
in spiny lobster management due to its larval stages which
may last up to six months (Goodwin 1985). The dispersion of
larvae while they inhabit the water column means that
recruitment of one island may be dependent on adult popu-
lations of another locale (Goodwin 1985).
The deepwater demersal fishery
Deepwater demersal species are found at depths of 60 meters
to 27 meters on the edge of shelf areas (Goodwin 1985). The
distinction between the inshore and deepwater stocks is made
by the fishing gear utilized in this zone and a general
transition in the occurrence of species. The inshore
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artisanal trap fishery generally changes to handline or
vertical longline techniques in deepwater areas (Goodwin
1985). The dominant target species in this area are snapper
and grouper. Although these areas are considered to be
under-exploited at present, they are thought to be sensitive
to fishing pressure and present limited potential (Goodwin
1985).
The pelagic fishery
On most Eastern Caribbean islands pelagic species make up
the largest component of total landings. The seasonal
flying fish fishery of Barbados and the dolphin associated
with it is the one largest fisheries of the region. Fish-
ermen also capture small tunas, yellowfin tuna, albacore,
billfish and, to a lesser degree, sharks with handlines and
by trolling lines. Although greater potential landings are
possible, the lack of more precise estimates of abundance
and sustainable yields are constraints to further develop-
ment (Goodwin 1985). One estimate states that in the Lesser
Antilles 6nly 5,000 of a potential 2~,OnO tons of tuna
species are taken (Marcille and Caddy 1985). Martinique,
Guadeloupe, Barbados, St. Lucia and St. vincent participate
in an artisanal fishery for these species, and are respons-
ible for most of the landings. Venezuela is the only
regional nation which has developed an industrial tuna
fishery with landings estimated at 5,000 tons of yellowfin
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and skipjack in the Caribbean Sea alone (Marcille and Caddy
1985). Highly migratory tuna and billfish stocks are also
taken by foreign fishing operations. However., the wide-
ranging nature of the Asiatic fleets of Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan results in annual variations in effort and landings
within a given area. Catches of longline tuna and marlin by
Asiatic fleets in the Caribbean and Lesser Antilles Zone
were quite low at approximately 500-1000 tons (Marcille and
Caddy 1985). These figures are highly speculative in re-
spect to amount and location, but they are illustrative of a
probable range of resource limitations.
Fishing gear
Most fishing operations pf the Eastern Caribbean can be
characterized as artisanal. Vessels are generally either
traditional canoes, which are shaped and hollowed from logs
ranging in length from 12 to 15 feet, or double-ended
"whalers" with a length of 20 to 30 feet (Goodwin 1985).
Outboard motors are used for propulsion except in southern
. .' .
parts of the region whefedinghies may be powet~d by sails
(Goodwin 1985). In inshore areas Antillean fish traps are
used to target on reef species. Bottom handlines made up of
monofilament line and baited hooks are also used on shelf
areas (Goodwin 1985). Trammel nets are nonselective en-
tanglement gear which is set in shallow reef areas. Since a
wide variety of fish including juveniles and undesirable
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fish are caught, its effects on resource health are poten-
tially serious (Goodwin 1985). Beach seines are a tradi-
tional gear type used in near shore areas to capture
pelagics passing nearby (Goodwin 1985). Trolling lines are
used for pelagic species from a running or drifting boat.
Gillnets are also used for pelagic species especially flying
fish (Goodwin 1985). Vessels generally operate without
haulers for traps or longlines and without depth sounders.
There are very few larger modern vessels which could be
considered industrial operating from GEeS states. In the
French Islands, U.S. territories, Trinidad and the Barbados
flying fish fishery, many of the operations have developed
beyond basic artisanal capabilities, yet are not on the
scale of industrial operations in respect to capital and
equipment.
Status and Development of the Industry
The fisheries of the Eastern Caribbean can be generally
classified as labor intensive as opposed to highly capital-
ized operations. Therefore employm~ntis a major consid-
eration for the industry. Small-scale fishing activities of
the region tend to be marginal operations resulting in less
disposable income than in other occupations (Goodwin 1985).
For these reasons fishing may not be considered a prestig-
ious job. The recent development of light manufacturing and
service industries such as tourism have produced employment
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opportunities which might be considered more respectable.
These factors contribute to the large percentage of part-
time fishermen working in the industry (Goodwin 1985 [see
Table 7]).
The lack of available capital for greater investment in the
industry and the introduction of new fishing technologies
are often stressed in development efforts. Yet the basic
artisanal methods, combined with some modern adaptations
such as outboard motors, have been ample to over-exploit
most inshore stocks (Goodwin 1985). It also should be noted
that traditional fishing methods are well adapted to local
conditions, constraints and culture. In the case of
currently under-exploited resource~, care should be taken in
the increase of fishing effort and the transfer of tech-
nology foreign to the region. First the resource base may
be limited and easily over-exploited, resulting in the same
problem currently being faced with most inshore resources.
Second, the technology or methods may not be appropriate in
resp~ctto the local econo~y, 6ulture and conditions. Many
fishermen currently operating maiginal enterprises cannot
afford to risk limited resources on technology which is
unproven within their range of experiences (Goodwin 1985).
Many of the fishery resources of the Eastern Caribbean are
limited and at or beyond maximum levels of exploitation.
Although the accuracy of the fishery statistics in Table 6
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TABLE 6
Nominal Catch by Country in the Eastern Caribbean
(All landings given in metric tons)
Country Years
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Puerto 3197 3597 2537 1784 2202 2655 2354 1496 1327
Rico 2802a
USVI 557 547 669 634 883 611 680 600 640F
1667a
BVI 318R 318R 318R 318R 318R 318R 318R 318R 318R
607b 680c 667b
Anguilla
740d
St 1700 1700 1850 1880 1880 1100 1300F 1500 1500F
Kits & Nevis 1500e 973f
Antg 3313 2469 2444 2439 2004 2246 2246R 2246R 2246R
Barbuda 2000f 1700f 1400f 1100f 800f
Montserant 100 102 109 104 111 111R l11R 11lR l1lR
55f
Guad 9000F 8500F 8000F 8300F 8240 8826 8940 8390F 8500F
Domnica 1070 642 1445 1514 1545 lOOOF 500P 446 450F
1070h 950i· 625f
Martn 4375 4664 4891F 4700F 5500F 5107F 5147F 4604F 5000F
st Lucia 2600 1024 969 891 921 910 946 1052 840
2700k 1772f
2600j
St Vincent 698 547 547R 547R 547R 547R 547R 547R 547R
1600m 1700f
Barbados 3884 4516 3808 3528 3579 6648 . 5913 3915 4223
66001
Grenada 2063 1464 1387 718 960 1473 1501 1584 2328
2908f 4085f 1500n
Trind 4823 3840 4461 3804 4574 4240 3593 2862 3000
Tobag
Total 37698 33162 33264 34096 31030
Sources: FAD, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, 1986, FAa Rome, (All first
line entries adjacent to country name), R-Repetition of data
previously reported by country or area. F-FAO estimate from
available sources of information. Other references given after
Table 7.
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are questionable, it illustrates that total landings may
have peaked and may actually be dropping. Nearly half of
the fish consumed in the Lesser Antilles is imported (Idyll
1981) as shown in Table 7. The region must now examine
methods of better management of its resources through the
identification of priorities and goals and the building of
management institutions to carry them out. Improvements are
also required in areas such as infrastructure and marketing,
field staff and training, regulation, monitoring programs
and enforcement (Goodwin 1985). The development of under-
utilized resources should be undertaken with caution in
respect to technology and potential impacts on stocks.
Although the resource base of the Eastern Caribbean region
is limited, its fishery resources have the potential to make
a greater contribution to local development in respect to
balance of payments, employment and nutrition (Goodwin
1985). Industry constraints and potential benefits must be
considered as the region's island nations attempt to manage
adjacent pelagic resources.
Regional Organizations
There are several regional and subregional organizations
which are active in the economy and fisheries of the Eastern
Caribbean. The island states of the region have character-
istics such as small size, dependence on e~ternal influences
and a limited resource base. These factors may encourage a
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TABLE 7
Fisheries Statistics for Eastern C~ribbean Nations
Count.ry No. Vessels Landings Imports Exports Per Cap.
Fishermen (mt) (mt) (mt) kgjyr
P.R. fa 1872 1449 2802 24454 9
USVI la 578 237 1667 2590 26
BVI Ib 9lft75pt 123 667 416 520 32
Anguilla
Id,e lSOftlOOpt 122 980 740 24
St Kitts Nevis
If 267ft283pt 283 974 850 39
Antigua Barbuda
If.g 1100 350 800 500 350 31.5
Montserrat
If 20ftl80pt 80 55 221
Dominica
If,i 1300 640 625 260 0 15.1
St. Lucia
If,j 1000ftlOOOpt 600 1772 500 0 26.4
Barbados
II 1600 618 6600 3600 30 40.4
St Vincent
If,m 2750ft2750ot 537 1700 200 550 11
Grenada
ff,n 560ft840pt 700 1500 920 750 14.9
ft-full-time fishermen, pt-part-time fishermen, - no data
a CFMC, 1985
b Gold et al., 1985
c Caddy, 1981
d Olsen and Ogden, 1984
e Gold et al., 1984
f Goodwin, 1985
g FAO. Antigua Country Profile 1986
h Mitchell, 1983
i FAO, Dominica Country Profile 1984
j FAO, St Lucia Country Profile 1985
k Mitchell et al., 1982
1 FAO, Barbado? Oountry Profile 1984
m FAO, St Vincent Country Profile 1986
n FAO, Grenada Country Profile 1987
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regional unified approach toward common problems involving
trade and management. Although common characteristics,
especially geography, promote such action, the states of the
Caribbean as a whole and those of the Eastern Caribbean in
particular are not homogenous. Factors related to history,
current trading partners, individual island state site-
specific conditions and goals underscore the diversity
present in the region. The French islands of Guadeloupe and
Martinique provide an example of the limitations of regional
action based on geography. Although they are located in the
middle of the region, due to strong ties with France, they
have remained outside the regional institutions formed by
the former British colonies of the Caribbean. Regional
groupings and action are often cited as one of the few
alternatives of small developing states although the results
of such programs are mixed at best. The following is a
review of the regional organizations which are especially
relevant to the fishing industry of the Eastern Caribbean.
Table 8 indicates participation of political entities in the
region.
CARICOM
For the wider Caribbean, The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
is the main economic regional organization. CARICOM evolved
from The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) which
eliminated most tariff barriers between most nations and
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TABLE 8
Partici~tion of Eastern Caribbean States in Regional
Organi zations
country OECS
Puerto Rico
United States
Virgin Island
British Virgin
Islands
Anguilla
St Kitts and
Nevis
Netherlands
Antilles
Antigua and
Barbuda
t1:>ntserrat
Guadeloupe
[):)minica
Martinique
St Lucia
Barbados
St Vincent
Grenada
Trindad and
Tobago
associate
member
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
X
CFMC - Caribbean Fisheries Management COuncil
X - Member
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territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean (Payne 1984). To
advance regional integration, the Treaty of Chaguaramas was
signed in July of 1973 (Payne 1984). According to Payne the
goals of CARICOM involve three basic areas:
"The first is the furtherance of regional economic
integration by the establishment of a common market;
the second is the expansion of functional co-operation
in such fields as health, education transport and
meteorology; and the third is the co-ordination of
foreign policy among the fully independent states of
the Community" (Payne 1984, 128).
The international economic crisis of the 1970s deeply
affected the economies of the region. This led to tension
within the association caused by bilateral economic arrange-
ments between relatively wealthy Latin American countries
and impoverished member states, and import restrictions even
among member states (Payne 1984). Integration has continued
to be plagued by political forces such as the balance of
power between member states, the ideological question con-
cerned with the meaning of economic development, and
rivalries and conflicts between heads of government in the
region (Payne 1984).
Intra-CARICOM trade is low relative to both the total
trade of Member States and intra-regional trade among other
regional groupings of developing nations. In 1980 intra-
regional trade accounted for 8% of the total trade of
CARICOM members (McIntyre 1984). The weak production
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structure, limited resource base, and the resulting lack of
complementary production contribute to the low levels of
intra-regional trade (McIntyre 1984). However, the region
has potential to utilize CARICOM as a mechanism to reduce
imports, especially in the case of food and consumer goods
through the coordination and integration of commodity
production (Payne 1984).
In the case of fisheries CARICOM members can trade in fish
free of customs duties (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983). The role
of CARICOM in regional fisheries development was highlighted
by its third Technical Fisheries Conference in March of
1985. Topics of intended involvement which were discussed
included: insurance; training, aquaculture ~esearch center;
research, development and promotion of fishery products;
safety measures; resource assessment; intra-regional
cooperation; inter-agency coordination; and protection and
development of Exclusive Economic Zones (Goodwin 1985).
CARICOM intends to collaborate with OECS and FAO in the
areas cited above. The organization's role in the region's
fisheries has been questioned due to the differing goals,
needs and potentials of CARICO, member states, especially
between the smaller Eastern Caribbean states and other
members (Goodwin 1985).
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WECAFC and FAa
In 1973 the Western Central Fisheries Commission (WECAFC)
was established as a regional commission of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Edeson and
Pulvenis 1983). The Statutes of WECAFC state that its
objectives include the following:
"promoting and assisting in the collection of national
statistics relating to fisheries, and the compilation
and dissemination of statistical data on a regional
basis; facilitating the co-ordination of national
research programmes and standardization of research
methods; promoting the exchange of information relating
to fisheries in the region; promoting and co-ordinating
studies on environment protection and fisheries;
promoting and assisting the development of aquaculture
and stock improvement; encouraging education and
training; assisting member countries in establishing
national policies for the development and utilization
of fishery resources and promoting and co-ordinating
international aid to achieve these objectives. (Cited
in Goldet aI, 1984, 82.) .
The region includes the Caribbean, Northern South America to
five degrees north, Central America north of the Panama
Canal Entry, the coast of North America including the Gulf
of Mexico and southeastern United States to 35 degrees north
(Edeson and Pulvenis 1983). WECAFC and The United Nations
Food Agriculture Organization (FAa) have been involved in a
wide variety of fisheries development projects in the
Caribbean focused in areas such as development of under-
exploited stocks, training, utilization of existing catches,
management of heavily exploited stocks and promoting
harmonization of fisheries legislation in the region (Gold
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1984). The large size of the WF.CAFC region necessitates
action in conjunction with UNDP/FAO and other United Nations
agencies on a sub-regional level. Other United Nations
agencies involved in Caribbean ocean management include the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization/International Oceanographic Commission
(UNESCO/lOC) and The United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP) with its Regional Seas Program (Goodwin 1985).
lCCAT
During the period following the second world war there was
rapid expansion of tuna fisheries throughout the world.
Concern over potential production and continued viability of
. tUha stocks prompted hations and related industrie~' to
establish international organizations for research and
management of highly migratory species (Joseph 1983). The
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tuna (lCCAT) entered into force in 1969 under the Inter-
national Convention of the same name (Edeson and Pulvenis
1983). According to Article IV,
"The principal objective of the Convention is to study
populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes (including
billfish), and such other fishes exploited in tuna
fishing in the Convention area not under investigation
by another international fishery organization" (Edeson
and Pulvenis 1983, 7).
The main aim of the convention is conservation of these
species throughout the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas
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(Edeson and Pulvenis 1983). ICCAT is constrained by the
lack of funding for a permanent staff, data acquisition and
the timely formulation of management advice (Joseph and
Greenough 1979). It does not conduct its own research, but
depends on member nations to analyze data. The Caribbean is
included within this area although none of the nations of or
bordering the Eastern Caribbean, other than the united
States and Venezuela, have signed or deposited instruments
of ratification or adherence (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).
OECS
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was
established by formal treaty in 1981. The OECS evolved from
the West Indies Associated States Council as most members
achieved independence and perceived a need for a new
mechanism to promote cooperation (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983).
The main goal of OECS is political and economic integration
of the region's member states. A regional strategy for the
Eastern Caribbean is a rational answer to constraints such
as the small size of its island nations, limited resource
base and external dependence on capital, trade and security
(Palmer 1984). Therefore member states have made an effort
aimed toward the pooling of resources through the harmoniza-
tion and coordination of economic and foreign policies where
their interests converge (Palmer 1984). The general areas
of proposed cooperation are: international, economic and
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political relations; domestic economic and financial rela-
tions, including matters relating to the sea and its
resources; the judiciary; mutual defense and security; and
education, training and cultural relations (Emmanuel 1984).
To date, the areas of greatest integration are the jUdiciary
and currency systems while there has been little progress in
the areas of diplomatic representation and defense and
security (Emmanuel 1984). The GECS countries suffer from
many of the same problems which plague CARICGM such as the
lack of trained managers, a limited resource base, depend-
ence on imports and the lack of indigenous capital.
In November of 1988, the Windward Islands of GECS, including
Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, agreed to move
forward on plans for a political union (The Daily News
1988). The Leeward Islands of the GECS - St. Kitts,
Montserrat and Antigua - have not joined in the initiative
although they may join in the future if they wish (The Daily
News 1988). The four windward islands are closely grouped
geographically and have been the most active of the GECS in
formulation of the political union. Further integration of
this type has the potential to be a positive development in
coordination of fisheries policies.
GECS is active in development of the Eastern Caribbean's
fisheries resources. GECS plans to work closely with
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CARl COM in the development of its programs (Goodwin 1985).
OECS has also been a participant in FAO workshops involving
the harmonization of fisheries legislation and fisheries
development in the Lesser Antilles (Goodwin 1985). An OECS
fisheries desk has also been established in St. Vincent for
the provision of technical services to member states and the
collection of fisheries statistics in the Eastern Caribbean.
The OECS fisheries desk is currently working on a regional
approach to foreign fishing within member states' zones of
national jurisdiction (Blok per. com. 1988).
Other Organizations
In the field of oceanography, The International Oceano-
graphic Commission promotes cooperative international marine
research. Its projects include the support of research for
projects involving snappers and groupers, lobster migration
and turtle stocks (Idyll 1981).
The Caribbean Fisheries Management Council (CFMA) based in
Puerto Rico is the principal agency involved with United
States fisheries management in the U.S. territories of
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Their work has
involved management of reef fisheries, lobster and input
concerning U.s. swordfish management.
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Finally the Gulf and Caribbean Fisheries Institute has met
for 40 years, bringing together U.S. and Caribbean scien-
tists, administrators and industrialists (Idyll 1981).
Papers and sessions include a wide range of topics concerned
with fisheries of the region. The special topic at last
year's meeting involved the swordfish fishery which has been
recently developed in the region.
Although the OECS is the principal institution involved in
the management of the swordfish fishery of the region, all
of the organizations mentioned are required for management
both within and outside the region. Stock management and
benefit distribution are dependent on the coordination of
these agencies in data collection, evaluation, information
dissemination and regulation. These organizations must be
utilized to match the wide biological range of highly
migratory pelagics to the political range of fishery
participants and resource adjacent states involved in the
fishery.
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CHAPTER III
SWORDFISH FISHERY BACKGROUND
During the early 1980s, the swordfish fishery of the North-
west Atlantic was undergoing rapid expansion due to the
relaxing of U.S. mercury regulations in 1978 and growing
consumer demand for the product. These factors encouraged
the expansion of effort and range of U.S. swordfish opera-
tions. A perceived trend toward declining stocks and issues
associated with fishing outside traditionally fished areas
have made the swordfish fishery one of the most controver-
sial fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic.
This chapter will examine the characteristics which make the
management of the swordfish fishery inherently difficult as
the geographic range of U.S. operations has expanded.
Swordfish Biology
Swordfish, Xiphias gladius, range throughout most of the
temperate and tropical waters of the world between roughly
45 degrees north to 45 degrees south latitude (Conser et
aI, 1985b). In the Atlantic, swordfish generally occur
throughout this zone with concentrations in the Northwest
Atlantic along the east coast of the United States and
Canada, in the South Atlantic along the South American
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coast, and in the Eastern Atlantic off the west coast of
Spain and in the Mediterranean Sea (Beardsley 1979).
Although their distribution is considered to be continuous
with no clear-cut dividing line between these areas of
concentration, no movement among the areas in question has
been documented with the limited number of tag recaptures
which have been recorded up to 1985. This suggests the
possibility of separate stocks in the three areas although
it is more likely that at least limited interchange occurs
between these groups (Conser et aI, 1985b).
In the Northwest Atlantic, swordfish inhabit waters from
Newfoundland to Northern South America. Seasonal shifts of
different age groups have shown central movements which are
dominantly south-north (Hoey and Casey 1983b). Larger size
groups generally move further north and east than those fish
of smaller age groups. All groups show a tendency toward
northern movement in the summer and southern movement in the
winter (SAFMC 1985). Swordfish can be highly migratory in
nature as indicated by tag and recapture of individuals
which have travelled several thousand miles. This does not
mean that the entire population migrates long distances.
Some elements of the population occur year-round in specific
areas, and different age groups may migrate to different
degrees as mentioned above (SAFMC 1985). Distribution and
seasonal migration are dependent on temperature, feed
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availability and spawning (SAFMC 1985). Swordfish are
opportunistic feeders which favor cephalopods (squids) and a
variety of fish species including juvenile swordfish.
Swordfish are often found in greater concentrations where
favorable conditions exist although they are generally
classified as a solitary fish. Areas which sustain the
greatest fishing effort are the edge of continental shelves
and along ocean frontal zones where swordfish forage is most
abundant, such as the edge of the Gulf Stream off the east-
ern United States. This is probably a reflection of the
swordfish's somewhat narrow horizontal distribution (SAFMC
1985).
Larval studies have shown concentrations of occurrences in
the east-central Gulf of Mexico, Straits of Florida and the
Eastern Caribbean. Swordfish larvae have been collected
throughout the year in the Northwest Atlantic with the
greatest concentrations during the fall and winter (Grall et
aI, 1981). In the Caribbean Sea the greatest number of
larval swordfish have been collected from November to
February (Berkeley and Houde 1980). Swordfish are continu-
ous pulse spawners with most spawning activity occurring
during March and April. The estimated fecundity of sword-
6 7fish ranges from lxlO to 2.6xlO eggs which are released
into the water column (SAFMC 1985).
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Swordfish exhibit growth differentiation according to sex.
Females grow faster than males after age two and attain a
larger size. In Florida the largest aged female weighed
over 300 kg compared to the largest males which weighed less
than 140 kg (Berkeley and Houde 1985). Males reach repro-
ductive maturity at approximately three years of age with a
lower jaw fork length (LJFL) equal to 126 em and a dressed
weight of 17 kg, while females reach reproductive maturity
at five years of age with a LJFL of 151 em and a dressed
weight near 28.8 kg (SAFMC 1985).
History of th~ Fishery
In 1962 the dominant gear strategy utilized in the Northwest
Atlantic swordfish fishery changed from harpoon to longline
gear. This change was associated with a dramatic increase
in swordfish landings from 2,500 MT to a high of over 8,000
MT round weight in 1963 (SAFMC 1985). This figure droped
off and stabilized around 5,000 MT on an annual basis until
1970 (Caddy 1976). During this period, the fishery was
dominated by Canadian participants who accounted for 80-95%
of landings in the Northwest Atlantic. The size composition
of the catch was marked by a trend toward smaller fish from
an average dressed weight of 90.7 kg in 1963 to 45.4 kg in
1971 (Beckett 1971). This decline has been attributed to
the change in gear strategy from harpoons, which take larger
fish.to longline~. which are less selective, and the
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expansion of fishing grounds to southern areas where smaller
fish make up a greater percentage of the population (Caddy
1976). Harpoon effort generally decreased during this
period, while longlining effort increased from under six
million hooks when landings were at their peak to six to
seven million in 1970 (Caddy 1976). Landings which were
maintained around 5,000 MT in the later 1960's depended on
increased fishing effort and expansion into new fishing
grounds. The fishery subsequently collapsed after the
imposition of mercury regulations in 1971 (Beckett 1971).
Since 1956, the Japanese have carried out a pelagic longline
fishery in the Atlantic targeting on tuna (Fox 1971).
Swordfish landings from this fishery were incigental because
sets were usually made during the daytime when swordfish are
least likely to feed. According to ICCAT, annual landings
of incidental by-catch were around 1,800 MT during the late
1960s.
In 1971, the FDA issued guidelines which limited the concen-
trations of mercury in swordfish to 0.5 ppm. A positive
correlation between mercury concentration and swordfish body
weight was found to exist; generally the larger the fish,
the larger the concentration of mercury. Since few fish
could meet ~he standards, the 1970s were characterized by
clandestin~ fishing operations. Fishermen were afraid of
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losses to impoundment if the FDA sampled their fish (SAFMC
1985). Therefore, little is known about the fishery during
this time period although average size and CPUE were
reported to increase as expected after 1970 (Caddy 1976).
In 1978 the FDA restr.ictions were challenged and raised to
1.0 ppm. This action encouraged a dramatic growth in
fishing effort and expansion to new areas in the fishery.
In 1982 Canadian landings were calculated to be approxi-
mately 2,500 MT while u.s. landings had reached approxi-
mately 4,100 MT (SAFMC 1985). Figure 2 illustrates the
areas of longline effort concentration during this period.
Fishin~ Methods
Swordfish are taken by harpoon, entanglement gear, hand-
lines, rod and reel, and longline. Longlines take the
majority of the u.s. commercial catch and are the primary
gear strategy which is employed in the Eastern Caribbean.
Swordfish exploitation began as a commercial longline
fishery in the U.S. in the early 1960s off the Northeast
coast, although it has been practiced by both the Cubans and
Japanese since the 1950s.
The three principal types of longline strategies are the New
England, Florida and Cuban methods although the artisanal
Cuban method is rarely used today (Berkeley et aI, 1981).
The general fishing method can be characterized by the
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following description. Longlines of up to 40 miles are set
in the evening and retrieved the next morning by vessels
which usually range from 50-85 feet in length (Berkeley et
aI, 1981). The preferred area for sets are ocean frontal
areas which are the border areas between zones of different
physical characteristics such as the edge of the Gulf
Stream. In the Caribbean, sets are commonly made in areas
adjacent to shelf areas where the depth may be 1,000 feet or
more. Swordfish longlining takes plac~ at night due to the
nocturnal feeding habits of the species. Hooks are baited
with squid or mackerel and spaced along the main line every
200 to 300 feet (Berkeley et al, 1981). The main line is
suspended below the surface with floats which may be made up
of inflatable olyethylene balls at a predetermined depth
. '.
which vaiies around 10 to 20 meters (Campos et al, 1985),
although adjustments are frequently made according to con-
ditions. The gang ions which are suspended from the mainline
vary in length from 10 to 40 meters also depending on condi-
tions. Strobe lights and radar reflectors or high flyers
are attached to the main line everyone to one-and one-half
miles (See Figure 3). The gangions, floats, and high flyers
are all attached to the mainline with stainless steel "snap-
on" connectors (Berkeley et aI, 1981). The mainline is made
up of 700-pound test monofilament while the gangion line has
400-pound test monofilament line (McLain per. com. August
1986). Cyalume chemical lights are suspended 10 to 15 feet
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Figure 3 Longline gear types for swordfish
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above the bait with elastic or rubber bands for swordfish
attraction (Berkeley et aI, 1981). These lights are thought
to resemble glowing squid. The hooks are big game fish
hooks ranging in size from 8/0 to 12/0 (Campos et aI, 1985).
Haulback is usually accomplished hydraulically with a
longline hauler or reel on which the main line is wound
(Berkeley et aI, 1981). Gear clipped to the mainline is
then detached and fish are taken aboard as the mainline is
retrieved. Swordfish are dressed immediately and stored on
ice which is made from salt water. Dressing is accomplished
by removal of the head, fins, entrails and tail. This
routine is repeated daily until the boat has the catch
required to fill the hold or to make the venture economical-
ly viable. This means that a trip may last up to three
weeks with catches ranging from 10,000 to 30,000 pounds per
trip. There are variations to the preceding description in
gangion spacing, depths, bait, floats and catches which
depend primarily on vessel size and local conditions, but
most methods and gear are similar to what has been described
above.
Most of the operations in the Caribbean are characterized by
a hybrid of New England and Florida methods. New England
boats, especially those fishing in the Caribbean, are larger
allowing them to travel greater distances, make longer sets
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and spend greater periods of time away from port. Many of
the Florida vessels are smaller in size because they usually
fish areas where the Gulf Stream comes within 15 miles of
shore, or in the Gulf, and make shorter trips of two to
three days. The utilization of longer sets and larger
vessels characteristic of New England and of Florida gear
sets which utilize monofilament line, deeper fishing depths
and greater spacing of gangions have been the predominate
gear strategy operating in the Eastern Caribbean.
The Cuban method is rarely used today although it may be
useful for adaptation by Eastern Caribbean artisanal
fishermen, especially in areas where the shelf edge is near
shore. Unlike the former methods, the sets were approxi-
mately four miles, which is relatively short, and done from
smaller vessels of around 30 feet. These vessels were not
equipped with the electronic instrumentation which is common
to most longline vessels currently operating. Lanterns were
utilized instead of cyalume lights for swordfish attraction
and for indication of when a fish is hooked. The set was
checked for fish throughout the night so that fish were
taken soon after becoming hooked, resulting in less loss due
to sharks. Retrieval was accomplished by hand instead of
hydraulically. Fish were then preserved on ice or by
covering with a wet tarp. Trips were usually limited to one
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night, thereby limiting the effective range of the operation
in comparison to the other two methods (Berkeley 1982).
The utilization of larger New England boats and Florida
methods and gear has been a successful combination in the
Eastern Caribbean, as evidenced by the growing number of
vessels which visit the area each year. The fishery can be
described as lucrative for the longliner in supplying
swordfish dockside for prices approaching four to five
dollars per pound (Rolon per. com. August 1986) while sold
in the U.s. for prices approaching $12.00 per pound
depending on location and season. Commercially viable
concentrations are present in the Eastern Caribbean from
November through May although swordfish are present in the
region throughout the year.
Status of the Swordfish Resource and Fishery
Perhaps the subject which is researched and discussed the
most, but the least understood or agreed on, is that of
swordfish stock health and management. The swordfish
fishery has been subject to virtually no regulation
throughout its range. Management measures are complicated
by: the wide distribution of the species; limited under-
standing of swordfish stock differentiation, biology and
population dynamics; and the number of countries which
participate in the fishery, either directly or indirectly.
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Since over one-half of U.S. landings originate outside the
U.S. EEZ, regulation is further complicated by jurisdic-
tional questions (Pollack 1988).
In 1983 swordfish landings in the Northwest Atlantic peaked
at over 9.3 million pounds (SAFMC 1985). Recently the
number of small fish (dressed weight~40 pounds) taken has
risen significantly, and average size has dropped in most
U.s. management regions indicating growth overfishing (SAFMC
1985). Mean dressed weight has dropped from 83 pounds in
1980 to 60 pounds in 1986 (Pollack 1988). According to
analytical assessment of Northwest Atlantic stocks, fishing
mortality has increased since 1978 resulting in a 40% drop
in spawning stock biomass of swordfish aged five years or
greater by 1984,.then increased to within 75% of 1978 levels
by 1986 (Southeast Fisheries Center 1986)~ Meanwhile the
number of juveniles of ages 0-2 years remained stable until
1982, then increased thereafter (SEFC 1986). A 30% reduc-
tion in total stock biomass took place from 1978 through
1982, then stock biomass increased to the 1978 level by
1985. Catches exceeded stock growth from 1979 through 1980,
became approximately equal to growth in 1981, and increased
from 1982 to 1985 (SEFC 1986). Total landings have
generally remained stable during the period. In 1980 u.s.
landings were 8.0 million pounds, while in 1986 landings
were 7.6 million pounds (Pollack 1988).
58
Although studies indicate that growth overfishing has taken
place resulting in a smaller averge size, recruitment
overfishing has not occurred (ICCAT report 1985). Steve
Berkeley of the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council
states that "longliners are working longer and harder and
with more sophisticated gear to catch about the same number
of fish" (Pollack 1988). The fishery has experienced
substantial increases in the fishing mortality rate since
1978 and has approached the fully exploited level (C~nser et
aI, 1985b). It should be noted that there are inherent
uncertainties associated with the analysis of fish popula-
tions due to the effects of natural fluctuations in the
environment, imperfect or incomplete data and models which
cannot fully explain the complexity for fish stocks (Pollack
1988).
United States Swordfish Management
The actual health of swordfish stocks is debatable, but most
studies agree that exploitation is at or near peak produc-
tion levels, while total effort within their probable range
in the Northwest Atlantic is steadily increasing. This
guestion has prompted the five U.S. Fishery Councils (New
England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Gulf and Caribbean),
whose regions lie within the range of swordfish stocks, to
initiate a cooperative effort to control the resource
through the establishment of a Fisheries Management Plan
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(FMP). Although this action was initiated over six years
ago, the effort has resulted in very little in the form of
regulation to date. The last FMP was rejected by the
Secretary of Commerce in 1985. Management was further
complicated by disagreement among participants, scientists
and managers involved in the Northwest Atlantic longline
fishery whose arguments were as politically motivated as
economic or biological.
The major goal of the FMP currently under consideration is
to reverse the current trend of growth overfishing by the
increase of average weight. According to Brad Brown of the
Southeast Center, it can be argued that the increase in
fishing mortality due to longline effort has resulted in a
more intensive fishery on the entire resouice ~nd that the
fishery appears to be functioning at or near an optimum
level (Pollack 1988). However, since price is positively
correlated with swordfish carcass size, pound for pound,
lar.ger fish are more desirable. The increase in average
size exploited will also raise the time of first capture
which will prevent the future possibility of recruitment
overfishing.
The principal components of the FMP that were under consid-
eration include Variable Season Closures (VSC), mandatory
log requirements, restriction of entanglement gear and on-
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board observers. Log requirements went into effect in May
of 1986 while the possibility of on-board observers has been
dropped. VSCs were passed by the Councils, but never en-
acted by the National Marine Fisheries Service. According
to the South Atlantic Council, "the VSC was designed to
reduce the catch of small swordfish by selectively closing
the fishing grounds during periods when small swordfish are
most concentrated there" (Pollack 1988E, 4). It was ques-
tioned whether the measure would produce the desired goal
due to the possibility of increased effort during openings
and the difficulty in making the VSC coincide with the
presence of small fish.
According to Craig O'Conner (NMFS acting Southeast Regional
Director), becaus~ a large proportion of U.S. l~hdings
originates outside the U.S. EEZ, "the VSC would deny
American fishermen access to U.S. ports thereby impairing
their ability to compete with foreign vessels fishing the
same waters" (Pollack 1988, 72). The proposed ban on
imports during closures could help to alleviate the problem,
but it has been blocked by controversy (Pollack 1988).
Meanwhile, adverse effects on U.S~ tuna longliners due to
the prohibition of nighttime longlining during closures was
another negative factor associated with the VSC measure
(Pollack 1988). Finally, the Japanese fishing industry
filed suit against the Department of Commerce because the
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proposed measure would limit their longline operations in
the U.S. EEZ (Pollack 1988). The Japanese contend that VSCs
would "deprive them of a significant part of their tuna
catch" in the U.S. EEZ in which the U.S. has not declared
jurisdiction over tunas (Pollack 1988, 72). These factors
have combined in killing the proposed VSC regulation. Size
limits have been proposed for fish under 25 pounds dressed
weight. This proposal. was rejected by the South Atlantic
Council because lon91ine gear is nonselective, and small
fish will be hooked and killed anyway (Pollack 1988).
Although no regulatory actions have been taken other than
reporting requirements, the U.S. Atlantic Fisheries
Management Councils are planning to amend the swordfish
. .
management plan in theco~ing jear (Stevens 1988). ~here is
no definitive plan of action at present; however, there is
general agreement among the' councils that management meas-
ures are required. According to Gail Johnson, swordfish
committee chairperson, "fishing mortality is too high across
all age groups and something needs to be done" (Stevens
1988, 20). The one certainty which remains is that sword-
fish management will remain controversial and the enactment
of a regulatory regime is uncertain in the near future.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SWORDFISH FISHERY
During the 1983 season, two u.S. mainland longline vessels
initiated the first attempts at the commercial exploitation
of swordfish stocks in the Eastern Caribbean. In 1986 the
number of vessels operating in the region increased to at
least 50 with some reports that the total may range as high
as 70 (Rolon per. com. 1987). In 1985 u.S. landings in the
Caribbean Region reached 652,635 pounds. Landings increased
by nearly 300% to 1,902,750 in 1986, accounting for over a
quarter of the U.S. Atlantic catch of 7,607,909 pounds
(SAFMC 1987a) (See Tables 9 and 10). In addition to the
target species, th~ incidental by-~a~ch of marlin, tuna,
wahoo, dolphin fish and a number of shark species has been
reported.
The majority of the commercial fishing vessels which exploit
large pelagics such as swordfish or tuna in the Eastern
Caribbean are of foreign origin. Most swordfish vessels
originate in the continental United States while the
majority of far-ranging tuna vessels come from Asiatic
nations such as Japan, Taiwan and Korea. The Japanese have
carried out pelagic longlining in the Atlantic since mid-
1956 (Fox 1971). From 1956 through the 1960s they targeted
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TABLE 9
Caribbean
1985 Swordfish Landings and Size Composition
Landings Mean Total %(50 No. <50
r-bnth Dressed Wt. Wt. No. lb. lb.
January 138,170 107.0 1,291 15.1 195
February 143,546 105.5 1,361 10.9 148
March 172,138 101.3 1,699 18.4 313
April 59,971· 91.8 653 24.8 162
May 24,474 101.0 242 21.7 ·53
June 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
July 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
August 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
september 0 0.0 0 0.0 0
OCtober 7,901 76.2 104 27.9 29
November 18,630 71.0 262 33.8 89
,
December 87,805 78.7 1,116 22.0 246
Total 652,635 97.0 6,728 18.4 1,235
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Source (SAFMC 1987)
TABLE 10
Caribbean
1986 Swordfish Landings and Size Composition
landings Mean 'Total %<50 No.< 50
funth Dressed Wt. Wt. No. lb. lb.
January 275,250 80.6 3,192 32.0 1,021
February 369,000 83.1 4,440 31.6 1,403
March 297,750 83.7 3,557 32.0 1,138
April 270,750 79.9 3,389 31.6 1,071
May 121,500 71.3 1,704 34.5 588
June 57,750 64.7 893 38.1 340
July 28,500 54.8 520 49.9 259
August 15,750 60.5 260 37.1 96
september 105,750 79.0 1,339 25.7 344
October 90,750 72.8 1,247 31.0 387
November 122,250 74.0 1,652 32.0 52~
December 165,750 81.5 2,034 25.2 513
'Total 1,902,750 78.6 24,227 31. 7 7,689
Source (SAFMC 1987)
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on yellowfin tuna in areas adjacent to the Eastern Caribbean
(Fox 1971). Taiwanese and Korean operations are currently
more active in the region and transship landings through St.
Martin, Curaco and Trinidad and Tobago (Rolon, per. com.
1986).
United States operators who formerly fished in areas ad-
jacent to the mainland originally expanded to U.S. waters
adjacent to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The
only requirement for U.S. fishermen who fish in U.S. waters
is a federal swordfish permit which is free of charge.
Although swordfish were known to inhabit Caribbean waters,
stock concentrations and commercial viability were unknown
until these initial attempts were made. In 1984 the U.S.
Virgin Island Pelagic Fisheries Developmen~ Project, funded
through the Saltonstall-Kennedy Act, illustrated the poten-
tial viability of the fishery as the number of U.S. vessels
visiting the area increased annually (Wood 1986).
The sudden influx of nonindigenous participants and the
introduction of gear technology uncommon in the Lesser
Antilles have resulted in a variety of user conflicts and
policy issues. Problems began to surface in Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1985. The landing of longliner
by-catch, including recreational billfish species, put
longliners in conflict with local commercial and
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recreational fishermen. Meanwhile it became apparent that a
substantial proportion of swordfish landed in Puerto Rico
originated outside U.S. waters. Issues involving access of
foreign fishing vessels became a pressing policy considera-
tion for island states of the Lesser Antilles because long-
liners have operated in their fishing zones without per-
mission, or in a manner which was inconsistent with prior
agreements. Embedded within these policy issues is the
realization that development of a local longline fishery is
impeded by the lack of expertise, experience and capital.
These issues appear before a background riddled with con-
troversy concerning stock health, management and regulation
of the far.-ranging species.
Issues in the U.S. Virgin Islands
and Puerto Rico
The effect of longliner by-catch sales on local markets is
the major source of conflict between local fishermen and
stateside longliners. Recreational fishermen fear that the
health of several billfish species which they target on is
threatened due to longliner landing. Foreign tuna vessels
from the Far East have carried out longline operations in
the region for nearly three decades with little or no prob-
lem. The lack of associated conflicts is due to their lack
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of visibility to local fishermen. Tuna vessels fish farther
from shore and over greater ranges than U.S. swordfish
vessels, while local markets are not utilized for their
operations' by-catch.
Local Marketing of Incidental By-catch
The question of incidental by-catch and its impact on local
markets and billfish stock health are related to the actual
volume resulting from swordfish operations. Swordfish
longline gear is only as selective in the capture of other
pelagic species (which also inhabit Eastern Caribbean
waters) as the strategy with which it is fished and de-
ployed. This means that the depth and time of deployment
are instrumental in the determination of catch composition.
Japanese longline statistics, NMFS exploratory fishing and
New England Swordfish operations illustrated temporal seg-
regation between tuna and billfish which are more vulnerable
to daytime sets, while swordfish are more vulnerable to
nighttime effort (SAFMC 1985) (see Figure 4). The strategy
of nocturnal gear deployment is selective for swordfish with
a predominate incidental by-catch of sharks (Hoey and Casey
1983a). Longline operations which target on tuna are
generally set during the day and yield a by-catch of sharks
and a greater percentage of billfish species and other
teleosts than nocturnal sets (Casey et aI, 1983).
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In 1986 the Caribbean Region reported landings of 110,077
pounds of billfish and 287,863 pounds of tuna (SAFMC 1987a)
(see Table 11). The incidental catch of fish actually
hooked is lacking except for 78 sets made by the U.S. Virgin
Islands Pelagic Fisheries Development Project. This is a
relatively small sample size from which to draw conclusions,
but it reported the expected predominance of swordfish at
nearly 50% and sharks at 32%. Other telosts including tuna,
marlin, dolphin and others totalled approximately 16% of
total landings (Wood 1984) (see Table 12). Although these
figures should be treated cautiously, ln association with
the studies cited earlier, they indicate that by-catch rate
of sharks is substantial, probably as high as 50%, while the
by-catch of teleosts such as tuna, wahoo and dolphin are
likely to be between 10% and 20%.
It seems reasonable to expect that a great deal of variation
in amount and composition of landed by-catch exists, de-
pending on each vessel's objectives and fishing strategy.
Although swordfish longline retrieval is usually started
before first light, it may take over six hours, thereby
extending into daylight hours due to the length of sets
which may approach 40 miles (Rolon per. com. 1986). The
result is the capture of a greater percentage of species
that are commonly caught during daylight hours such as tuna,
marlin, sailfish, dolphin, and wahoo (McLain per. com.
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TABLE 11
Swordfish Tuna Billfish
Dressed Wt. Value Whole Wt.-- Value Whole Wt. ValueArea
--
NE & MA 3,720,750 $ 9,332,214 1,818,370 $ 5,358,043 14,000 $ 8,400
South Atlantic 1,385,909 3,869,183 672,913 1,061,819 36,218 20,685
Gulf Of Mexico 598,500 1,617,855 6,734,981 9,637,893 141,400 89,082
caribbean 1,902,750 5,258,335 287,863 541,811 110,077 16,394
Total 7,607,909 20,077,587 9,514,127 16,599,566 301,277 134,282
% of Total 43.67% 54.54% 54.61% 45.09% 1. 73% 0.37%
"0
1986 u.S. long1ine landings and value of swordfish, tuna and
billfish acording to u.S. management region.
Source (South Atlantic Fisheries Management Council 1987)
Wahoo
(Acanthocybium solandr i)
sailfish
(Istiophor~5 platypterus)
escolar
(Lepidocybium flavorbrunneum)
20 .074
13 .048
10 .037
6 .022
4 .015
4 .015
29 .107
12 .044
3 .Oll
12 .044
14 .051
3 .011
2 .007
2 .007
1 .004
1 .004
272 .997
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Relative Abundance
.496
TABLE 12
Longline catch Composition
Number caught
133
white marlin
(Tetrapturus albidus)
dolphin fish
(Coryphaena hippurus)
Totals
Source (Wood 1986)
snake mackeral
(Gempylus serpens)
yellowf in tuna
(Thunnus albacarus)
unidentified sharks
tiger shark
(Galeocerdo cavieri)
blue marlin
(Makaira nigricans)
blackfin tuna
(Thunnus atlanticus)
bull shark
(Eularnina leucas)
hammerhead shark
(Sphyrna rnokarran)
whitetip sharks
(Eularnia longimanus)
blacktip shark
(carcharhinus limbatus)
Species
swordfish
(xiphias gladius)
blue shark
(Prionace glauca)
1986). Recent increases in the price of fresh tuna are
making them a valuable component of landings. Sharks have
been reported as a nuisance due to the damage they cause to
hooked swordfish. Most shark species have a low dockside
value and are prone to spoilage without special treatment.
Therefore, they are usually cut from the mainline to save
time and money. It has been reported that marlin may also
be cut away or released due to their low dockside value.
The press reports a difference between the major companies'
vessels which seem to have a set of ethical rules and rene-
gade vessels which have little regard for the preservation
of gamefish or local conditions (Martin and Woods 1986d).
Hypothetically, the behavior of fishermen will be dictated
by their self-interest, in this case most likely being
financial returns due to the transitory nature of their
operations. If there are low marginal costs associated with
the use of available space and the extra effort involved
with incidental catch retention, or daytime effort, then
by-catch will be retained. Combine low costs of retention
with ready dockside markets, and incidental by-catch becomes
an attractive commercial proposition for the longliner. If
it is not cost effective to send these species to the U.S.
by airfreight from Puerto Rico, then it will be sold local-
ly. Mainland longliners who wish to sell fish locally must
obtain a Virgin Islands commercial fishing license for five
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dollars (Christian per. com. 1986). Sales may be carried
out by the company which is involved in the enterprise or as
"shack" (the sale of incidental catch), the profits of which
are immediately split by the crew (Rolon per. com. 1986).
A major factor contributing to disruption of local markets
is the relatively low price of by-catch in relation to the
prices normally obtained by local fishermen for the same
pelagic species such as dolphin fish. Local fishermen cite
examples where they have been undersold for species such as
dolphin fish for prices of $2 or less per pound (Hildebrant
1986). Swordfish vessels are not constrained by the same
costs and conditions which affect local fishermen. The
outcome appears to result in the dumping of fish which
creates temporary market gluts and prices which may be below
the local cost of local production (CFMC 1986).
In both the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico the lack of
infrastructural facilities for product storage and marketing
may leave the fisherman without an alternative on a given
day. An example reported in Puerto Rico involves middlemen
who normally deal with local fishermen. They cite greater
profits, regular supply and a high guality product as fac-
tors which attract them to longliner by-catch marketing
(Rolon per. com. 1986). Tourist hotels find large pelagics
such as fresh dolphin fish or tuna desirable for their menus
for the reasons cited above (CFMC 1986). Local catches
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which are generally composed of pot fish are also in dir~ct
competition with longliner by-catch. The actual or per-
ceived threat of ciguatera in reef fish is not present in
the pelagics landed by longliners, presenting another pos-
sible reason for preference of the latter.
Total imports of fish and fish products amounted to 2.2
million pounds in the U.S. Virgin Islands and 53.8 million
pounds for Puerto Rico in 19.80, as compared to 1.5 and 7.2
million pounds which were landed in the same year (CFMC
1985). Although salt cod and luxury tourist products are
included in these import statistics, the figures illustrate
a large short fall in the supply of fishery products. From
the consumer's side, locally produced fishery products are
considered somewhat scarce and expensive at prices approach-
ing or surpassing $3 per pound for mixed reef fish. It
seems reasonable to expect that the general population and
restaurants of the USVI and Puerto Rico stand to benefit
from an increase in fish supplies in the form of lower
prices, better quality and greater choice.
In the long term, or on an annual basis, it is apparent that
short falls of supply in relation to demand occur in most of
the Eastern Caribbean. The problem occurs in particular
markets at certain times of year in an area which has a
poorly developed fisheries marketing infrastructure. The
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established marketing system, although imperfect, has
evolved over a long period of time and has more or less met
the fishermen's needs until the advent of longlining by-
catch. When a new element was introduced to an already
somewhat stressed and delicate system, it caused disruption
to fishermen who were already operating what is in many
cases a marginal enterprise. Most fishermen believe that
the local fishing industry has stagnated or is in decline
while most inshore stocks are at or beyond maximum levels of
exploitation (Taylor 1986). The income of fishermen aver-
ages below $300 per month in this region (CFMC 1985).
Swordfish fishing is not a traditional activity among local
fishermen. They do not "seem particularly worried about the
impact of the longliners on stocks of swordfish" (CFMC
1986-8). However, local fisherm~n believe that the long-
liners are in part responsible for a perceived decline in
pelagics which they also target such as dolphin fish, wahoo
and occasional tuna and marlin (CFMC 1986).
Recreational Concerns
Another area of concern is the possible detrimental effect
of swordfish longlining on recreational species such as
marlin and sailfish. Recreational fishermen perceive long-
lining as a threat to populations of the large highly migra-
tory pelagic species which they target (CFMC 1986). In
1986, longline landings of billfish in the Caribbean
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Management Region totalled 110,077 pounds as compared to
1,902,750 pounds of swordfish (SAFMC 1987a) (see Table 11).
This figure may have been low relative to the number of fish
actually hooked because marlin were sometimes cut off dead
or alive due to their relatively low dockside value (Rolon
per. com. 1986). Also a portion of the billfish landed may
not have been included in these figures because it was
reported that fish were landed illegally without a local
commercial fishing license. Dockside prices were reported
to be $.60 to $1.20 per pound, although during the last two
years the price has been rising (Rolon per com. 1986).
Recreational and small commercial fishermen also reported
11,000 pounds landed in 1985 for an ex-vessel value of $1.50
per pound (SAFMC 1987b).
As noted previously, incidence of billfish by-catch is
greater for daytime as opposed to nocturnal longline sets.
In the USVI Pelagic Fisheries Development Project, sailfish
and marlin constituted approximately 6% of the total catch
(Wood 1986). NMFS exploratory fishing and commercial sword-
fish data off the east coast of the united States resulted
in a composition of less than 1% billfish for night sets
(SAFMC 1985). The tuna longliners operating throughout much
of their range utilize daytime sets which may account for
higher rates of hooked fish per. unit effort. Species
76
composition data indicates percentage catch of 4% billfish
as the result of Japanese tuna effort (Casey and Hoey 1983)
(see Figure 4). An accurate mortality rate for marlin
released from longlines may vary markedly although 47% for
blue marlin and 71% for white marlin have been cited in
observer reports from Japanese longline operations (SAFMC
1987b).
Stock assessment analysis is plagued by deficiencies in
basic data and biological parameters (ICCAT report 1985).
Sailfish appear to be only moderately exploited, but a
better picture could be achieved if data concerning sailfish
and spearfish species were separated and with better overall
data collection (ICCAT Report 1985). Stock condition of
white and blue marlin is also unclear although "a declining
trend in CPUE for both species is seen as a cause for con-
cern" (SAFMC 1987b, 10). Bill Vissner, an organizer of
Caribbean billfish tournaments, feels that "the billfish
population has declined dramatically over the past few years
and that longliners are responsible for an 85% reduction in
billfish landings" (Stimpson 1988, 50). It should be empha-
sized that, although this is a common view among recrea-
tional fishermen, scientific analysis cannot support this
assertion.
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sport fishing brings to~rist dollars into the local economy
for charter boats, equipment and indirect revenues to vari-
ous service sectors of the economy (Campos et aI, 1986).
Expenditures by participants in the U.S. recreational bill-
fish fishery were estimated at approximately $100 million in
1977-78 (SAFMC 1987b). The actual figure may be larger due
"to inflation, growth in the activity and indirect expendi-
tures which were not accounted for in the study" (SAFMC
1987b,27). Fishing tournaments are annual attractions in
both Puerto Rico and USVI. A National Marine Fisheries
study done by the Clapp and Mayne Consulting Firm stated
that the marine recreational fleet of Puerto Rico was com-
posed of 8,200 vessels with an investment of $85.3 million
in 1979 (Puerto Rico Sea Grant, per. com. 1987). Caution
should be exercised with these figur~s because they do not
represent the actual economic value of the resource. They
are also crude estimates if projected to 1988, yet these
figures illustrate that the recreational billfish fishery is
an important component of the region's economy.
Conclusion
The investigation of by-catch landing composition and volume
is essential to gain a better understanding of the problem.
In addition, the voluntary stationing of on board observers
could supply valuable data on the composition of fish actu-
ally hooked and fishing operations. Since longliner
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landings are seasonal and have localized effects, a better
understanding of local marketing infrastructure could assist
in the formulation of policies which could minimize effects
on the local industry.
CODREMAR, the agency in Puerto Rico which classifies and
inventories catches of small boat fishermen, is doing
surveys on landings of longliners in Puerto Rich (Kimmel
per. com. 1987). In 1986, a contract was awarded to the
University of Puerto Rico to begin the Caribbean Observer
Project (NMFS 1987). ICCAT is also intensifying efforts in
the research of Atlantic billfish. The fisheries councils
of the Atlantic U.S. recently proposed a Billfish Management
Plan which will prohibit the commercial sale of billfish and
require size limits 6~ fish retained by r~creation~l opera-
tions (SAFMC 1987b). This plan illustrates current concerns
regarding recreational billfish stock health.
Local market interactions and impacts on recreational stocks
are issues which have no easy answers, but they illustrate
valuable lessons in dealing with the swordfish fishery.
These issues have the potential to be instructive and to
contribute to future policies of Eastern Caribbean states
throughout the region as the U.S. longline presence expands.
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Illegal Swordfish Longlining in Eastern
Caribbean States' Waters
The illegal operation of U.S. longline vessels in Lesser
Antillean nations' waters, either due to unauthorized entry
or by operating in a manner inconsistent with prior agree-
ments, has become a major issue in the Eastern Caribbean
region. A significant percentage of the 1,902,750 pounds of
swordfish reported for the U.S. Caribbean Region originates
beyond the U.S. zone. During the Caribbean Pelagic Re-
sources session of the 40th Annual Gulf and Caribbean
Fisheries Institute, U.S. industry participants openly
admitted to fishing in other island nations' waters (Merritt
1987). Al Merritt also stated that, "And I can't say we
never poached. We're not lily white" (Stimpson 1988, 51).
Bob McAuliffe, a representative on the Caribbean Management
Council illustrates the attitude which may be common among a
large segment of longliners when he stated that, "the major
problem this year is that the smaller independent Caribbean
states view the ocean as their private property" (Stimpson
1988, 51). The question remains as to the frequency of
longliner intrusions and the amount of fish caught in the
fishing zones of the Eastern Caribbean island states.
The Case of the British Virgin Islands
The most immediate problem and best documented case involves
the British Virgin Islands. The "Reciprocal Fisheries
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Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland" states that commercial fishing
by vessels of the United States may continue in the terri-
torial waters of the British Virgin Islands (BVI) in
accordance with existing patterns and at existing levels.
In 1977, when this agreement was drafted, there was no
swordfish fishery with only a small number of USVI pot
fishermen utilizing stocks in BVI waters. Longlining initi-
ated by U.S. vessels in 1983 prompted the British Virgin
Islands to draft new requirements for entry of U.S. longline
vessels. The 1985 amendment r.equired a higher fee, from
$150 to a $7000 permit for each vessel, required reporting
of swordfish catch and the landing of all by-catch at the
British Virgin Islands fisheries terminal (Walters per com.
1986).
In the 1985-86 season, 13 of the 14 vessels permitted to
fish reported the taking of 400,000 pounds of swordfish and
10,615 pounds of by-catch which was landed in the BVI
(Walters per com. 1986). In addition to late reporting of
swordfish catch, only eight of the 13 vessels operating in
BVI waters complied with by-catch landing requirements
(Walters per. com. 1986, CFMC 1986). The price offered in
the BVI by the government cooperative handling by-catch
landings was only $.30-$.50 per pound although according to
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Mr. Blok, the acting BVI Fisheries Officer, this was never
actually paid (Blok per. com. 1987, Walters per. com. 1986).
It was suspected that a large percentage of the by-catch
actually went to the USVI or Puerto Rico where $2 to $3 per
pound could be obtained (Rolon per. com. 1986). These
factors dismayed BVI officials who issued permits for four
vessels during the 1986-87 season with a reported catch of
71,278 pounds of swordfish and 5,350 pounds of by-catch
(Blok per. com. 1987). In the 1987-88 season the number of
vessels permitted to work in the British Virgin Islands Zone
dropped to two with a swordfish catch of approximately
100,000 pounds and landed by-catch of nearly 5,000 pounds
(Blok per. com. 1988). By-catch was made up of predomi-
nately tuna and marlin species (Blok per. com. 1988). The
reasoris given for intreased sw~rdfish landings iri 1987-88
were better reporting at the Puerto Rico terminal and better
all-round fishing than during the previous season (Blok per.
com. 1988). The reason for limiting entry of vessels re-
lated to poor cooperation in previous years, but the two
vessels currently permitted have been very cooperative (Blok
per. com. 1988).
In respect to enforcement, the BVI has a police boat which
is frequently unavailable for fisheries work or inoperative
(Walters per. com. 1986). It is responsible for the entire
200-mile zone of 84,000 square miles which is under BVI
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jurisdiction (Gold et aI, 1985). It is suspected that other
U.S. swordfish vessels operate illegally within the BVI
Fisheries Zone. The BVI also requires that foreign vessels
take domestic observers for compliance monitoring, data
collection and familiarization with the fishery.
Illegal Fishing in Other Parts of the Region
Another activity which is unconfirmed in many cases, but
likely in light of the longline fishermen's attitudes pre-
viously cited, is the operation of U.s. longliners in other
Eastern Caribbean nations' waters. A confirmed report
involved three Florida-based fishing vessels which were
detained by St. Vincent officials (San Juan Star 1986). One
vessel allegedly had engine trouble, and when the two other
vessels entered within 12 miles of St. Vincent waters all
three were seized (San Juan Star 1986). The boat which had
been fishing had a sizable quantity of swordfish on board,
$75,000 worth according to the captain (San Juan Star 1986).
The captain of the "Miller Time" claimed the $200,000 fine
demanded for release of the vessel was "extortion, ransom -
whatever" (San Juan Star 1986). Sightings of U.S. long-
liners have been reported by an Anguillan fisherman in 1986
(Carty per. corn. 1986). Meanwhile, amid controversy Merritt
boats attempted operations in Venezuelan waters (Stimpson
1988). Al Merritt, owner of Merritt's Seafood, stated that
he has approached several island nations for fishing permits
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(Merritt per. corn. 1987). These reports indicate that U.S.
longline activity extends beyond the U.S. zone along the
entire Lesser Antillean island chain. Therefore, a substan-
tial proportion of the reported BVI and USVI catch may
actually come from areas beyond their respective fisheries
zones.
Without exception, the neighboring island nations of the
region lack the enforcement capabilities required to deal
with foreign fishing vessels. In addition, although ex-
tended jurisdiction had become a widely recognized component
of international law, Eastern Caribbean states are only now
in the process of developing necessary legal and technical
institutions to deal with the problem.
The U.S. Department of Commerce could be of some assistance
by the enforcement of the Lacey Act. This law gives the
U.S. government the right to prosecute U.S. nationals who
are importing fishery or wildlife products which were ob-
tained in violation of foreign law recognized by the United
States (Christian per. com. 1986). For U.S. enforcement
followup, the country in question must report the vessel's
description, location and whether fishing gear was deployed
at the time of the sighting (Christian per. com. 1986).
Therefore, a U.S. vessel which is fishing illegally in other
nations' waters is subject to U.S. prosecution although this
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has not happened during the short history of the swordfish
fishery in the Eastern Caribbean. It might be suspected
that fisheries enforcement of this type is not a priority in
the region given u.s. preoccupation with drug enforcement.
Local Development of a Pelagic Longline Fishery
Another issue relates to the revenues which are not kept in
the local economy because most longliners are based in the
mainland United States.. It might be concluded that the
local fishermen and population of both the u.s. territories
and Eastern Caribbean states could derive greater benefits
from direct participation in the swordfish fishery. The
potential feasibility of a local fishery was one of the main
objectives of the u.s. Virgin Islands Pelagic Fisheries
Development Project(~ood 1986). The inshore reef fish~ries
of most of the region's islands are already at or beyond
maximum sustainable levels of exploitation. Local exploita-
tion of pelagic resources on islands such as Barbados,
Grenada, Dominica and St. Lucia is substantial for flying
fish, dolphin fish, kingfish and tunas in some cases
(Goodwin 1985). Yet, the local development of a pelagic
longline fishery is practically nonexistent.
One reason might be the capital requirements for what might
be considered a risky venture. There is little room for
error if operating and finance costs are to be covered
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during the initial year of operation. In 1979 an investment
of $80,000 was required for a 36-foot vessel and gear, with
variable and fixed costs for the first year totalling nearly
$85,000 (Cato and Lawlor 1981). In Florida, gross revenues
of nearly $150,000 were expected assuming a catch of 70,000
pounds (Cato and Lawlor 1981). During the past seven years,
these costs have surely increased, pushing initial invest-
ment requirements beyond the capabilities of the majority of
local fishermen. The U.S. Virgin Islands Development
Project utilized a vessel of similar size and indicated that
sets longer than the six miles they used were required for a
profitable operation (Wood 1986). Most vessels currently
operating in the region are of larger size allowing them to
utilize longer 40-mile sets and to spend longer periods at
sea. It is questionable whether smaller vessels could be
competitive given the current structure of the fishery.
Local fisherman may also have problems in adapting to new
fishing methods and strategies. Most fishermen have worked
in a less capital intensive pot fishery. A local pelagic
longline fishery will require a jump in vessel size, re-
quired equipment, fishing skills and record keeping and
accounting skills to compete with the boats arriving from
the mainland. A coordinated extension program oriented
toward the adaptation of islands technology to the swordfish
fishery, a long-term monitoring system and provision of
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startup costs are required if the activity is to have a
chance at becoming a viable alternative for local fishermen.
Even if the required skills and capital can be transferred,
cultural and social factors may prohibit development. Local
fishermen are not accustomed to spending long periods at sea
which they may find unacceptable. They may also be risk
adverse when presented with new methods with which they are
not personally familiar.
Two vessels were operated by British Virgin Islands fisher-
men during the 1987-88 season. One of them failed because
they simply could not find fish (Blok per. com. 1988). At
least one vessel is now being operated out of the u.s.
Virgin Islands although the owner is from the u.s. mainland
(Stimpson1988). In Grenada local longlining for Atlantic
sailfish was recently reported (Bryant 1988). Generally
longlining remains an activity undertaken by foreign par-
ticipants. Local development may be possible, but it will
require consideration of many of the factors cited above,
including time.
Other Considerations
The stock management problems of the Eastern Caribbean are
magnified by the newness of the fishery and the lack of
associated data. Evidence related to local swordfish popu-
lation origin and migratory patterns are less certain than
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those of other regions to the north. Preliminary landing
statistics show a greater average size than landings of the
Southeast and Gulf regions of the United States (SAFMC
1987a). There is evidence that a segment of the swordfish
population remains in the eastern Caribbean throughout the
year. Therefore, various segments of population may have
different migration patterns dependent on age. It has also
been speculated that swordfish landed in the region may
originate from southern areas adjacent to South America
(Rolon per. com. 1986). The Caribbean is also probably a
major spawning area for swordfish as evidenced by larval
studies. All these possibilities illustrate the underlying
uncertainties related to the dynamics of the Caribbean
region's swordfish stock dynamics.
Another factor relates to the growing demand for fishery
products in the continental United States, especially for
highly valued species such as swordfish. Consumption of
swordfish reached record levels in 1986 at approximately 21
million pounds including imports (Lipton 1986). Assuming no
changes in real prices due to the dollar exchange rate with
exporting countries and consumer preferences, consumption
would exceed 30 million pounds in 1995 (Lipton 1986).
Meanwhile, recent increases in tuna prices, due to U.S.
fresh and sushi markets and a growing Japanese export
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market, have increased the value of species such as bigeye
beyond prices for swordfish in some cases. In the Gulf,
yellowfin tuna landings increased from 148 thousand pounds
in 1983 to 3 million pounds in 1985 (Pollack 1987). It was
reported during the 1987 Caribbean season that tuna became
an important segment of longliner landings for many fisher-
men due to rising prices (Rolon per. com. 1987). It was
also indicated that some daytime sets were made to target
exclusively on tuna.
Sharks are an under-utilized species which are currently
considered a nuisance to swordfish operations due to the
damage they cause to hooked swordfish and the time and
effort wasted when they are hooked (McLain per. com. 1986).
Although they make up a high percentage of total fish
hooked, only certain species are taken due to their rela-
tively low value. Unlike other large pelagics, fecundity is
low for shark spcies, making their populations more suscep-
tible to fishing pressure. In the future, under-utilized
shark species could become a valuable resource while impacts
on those species of present commercial value could become
serious.
Increases in longline effort of U.S. vessels seem probable
due to the factors cited above. In addition, longline
90
efforts of other nations such as Korea, Spain and Venezuela
are reported in areas within or adjacent to the region
(Campos and Munoz-Roure 1986).
The central problem in the Eastern Caribbean region relates
the sharing of benefits accruing from the exploitation of
highly migratory species among resource adjacent island
states and the nations which possess the capital and exper-
tise to exploit the resource. Yet side issues exi~t con-
cerning the best possible use of pelagic resources affected
by the swordfish fishery such as recreational species.
Meanwhile, all fishery participants are intricately related
to the complex issues associated with the goal of stock
conservation due to the wide ranges of large pelagic
species. Only through international cooperation will it
become possible to implement sound management measures.
Fisheries management principles, international ocean law and
regional management strategies are currently evolving as
responses are formulated to many of these issues. The next
two chapters will examine these factors for their potential
application to the Eastern Caribbean.
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CHAPTER V
MANAGEMENT OF HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES
The objective of this chapter is to present a general
overview of HMS management. This is initiated through an
examination of management objectives, basic principles of
fisheries management and international legal aspects of
highly migratory species management. These factors are the
basis from which management regimes can b~ organized, built
and evolved. However, the application of these principles
must also be modified due to constraints such as site
specific factors, imperfect information and the differences
between simplified models and complex real world situations.
General Principles of HMS Management
Management Objectives
Highly migratory species are among the most complex and
controversial stocks to manage. They are the most extreme
example of transboundary stocks because their wide-ranging
oceanic migrations repeatedly cross boundaries between zones
of national jurisdiction and the high seas. Tuna and bill-
fish species are the two major groupings of highly migratory
fish which are treated in this chapter. These species have
exceptionally wide ranges, and their conservation is depen-
dent on international cooperation (Joseph and Greenough
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1979). According to the Law of the Sea Treaty, Dolphin
fish, Cetaceans, oceanic sharks and sauries also fit within
the highly migratory category, but are not dealt with in
this report (United Nations 1983). Tunas and billfish are
among the highest valued fishes, due to their demand as food
fish and the recreational excitement they provide at the end
of a fishing line. Due to their high demand, fishing effort
has increased dramatically within the last three decades.
Some commercial stocks, such as Atlantic swordfish, southern
and northern bluefin tuna and Eastern Pacific yellowfin
tuna, are now considered to be at or beyond maximum levels
of exploitation (Saila and Norton 1974, Hilborn and Sibert
1988).
The identification of management objectives is the first
step in devising potential HMS management arrangements. A
1971 FAD publication cited the following tuna management
objectives which were identified in a joint meeting of the
Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council and the Indian Ocean Fishery
Commission (Saila and Norton 1974). These objectives are
still appropriate 15 years later and apply to most HMS. The
five main objectives include:
"(I) Maintenance of tuna (HMS) stocks at levels that
provide high sustained yields;
(2) Improved economic efficiency;
(3) Appropriate distribution of benefits;
(4) Measures which afford the opportunity for
countries not yet participating in tuna (HMS)
fishing to build up their fishing industries;
93
(5) Conservation measures that do not interfere with
development of unexploited stocks"
(Saila and Norton 1974, 37).
Objective 5 may also be stated as: Conservation measures
which can protect stocks caught incidentally while creating
as little disruption as possible to the primary fishing
operation.
It should be recognized that the strong interrelationships
which exist between objectives mean that achievement of one
objective may conflict with another (Saila and Norton 1974).
The following section examines these objectives in terms of
basic fisheries management principles. These principles are
initially presented under ideal conditions; then they are
related to realities of HMS management.
Stock management
Objective (I), the maintenance of high sustained yields, is
of interest to all concerned parties. From a biological
perspective, "conservation of a stock depends on the balance
between losses due to natural and fishing mortality and
gains in stock growth" (Copes 1987, 5). A stock is made up
of individual fish of fishable size. The stock increases in
biomass through recruitment, juvenile fish which reach
fishable size, or by the growth of fish which are already
part of the stock (Copes 1987). The relationship between
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stock gains and losses due to fishing effort is explained by
an analysis of "effects of fishing effort on fish catches
over time" (Copes 1987, 5). The relationship between yield
and effort shows "the yields that can be sustained at
various levels of long-term effect" (Copes 1987, 7). This
is called a surplus yield model because it represents the
surplus which can be harvested on a sustained basis at a
given level of effort (Copes 1987). Maximum Sustainable
Yield (MSY) is the level of effort which will result in the
largest possible sustained yield. Figure 5 illustrates that
increases in effort beyond MSY will in the long run decrease
landings due to the decline in the standing stock of fish.
Surplus yield models are utilized for most of the world's
tuna stocks because: they are relatively simple; they
require catch and effort statistics which are available and
they are "reasonably well suited for long-lived species such
as tuna" (Copes 1987, 8). Therefore, to satisfy objective
(1), Total Allowable Catch (TAC) could be set at MSY. This
would provide the highest possible sustained yields without
the risk of over-exploitation while producing the greatest
amount of protein possible for the world population (Copes
1987) (See Figure 5).
Unfortunately, maximum sustained yield is an ambiguous term
due to an incomplete scientific understanding of stock
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Figure 5 Surplus Yield Model
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This curve illustrates a yield-effort relationship. The
curve represents the yields that can be sustained at various
levels of long-run effort. Long-run means that equilibrium
will be reached among the stock and catch levels at a given
level of effort over a period of time depending on stock
dynamics. MSY is the maximum yield of fish which can be
harvested from a stock on a sustained basis.
Source (Copes 1987)
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populations and imperfect information. The importance of
the preceding explanation is that, like most renewable re-
sources, a biological limit to prduction on a sustainable
basis exists for HMS (Saila and Norton 1974).
Economic efficiency
The presence of strong interrelationships between objectives
means that an action in one area such as objective (1), high
sustained yields if set at MSY, will affect another such as
objective (2), economic efficiency (Saila and Norton 1974).
Economists would argue that MSY is only a measure of gross
benefits without accounting for the cost of production
(Copes 1987). From a standpoint of economic efficiency,
benefits should be measured by the difference between "the
value of the catch over the costs of production" (Copes
1987, 9). Figure 6 illustrates the maximum economic yield
(MEY), the point at which "the maximum net benefit or
resource rent can be generated" (Copes 1987, 9). MEY will
be lower than MSY in respect to effort and total landings,
but it will yield the greatest resource rent without
threatening over-exploitation. Like MSY, MEY is difficult
to attain due to modeling and information constraints while
the political goals of user groups make agreement on a set
level of effort difficult to attain.
97
The common property character of most fisheries resources is
usually a major factor which contributes to their economic
and biologic waste. Under open access, all fishermen have
access to a given stock, but they neither control nor own
the stock. An individual fisherman has no incentive to
limit harvests for the maintenance of productivity because
other fishermen fishing the same stock will capture these
benefits (Copes 1987). Fishermen will continue to enter the
fishery with corresponding increases in effort until eco-
nomic benefits are equal to economic costs (See Figure 6).
At this point, the economic rent has been dissipated and
overcapitalization has occurred. Therefore, the high
opportunity cost of labor and capital utilized in the
fishery indicates that resources could be better utilized in
another economic sector.
The use of overall catch quotas to satisfy objective (1)
will lead to overcapitalization. Individual fishing nations
will generate over capacity in the race to catch as much as
possible before the quota is reached (Saila and Norton
1974). The limitation of effort through limited entry is
one strategy which could satisfy objective (2). Improved
economic efficiency will also result if those nations with a
comparative advantage are allowed to operate. For highly
migratory species, this could be accomplished through the
establishment of transferable national quotas. If fishing
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Figure 6 Bioeconomic Model
$
o
NI
L K P
Cost
Revenue
Effort (amount of fishing)
In this diagram the yield curve is transformed into a
revenue curve by multiplying the yield at different effort
levels by a constant price. Total costs are proportional to
the level of effort, and they are represented by a linear
cost curve. The maximum net benefit or resource rent that
can be generated is MN which occurs at an effort level of OL.
This is the maximum economic yield (MEY). At MSY the resource
rent is smaller while at effort level OP, which corresponds
to an open access situation, there are no net ben~fits in the
fishery. Therefore at the effort level OL the government of
the coastal state in question can collect the greatest amount
of revenue illustrated by MN while at effort level OP the
economic rent has been dissipated and there is no room to
generate revenues through access fees.
Source (Copes 1987)
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rights are transferable or marketable among nations, then
shifts to those operations with lower labor and capital
costs could take place (Saila and Norton 1974). Unfor-
tunately, a system of this type would require a large degree
of political compromise for the distribution of the resource
among concerned parties. This is not presently realistic on
an international level in most cases.
Distribution of benefits
The question of benefit distribution involves the coastal
state or resource adjacent nations (RANs) and the distant
water fishing nations (DWFNs). The increased mobility of
foreign fishing fleets during the 1960s, the development of
excess harvesting capacity and high resource demand have
resulted in the expansion of DWFNs to new fishing grounds
and increased effort worldwide (Saila and Norton 1974).
Since the near universal acceptance of exclusive economic or
fishing zones, governments have claimed ownership or
management authority over stocks within their respective
zones of jurisdiction.
Ideally, objective (3), the distribution of benefits, could
be satisfied through the charging of entry or license fees
from those DWFNs which wish to operate within RAN fishing
zones (Copes 1987). The greater the rent (the amount above
normal levels of return for labor and capital, or economic
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costs), the greater the license fees which can be charged
without discouraging the vessels from operating in the given
nation's fishing zones (Copes 1987). If an open access
situation exists, then boats will enter the fishery until
they break even. In the case of open access or if excess
effort is allowed to enter a RAN's zone, the rent is
dissipated to the point where license fees will make the
boats leave the fishery. This will leave no room for
revenue generation by the government of the coastal state in
question (Copes 1987). Joint venture arrangements can
involve cooperation beyond the charging of license fees.
Assistance in the development of domestic fishing and
processing sectors are other ways in which benefits can be
realized by the RAN.
In the case of HMS, their wide-ranging nature makes manage-
ment difficult on a national basis because the highly migra-
tory resource retains its common property character on the
high seas. In addition, stocks also move from one zone of
national jurisdiction to another. Stock management can then
be complicated by different management approaches depending
on individual national policies. Entry can be limited on
the national level, but usually not on the international
level. Therefore in most cases no one RAN has control over
objectives (1), maintenance of stocks at high levels, and
(2), increasing economic efficiency, because of neighboring
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nations' policies and high seas fishing by DWFNs. An addi-
tional complicating factor involves enforcement. Many RANs
which have excess stocks adjacent to their shores are
developing nations which lack the enforcement capabilities
required to effectively police their zones. Therefore, in
reality, open access still exists within many zones of
national jurisdiction as well as the high seas.
Resource adjacent nation fishery development
Objective (4), the building of RAN fishing industries, is
related to objective (3), the appropriate distribution of
benefits. The generation of employment, export earnings and
a domestic supply of protein are potential benefits which
could be obtained by the RAN. However, these benefits must
be weighed against the required foreign exchange, fishing
skills and infrastructure of more capital intensive fishing
operations. In addition, competition with existing fleets
and overcapacity in many HMS fisheries will make the
achievement of this objective difficult. If the country in
question decides to develop a local fishery, then objective
(2), increased ec6nomicefficiency, might be relaxed in
favor of the social benefits produced within the RAN.
Another problem involves the relationship between domestic
and foreign fishing operations fishing within a national
fishing zone. The fishery resource might be envisioned as a
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pie which represents the total allowable catch. The pie is
then divided among the coastal state according to the
domestic harvesting capacity and the foreign participants
which are granted the surplus (Garcia et aI, 1986). Unfor-
tunately, the picture is complicated by the nature of the
resource because the total pie is "not fixed in size, its
size is not easy to determine and its components, domestic
harvesting and the surplus are not independent of each
other" (Garcia et aI, 1986, 192). The sustainable yield
from a given stock of fish is illustrated by a plot of
effort against catch. As more fishing effort, in this case
foreign fishing, is introduced to the fishery, catch per
unit effort will drop. Therefore, the domestic fishery will
have to increase fishing effort to maintain catch levels.
This will result in greater costs incurred per unit of catch
due to the decrease in CPUE. Therefore, the concept of
surplus has little meaning for the coastal state which has
the objective of catching the most fish with the least
amount of effort.
The coastal state which is allowing the entry of foreign
vessels while attempting to develop a domestic fishery must
recognize that this relationship exists. In reality, the
loss of domestic fishery revenues attributable to foreign
fishing must be weighed against gains associated with the
entry of foreign vessels. Under cooperative agreements, the
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domestic fishery could obtain benefits such as technology
and skill transfers, and fees which could mitigate the
effects of lower CPUE levels attributable to the foreign
fishery. The nature of highly migratory resources further
complicates the situation because fishing in adjacent
fishing zones and the high seas could affect stock abundance
within the given national zone. Therefore, objectives (1)
through (4) are all interdependent. Management decisions
depend on resource makeup, the makeup of the fishing fleet
which targets on the resource, both foreign and domestic,
and interaction between user groups. The relationships
cited in the biological and economic principles given above
are important; however, in the case of highly migratory
species, already inherent uncertainties are increased by the
international management requirements of the resource.
Incidental impacts on stocks
Objective (5) involves the effects of the fishery on other
stocks besides the principal target species. Longlining,
one of the major gear strategies utilized ·in HMS exploita-
tion, is usually a multispecies fishery. Therefore, fishing
operations could produce negative effects on species caught
as incidental by-catch. Although some pelagics may have
relatively low commercial values, their value for recrea-
tional fisheries may be quite high. Ideally, a balance
should be sought between commercial and recreational
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fisheries through an examination of whether or not impacts
on stocks caught incidentally in the commercial fishery are
significant and the benefits attributable to each fishery.
In reality, there is a great amount of uncertainty associ-
ated with economic values for competing user groups and
fishery stock populations, especially highly migratory
recreational stocks.
The preceding objectives and discussion of related manage-
ment principles are the foundation from which management
objectives can be evaluated, reality can be injected and
interrelationships between objectives can be examined. It
becomes clear that tradeoffs and compromise among objectives
and participants are required for management on the inter-
national level. The next section involves the foundation of
international cooperation, international ocean law and The
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
The Legal Regime for Highly Migratory Species
Highly migratory species are treated with a special article
in the Convention on the Law of the Sea, but their manage-
ment is also subject to other articles concerned with the
management of the living resources within the EEZ and
beyond. This section explores the international legal
background of fisheries management with emphasis on highly
migratory species and realities concerning state practices.
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The negotiation of The Third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) guided the evolution of the
international ocean law during the 1970s. These negotia-
tions produced a codified set of standards for national
conduct, especially for the utilization of the world's ocean
resources. Actual state practice is dictated by interna-
tional norms which are defined by the concurrent evolution
of accepted state practices or customary law, and codified
treaties such as the Law of the Sea Treaty (Belsky 1985).
Although UNCLOS III has not b~en ratified by the 60 nations
required for it to go into force, many of its components
reflect existing practice in the international community.
Distant water fishing fleets grew at a tremendous rate
during the 1960s into the 1970s. Rapid progress in
fisheries technology and the world's growing demand for
protein contributed to the expansion of fishing fleet ranges
and capacities. During this period, it became apparent that
fishing fleets had the potential to over-exploit many of the
world's major fishing grounds. This prompted coastal state
concern with exploitation of stocks occurring adjacent to
their shores by foreign fishing fleets. The benefits
resulting from stock exploitation were being obtained by
foreign operations. Meanwhile, the common property nature
of the resource, coupled with a general lack of interna-
tional cooperation, resulted in declining stocks and
over-exploitation. The question became: What rights do
106
coastal states have over fishery resources by virtue of
their geographic proximity to these resources?
The question of coastal state rights in the determination of
fishery management and utilization is one of the major
factors which contributed to the extension of coastal state
jurisdiction. During negotiations at the Conference of the
Law of the Sea, nine coastal states presented a working
paper concerned with the EEZ stressing the following point.
"The coastal [nation] should have the right to utilize
and preserve resources adjacent to its coasts, since
the survival or development of its people depends on
those resources and because it [is] in the best
position to regulate their rational exploitation"
(Cited in Bowen and Hennessy 1984, 42).
Unilateral jurisdictional claims have become a common
feature of state practice, while in most cases it has been
acquiesced to by the world community (Ross and Landry 1987).
The Law of the Sea Conference set down a comprehensive set
of guidelines to add conformity to nation states' zones as
jurisdictional claims spread during the 1970s (Ross and
Landry 1987).
The main component of extended jurisdiction is the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). According to Article 56 of the UNCLOS
III text:
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"In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has:
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the water
superjacent to the sea-bed ... " (United Nations 1983,
258) .
Article 56 indicates that the coastal state has complete
control of fisheries within its EEZ. The EEZ is comprised
of a 200-nautical-mile zone extending seaward from the
coastal state's baselines (United Nations 1983). Under the
convention, the coastal state also has jurisdiction over
fisheries resources within its: territorial sea, an area
not greater than the width of 12 nm measured from the
baselines; internal waters, waters on the landward side of
the baseline; and archipelagic waters, water enclosed by
archipelagic baselines in the case of countries comprised of
closely grouped islands (Slatyer 1987).
Article 64 of the UNCLOS III text refers explicitly to
highly migratory species and states the following:
"The coastal state and other States whose nationals
fish in the region for the highly migratory species
listed in Annex I shall co-operate directly or through
appropriate international organizations with a view of
ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of
optimum utilization of such species throughout the
region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic
zone. In regions for which no appropriate inter-
national organization exists, the coastal State and
other States whose nationals harvest these species in
the region shall co-operate to establish such an
organization and participate in its work" (United
Nations 1983, 261).
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Annex I identifies highly migratory species as tunas,
frigate mackerel, pomfrets, marlins, sail-fishes, swordfish,
sauries, dolphin, oceanic sharks and Cetaceans (United
Nations 1983).
Viewed by itself, Article 64(1) would appear to indicate
that HMS are an exception to coastal state competence over
the living resources of the EEZ referred to in Article 56.
Article 64(1) indicates that it is the joint responsibility
of the coastal state and other participating nations to
ensure conservation and optimal utilization, both within and
outside the EEZ. Cooperation and the formation or strength-
ening of international management institutions are stressed
in this paragraph. Article 64(2) clarifies the context of
Article 64(1) by stating: "The provisions of paragraph 1
apply in addition to the other provisions of this part"
(United Nations 1983). Therefore, the term "sovereign
rights" referred to in Article 56 indicates that HMS are
subject to coastal state authority within the EEZ just as
all other living resources (Burke 1984).
In the case of high seas fishing, Article 116 states that:
"All States have the right for their nationals to
engage in fishing on the high seas subject to:
(a) their treaty obligations;
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests
of coastal States provided for, inter alia,
in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 and
67; and
(c) the provisions of this section" (United Nations
1983, 273).
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Article 116 indicates that fishing states must cooperate
with the coastal state regarding questions of conservation
and allocation of HMS stocks occurring both on the high seas
and within the coastal state EEZ (Burke 1984). It appears
to give "priority to the coastal states' rights and
interests affecting high seas fishing states" (Burke 1984,
276).
In both the case of coastal state rights over HMS in the EEZ
and fishing nation's high seas fishing rights, the conven-
tion indicates that both parties should seek cooperation.
In reality, if cooperation does not exist, it is doubtful
whether the coastal state will limit effort in its EEZ or
that coastal state regulations will be followed by fishing
nations on the high seas. In most real world situations,
·except in the cases of international agreement, coastal
states have taken full control over HMS management within
their EEZs while fishing nations continue to fish the high
seas without coastal state input. HMS are found both within
adjacent EEZs and high seas areas with varying stock abun-
dances in each area due to their great mobility (Burke
1984). Although cooperation has been poor or nonexistent in
many i~stances, Articles 64 and 116 are constructive
approaches which are essential for the control of fishing
effort and stock conservation.
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HMS are also subject to UNCLOS provisions dealing with
conservation and utilization of fisheries resources in the
EEZ. Although the coastal state has sovereign rights over
the fisheries resources within its EEZ as specified in
Article 56, Articles 61, 62 and 63 are meant to imply that
it also has certain duties. In reality, the language of the
text and the characteristics of fish stocks have contributed
to ambiguities in this area and generally left the balance
of control in favor of the coastal state within its EEZ.
Article 61 states that the coastal state "shall determine
the allowable catch," and the coastal state "shall ensure
through proper conservation and management measures that the
maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive Econom-
ic Zone is not endangered by over exploitation" (United
Nations 1983, 260). Article 61(3) refers to MSY as the
level to which stocks should be restored or maintained, but
it goes on to state "as qualified by relevant environmental
and economic factors including the economic needs of coastal
fishing communities and the special requirements of develop-
ing states" (United Nations 1983, 260). Therefore, the
coastal state is authorized to set levels above or below
MSY, a concept which is theoretical and difficult, if not
impossible, to equate with a value (Burke 1984). In
reality, the coastal state has total control in setting
total allowable catch at any level it considers appropriate
III
with respect to specific circumstances. Again, due to the
mobility of HMS, it is impossible to set total allowable
catch for a given EEZ.
Article 61(4) refers to effects on other species associated
with harvested species. It states that the coastal state
should take into account, "Maintaining or restoring popula-
tions of such associated or dependent species above levels
at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened"
(United Nations 1983, 260). This paragraph does not indi-
cate that the coastal state is required to take action or
give a definition of "seriously threatened." Although this
paragraph is important in relation to multispecies
fisheries, it is unclear whether constructive measures will
evolve in this management area.
Article 61(5) refers to the free flow of information among
all participating states and competent international organi-
zations (United Nations 1983). Although most of the world's
nation states exchange such information, it should be recog-
nized that individual states will act in their own self-
interest if this information will reflect negatively on
their operations or sacrifice competitive advantages.
Article 62 refers to coastal state duty in promotion of "the
objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in
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the exclusive economic zone" (United Nations 1983). If the
coastal state lacks the capacity to harvest the allowable
catch, then access to the surplus should be given to other
states (United Nations 1983, 260). The terms "optimum
utilization," "allowable catch" and "surplus" are all
ambiguous and left to the discretion of the coastal state.
Optimum utilization does not require "full utilization"
while allowable catch can be set at any level considered
appropriate to the coastal state (Burke 1984)~ The concept
of surplus is also difficult to define when referring to
fisheries stocks, especially HMS. HMS require management
throughout their range, negating the importance of concepts
such as "surplus" and "total allowable catch" within an
individual EEZ.
As indicated in the previous section, levels of additional
effort will affect levels of catch per unit effort. Al-
though a biological surplus may exist, a surplus may not
exist in respect to the optimization of coastal state
operations within its EEZ. In reality, many coastal states
allow the entry of foreign fishing nations' to their EEZs,
but entry is given due to factors involving coastal state
self-interest, not due to international obligation cited in
UNCLOS III. If international cooperation fails, the coastal
state is in the position to allow entry of vessels at
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whatever effort level it considers appropriate. This
defeats the purpose of Article 64(1) and the special
management requirement of HMS.
Article 63 refers to cooperation between coastal states in
the cases of shared stocks, which is frequently the case
with HMS. It indicates that coastal states should seek to
cooperate through appropriate subregional and regional
organizations for the objective of stock conservation and
development (United Nations 1983). This has happened in
many parts of the world where information is exchanged and
attempts at quota allocations have been made. However, it
has been difficult to impose effort or quota limitations
within individual coastal state EEZs through regional
arrangements.
The UNCLOS III text is both ambiguous and incomplete for two
main reasons. First, it enabled the negotiating nations to
reach a consensus in areas where disagreement was acute. It
also gave room for individual states, subregions and regions
to address site specific problems. Although many of the
Convention's provisions are not spelled out in detail or
enforceable, it does present a set of norms, standards and a
spirit for members of the world community. Ratification of
UNCLOS III will not solve the problems of HMS management,
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but it will provide a foundation from which the inter-
national legal regime can continue to evolve.
International law is made up of compromises between indi-
vidual state self-interest and the need for order in the
international community. Rules are established by state
practice or custom and through multilateral treaties instead
of legislatures or political executives as in the case with
domestic law (Belsky 1985). Although each state might
benefit through international agreement, compromises may
entail, or be perceived by individual states as entailing, a
loss of potential benefits. Because cooperation and en-
forcement is the responsibility of each individual state or
group of states, individual states can disregard the system
or remain outside it (Belsky 1985). Only when the costs of
remaining outside the system outweigh the benefits will
individual states cooperate.
The case of HMS highlights these perceptions. It is in
coastal states' interest to claim HMS within their EEZ, and
take as much as possible before stocks move on to an adja-
cent EEZ, in the short run. It is in the fishing nations'
interest to take as much of the resource as possible both
within EEZs and on the high seas, also in the short run. It
is in everyone's interest to conserve and utilize the spe-
cies through international cooperation in the long run, but
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this means that certain states may sacrifice a proportion of
their harvest through compromise. Unlike less migratory
stocks, highly migratory species are common property at an
international level throughout much of their range. Ini-
tially there is no motivation to sacrifice individual goals
in the interest of the majority. On the high seas, and in
many zones of jurisdiction, this is the case where a first-
come, first-served mentality generally applies.
The interdependence between coastal states and fishing
nations for the conservation and maintenance of stocks at
high levels, and the benefits both sides can gain through
mutual cooperation, are the basis from which international
cooperation can originate. The next chapter examines
management of HMS in the South Pacific region where com-
promise has resulted in greater benefits to island states
while allowing continued access to foreign fishing fleets.
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CHAPTER VI
HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES MANAGEMENT EFFORTS
The declaration of sovereign rights over the living re-
sources occurring within national zones of jurisdiction has
become accepted practice in the international community. In
most cases, highly migratory species have also been claimed
within 200 nm EEZs or Fishing Zones. However, no one nation
can manage this resource unilaterally due to the unique
characteristics of HMS (King 1979). International coopera-
tion is hampered by differing resource endowments and
national priorities. The need for common action has en-
couraged national and regional entities to formulate a
variety of management proposals and regimes where their
interests converge. This secti~n will explore evolving
responses to HMS management, especially in the South
Pacific.
Management Alternatives
Coastal state extended jurisdiction and the regional ap-
proach to HMS management in the South Pacific should be put
in the proper international context as it evolves as a
management institution. The Eastern Pacific is an example
of regional management where attempts were made at limiting
catch while allowing for a greater distribution of benefits
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among developing resource adjacent states (RANs). The
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) was es-
tablished by treaty in 1949 and began operating actively in
the Eastern Pacific in 1951 (Saila and Norton 1974). It was
a regional body whose purpose involved the development of
programs for the management of tuna stocks (Saila and Norton
1974). The IATTC set annual catch quotas for yellowfin tuna
in the eastern tropi~al Pacific as a conservation measure
aimed at the maintenance of yields of the resource (Saila
and Norton 1974). This measure did not fully address the
objectives of economic efficiency and benefit distribution
among participants. From 1966 to 1973, the fleet operating
in the region increased by nearly three times, the open
season for yellowfin fishing decreased from 10 months to
three months, and competition among participants increased
(Joseph and Greenough 1979). This suggests that overcap-
italization and economic waste resulted (Saila and Norton
1974). It also did not solve the problem of benefit
distribution among participants.
As zones of extended jurisdiction gained acceptance in the
world community, resource adjacent nations demanded a
greater proportion of the benefits accrued through resource
exploitation. Meanwhile, U.S. tuna interests remained
intransigent to coastal state demands. In 1979, the IATTC
management system broke down, partly due to disagreements
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over allocations and fees between the foreign participants,
especially the United States, and the resource adjacent
Latin American nations (Joseph 1983). Since 1979, there has
been no set quota on landings, and yellowfin stocks have
been overfished (Copes 1987).
Overall catch quotas may be effective in the short term to
prevent over-exploitation, but, as indicated above, they
contribute to overcapitalization as participarits compete for
as much as possible before the quota is reached (Saila and
Norton 1974). National quotas have been recommended as an
alternative which would divide the permissible yield among
concerned nations (Saila and Norton 1974). National quotas
would allow each nation to harvest its quota where ever and
in whatever way it chooses. National quotas should be mar-
ketable so that nations without the capacity to harvest
their share of the resource would be able to market it to
obtain benefits from the resource. This would make the
resource available to the lowest cost or the most efficient
harvesters and contribute to greater economic efficiency
(Saila and Norton 1974). Although this would prevent over-
capitalization due to competition between states, it would
not prevent competition within the state and over-
capitalization (Saila and Norton 1974). Under this system,
benefits could be distributed, yet criteria in determining
quotas must be acceptable to all participants if the system
119
is to survive. Criteria may include historical catch and
proximity to the resource among other political aspects
considered appropriate to participating nations. Effort
limitation and license fees and taxation are other manage-
ment tools which can be utilized in serving the objectives
of conservation and economic efficiency. The main question
remains as to how effort and benefits can be divided among
concerned nations (Saila and Norton 1974).
Unfortunately, HMS management has not attained the level of
cooperation on the international level which is required for
the effective implementation of many of these proposals.
The next section will concentrate on the management regime
which is evolving in the South Pacific.
Management in the Pacific Islands Region
The island nations of the Central and South Pacific are
currently struggling with the issues of benefit distribution
with foreign fleets. Some of the largest tuna stocks in the
world range throughout the vast expanses of ocean waters
which separate the generally small, newly independent
nations of the region. Extended jurisdiction has given the
region's island nations new hope for greater control over
their destinies. It also offers the tremendous challenge of
formulating a management regime that is based on the coop-
eration required to obtain benefits from the resource.
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The Region
The Pacific Islands Region stretches from the Republic of
Palau in the west to the Pitcairn Islands in the east
(Doulman 1987a). A wide definition of the region includes
the more developed and larger nations of the region such as
Australia and New Zealand, but for the purposes of this
report, concentration will focus on the small, lesser devel-
oped island states of-the region (see Figure 7). Except for
Tonga, all of these states were colonies of metropolitan
powers; 14 are now independent and eight remain territories
of the United States, France, United Kingdom and New Zealand
(Doulman 1987a). Therefore, the region as a whole is di-
verse, widely spread and huge (approximately 30 million
square kilometers). It stretches across over half of the
tropical and temperate southern Pacific as indicated by
Figure 7.
The small, newly independent island nations of the region
are subject to political influence and economic dominance of
outside developed nations. According to Doulman, two of the
major factors which may cause the situation to worsen are
the islands' "narrow economic bases and limited agri-
cultural resources and land-based activities" (Doulman
1987a). As with many developing countries, the region's
island nations face low per capita incomes, rising imports
relative to exports, high unemployment, high rates of
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emigration by youth, and high reliance on external aid (Kent
1980). Table 13 illustrates the generally low per capita
GNP of the region's island nations and their relatively
small land area, as compared to the large ocean area which
has come under island nation jurisdiction. Due to these
factors, marine resources are central to economic develop-
ment, self-reliance and the general well-being of the people
of the region (Kent 1980, Doulman 1987a).
Fisheries of the Region
Tuna is the most abundant and valuable fishery resource of
the region (Doulman 1987a). In 1984, landings harvested by
both domestic and foreign vessels were estimated at 650,000
tons, with an ex-vessel value of $700 million (Doulman
1987a). This accounts for approximately 30% of the world
catch of tuna (Copes 1987). The tuna landings of the region
are comprised mainly of yellowfin and skipjack tuna with
several other minor tuna species (Copes 1987).
The three principal gear types utilized in their capture are
longline, purse seine and pole and line (Sibert 1987). Yel-
lowfin are generally caught with longlines, although they
are taken by all three methods (Sibert 1987). Skipjack are
caught with purse seines and pole and line (Sibert 1987).
Longlines and pole and line fisheries took most of the catch
until 1980. In the 1980s, the introduction of the purse
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TABLE 13
Basic Data of the South Pacific Region
Nation or Population 1974 GNP/ Land EEZ Area
Territory (1977) capita Area (000 sq kIn)
American 30,500 1,100 197 410
samoa
Cook Islands 18,500 240 2,200
Fiji 592,000 840 18,200 1,370
French Polynesia 137,000 2,530 4,000 5,380
Gilbert 53,500 730 684 4,430
Islands
Q.larn 102,000 .4,420
Nauru 7,300 6,500 30 290
New Caledonia 134,000 4,170 19,100 1,540
New Hebr ides 99,500 480 11,880 670
Niue 3,800 260 350
Norfolk Island 1,900 35 570
Papua New 2,908,000 470 461,693 2,300
Guinea
Pitcairn Island 65 4 970
Solanon 206,000 310 28,500 1,520
Islands
Tokelau 1,600 10 330
Tonga 90,000 300 697 720
Trust Terr. 120,000 500 1,800 7,460*
Tuvalu 7,500 25 760
Wallis and
Futuna 9,700 16 280
western Samoa 152,000 300 2,934 160
*-includes the EEZ of Guam
Source (Kent 1980)
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seine led to a decline in the pole and line fishery. In
1982, purse seining surpassed the other two major gear types
(Sibert 1987). Purse seining is the most capital intensive
and efficient method of catching tuna (Doulman 1987b). It
accounts for over half of total landings in the Pacific
Islands Region, but ranks behind longlining in value
(Doulman 1987b). Purse seines target on surface-dwelling
species such as skipjack and small yellowfin. These species
are of lower value than those species occurring deeper in
the water column such as larger yellowfin, bigeye and
albacore which are vulnerable to longline sets (Doulman
1987b).
Foreign fishing nations take the vast majority of the tuna
commercially harvested in the region. Locally-based or
registered fleets take 140,000 to 160,000 tons of the
650,000 tons landed (Doulman 1987a). The Japanese entered
the region in the early 1950s and steadily expanded longline
and pole and line fisheries in subsequent years (Fujinami
(1987). Korea and Taiwan expanded into the region during
the 1960s with longline and pole and line operations which
have continued to grow up to the present. United States
purse seiners began fishing in the region during the early
1970s (Felando 1987). Fleet overcapacity leading to shorter
seasons in the Eastern Pacific encouraged a shift in effort
to new tuna fishing grounds (Felando 1987). Currently,
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Japan and the United States take the majority of landings in
the region (Copes 1987). Many countries or companies
operating in the region are vertically integrated. Shore-
side processing and transshipment locations are an important
component of the industry for the region's economy.
The condition of yellowfin and skipjack stocks is not
certain due to inadequate statistical data (Van Dyke and
Heftel 1981, Sibert 1987). However, it is generally agreed
that skipjack stocks are well below maximum levels of ex-
ploitation. Kearney predicts that "a several-fold increase
in harvest levels above the present one of 300,000 mt may be
possible without depleting the resource" (Bardach and
Ridings 1985, 53). Moderate increases above current yellow-
fin landings of approximately 250,000 mt may also be pos-
sible without serious effects by utilizing longline gear
(Bardach and Ridings 1985). However, yellowfin stocks
present greater concern to managers because they are more
heavily targeted due to their greater value (Copes 1987).
There are concerns with the recent growth in the surface
purse seine fishery, because of potential effects on the
mixed stocks of yellowfin and skipjack which it targets, and
possible effects on the economics of the tuna fishery
(Sibert 1987). There is general agreement that further ex-
pansion is possible, although better reporting of statistics
and further analysis are essential (Sibert 1987).
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Tuna Management in the Region
Subsistance fisheries of the Pacific Island Nations are es-
timated at approximately 10,000 mt compared to the 650,000
mt commercial harvest landed annually (Doulman 1987a).
Therefore, virtually all of the tuna harvested is consumed
outside the region. DWFNs provide an important source of
revenue totalling between $15 to $20 million annually for
access fees. As indicated above, commercial operations are
dominated by outside interests in both the harvesting and
processing sector, but they also contribute to the region's
economy.
Fisheries Forum Agency
In the mid-1970s, UNCLOS III negotiations and coastal state
practice established the concept of extended jurisdiction as
an accepted norm in the international community. During the
South Pacific Forum meeting of 1976 in Nauru, the idea of
establishing a South Pacific fisheries agency was presented
(Gubon 1987). The meeting culminated in the Nauru Declara-
tion which emphasized creation of 200-mile zones, conser va-
tion, regional cooperation and coordination of policies
related to marine resources (Gubon 1987). Later in 1976 in
Suva, governments of the region:
"(1) declared their intention to establish 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zones after consulting with
each other;
(2) decided to harmonize fisheries policies in the
region and to adopt a coordinated approach to
their negotiations with distant-water fishing
nations;
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(3) decided in principle to establish a South
Pacific fisheries agency to promote conserva-
tion and the rational use of tuna stocks in the
region" (Kearney 1978, 250).
The scope of cooperation was questioned because regional
states indicated that: the sovereignty of the coastal
states should remain inviolable" (South Pacific Forum 1977
cited in Gubon 1987, 246). During subsequent meetings,
disagreement centered in two main areas: eligibility of
membership in the agency, and whether or not tuna should be
declared within the EEZ.
Actually, the two areas are interrelated. Two types of
organization were proposed: "one aiming primarily at
ensuring conservation and promoting optimum use of living
resources in the region, the other at ensuring maximum
benefits for the people of the coastal states of the region"
(Gubon 1987, 247). The former proposal followed a more
broad-based conservation approach as taken in Article 64 of
UNCLOS III (Gubon 1987). The united States promoted this
approach during meetings because this would allow partici-
pation of distant water fishing nations. The u.S. was one
of the few nations in the world which had exempted tuna from
jurisdiction within its fishing zone due to claims that tuna
should be managed throughout their range.
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In reality, west
coast tuna interests, such as the American Tunaboat Associa-
tion, were responsible for this policy in order to claim
reciprocal rights to access in other nations' fishing zones
(Wade 1984). This put U.S. policy in conflict with the
Pacific island nations' goals. The Pacific island nations
argued for coastal state jurisdiction over HMS because they
are the only significant fisheries resources within their
zones of jurisdiction .(Van Dyke and Heftel 1981). The
Pacific island nations wanted an organization which would
unite them in negotiations with DWFNs (Gubon 1987).
The South Pacific Fisheries Forum Agency (SPFFA) agreement
was signed in 1979. It recognizes that the coastal state
has sovereign rights over the living resources within the
EEZ including highly migratory species (Van Dyke and Heftel
1981). It also limited membership to Forum nations of the
region, thereby excluding distant water fishing nations and
nations with regional island dependencies (Van Dyke and
Heftel 1981).
The objectives of the SPFFA as stated in its preamble are
expressed by the following:
n ( 1 ) their common interest in the conservation and
optimum use of the living marine resources in the
region, particularly highly migratory species;
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(2) their desire to promote regional cooperation and
coordination in fisheries policies;
(3) their concern for securing maximum benefits from
the region's living resources for the national
well being of SPF countries;
(4) their desire to facilitate the collection, anal-
ysis, evaluation, and dissemination of informa-
tion about the region's fisheries resources,
especially highly migratory species" (Guben 1987,
248).
The SPFFA convention does not satisfy Article 64 require-
ments due to membership restrictions (Van Dyke and Heftel
1981). It reflects the common concerns of the region's
nations which center on maximizing benefits to the region.
The South Pacific nations realized that regional cooperation
is required in areas such as enforcement, expertise, infor-
mation collection and dissemination, and negotiation (Gubon
1987). As a group they stood a better chance at obtaining
essential information such as:
"(1) the quantity and quality of the fisheries
resources;
(2) how much fishing could be permitted while
sustaining stocks;
(3) who had traditionally fished their resources;
(4) where their fish were sold, processed, and
consumed;
(5) and the market value of their fish" (Gubon 1987,
249).
conventional wisdom concerning highly migratory species
management expresses the proposition "that international
cooperation is required for the effective utilization of the
tuna resources of the world" (Hilborn and Sibert 1988, 31).
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However, the term highly migratory species has been misused
to the point where its biological meaning may have become
irrelevant (Hilborn and Sibert 1988). The assumption that
all tuna species have huge ranges encompassing entire ocean
basins has been exaggerated in some cases. There are indi-
cations that the ranges of yellowfin and skipjack of the
South Pacific region are smaller than previously believed
(Hilborn and Sibert 1988). DWFN claims that widely-based
international organizations necessary for HMS management are
sometimes more self-serving than based on biological fact.
Therefore, international cooperation may not have to satisfy
Article 64 to be effective. It also indicates that inter-
national catch quotas may not be necessary if high seas
fishing does not threaten species conservation. The degree
of international cooperation should depend on actual species
distribution and geographic considerations such as EEZ
configurations and relative sizes (Hilborn and Sibert
(1988). A high degree of regional cooperation may still be
required, especially in the case of adjacent relatively
small EEZs. This lends legitimacy to the South Pacific
approach toward regional tuna management which excludes
DWFNs from membership. However, cooperation in data
collection and interpretation is still required of all
participating nations.
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The SPFFA was not generally concerned with dictating manage-
ment in areas such as quotas, setting of license fees or
limitation of fishing effort. The decisions pertaining to
the EEZ were left to the respective coastal state (Gubon
1987). The SPFFA functions as a forum for the exchange of
ideas, information, technical advice, and communication of
current state activities (Gubon 1987). Under the SPFFA
system, individual states were left to negotiate individ-
ually with foreign fishing nations. This left the danger of
encouraging competitive undercutting of fees required of
foreign fishing nations because of competition between
individual nations to sell fishing rights (Van Dyke and
Heftel 1981). As a united group, the Forum nations would be
in a better position to negotiate better terms (Van Dyke and
Heftel1981). Uniform entry would also be beneficial to
foreign fishing nations because this would enable them to
follow changing concentrations of fish without regard for
EEZ boundaries and national licenses (Van Dyke and Heftel
1981). Surveillance and enforcement is another common
problem of the region's coastal states due to the vast area
of the region. conventional methods of policing, such as
surface patrols and air patrols, are inadequate in this
situation (Van Dyke and Heftel 1981). A satellite system
has been proposed although costs would be very high (Van
Dyke and Heftel 1981). Enforcement activities can be
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enhanced by regional cooperation in order to avoid dupli-
cation of efforts and to share costs among concerned coastal
states (Van Dyke and Heftel 1981). These factors encourage
greater cooperation in issues involving foreign vessel entry
and management.
The Nauru Group
In 1982, the Nauru Agreement was signed by several countries
of the region. The basis of the regional grouping was
primarily economic (Doulman 1987c). The distribution of
tuna within the Pacific Islands Region determines individual
coastal state responses and distribution of domestic and
foreign fishing (Doulman 1987c). Those countries with the
greatest at stake in the region's tuna fisheries had the
common concern of deriving the greatest possible benefits
from their tuna resources (Doulman 1987c). The harmonizing
of policies within the region for the maximization of finan-
cial returns is the major goal of the Nauru Agreement. The
Nauru grouping is logical for the following reasons: most
of the group's EEZs are contiguous as indicated in Figure 8;
scientific research indicates that tuna stocks are shared
among members; more than 75% of the tuna taken by DWFNs in
EEZs of Pacific island nations is harvested in waters of the
Nauru nations; over 70% of access fees paid by DWFNs go to
Nauru nations (Doulman 1987c) (See Table 14 for organization
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Most of the Nauru Group EEZs are contiguous and
are endowed with the richest tuna resources of the
region.
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TABLE 14
FFA and Nauru Group Membership in the South Pacific
Country
Australia
Cook Island
Federated States
of Micronesia
Fiji
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Nauru
New Zealand
Niue
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Western Samoa
X indicates rnerrbership
FAA Membership
x
x
x
x
x
observer
x
x
x
observer
x
x
x
x
x
x
Nauru Group Member
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Note - Nauru membership is not exclusive while members may join or leave.
However, due to the contiguous nature of their zones and resource
endowments, the two most likely additions would be Tuvalu and
Vanuatu.
Source (Doulrnan 1987a)
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membership). These factors all have significance to en-
forcement and access agreements with DWFNs.
"The Nauru Agreement is an international treaty that
obligates members to adopt common courses of action with
respect to their shared fisheries resources so long as the
cooperation benefits them without derogating their sovereign
rights" (Doulman 1987c, 261). The two areas of greatest
importance involve a regional registry of foreign fishing
vessels and minimum terms of fisheries access that member
countries adopt in licensing foreign vessels (Doulman
1987c). All foreign fishing vessels must be listed on the
FFA's register before being granted a license by the Nauru
group nations (Doulman 1987c). If a vessel violates terms
of entry in a given nation's EEZ, it may be removed from the
register and eligibility to participate in the region's tuna
fishery. The registry has aided enforcement in the region
and in the collection of fines to prevent the deregistration
of vessels for violations (Doulman 1987c). The adoption of
minimum terms of fisheries access has allowed the Nauru
group to stop DWFNs from playing one nation against another
during the negotiations. It simplifies negotiation by
leaving fewer variables to be determined while allowing the
coastal state to concentrate on obtaining better financial
terms (Doulman 1987c).
136
Two other areas which the Nauru group will likely address in
the future are "preferential access for fishing vessels from
Nauru group countries and the standardization of methods for
determining access fee payments for DWFN fleets" (Doulman
1987c, 263). Preferential access is already taking place on
an informal basis and will probably become more common as
Nauru group members develop their own fleets (Doulman
1987c). The method of fee determination in using a per-trip
formula is also nearly universally accepted within the Nauru
group (Doulman 1987c). In the future, standardization in
setting access fees according to the scope of the DWFN
operation is expected (Doulman 1987c).
Foreign fishing nations were uneasy with the establishment
of the SPFFA and Nauru Agreement. They expected that un-
reasonable access terms' might be demanded, especially by the
Nauru Group (Doulman 1987c). However, DWFNs encouraged
cooperation among Nauru group members because of DWFNs'
willingness to play one country off against another. The
members of the Nauru Group realized the importance of the
financial returns they receive from access fees. They
understood that there was room for improvement in terms of
access without making terms destructive to the operations of
fleets they depend on for revenues.
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Cooperation between the Nauru Group and the FFA have con-
tinued to be good although there was some initial apprehen-
sion on the part of the FFA. The Nauru Group has been a
progressive influence on the FFA. This is illustrated by
its adoption of Nauru Group cooperative policies jn areas
such as a vessel registry (Doulman 1987c).
Historically, there has been little cooperation between the
Micronesian and Melanesian nations of the Na~ru organization
(Doulman 1987c). However, common resources and economic
concerns made a compelling case for regional cooperation,
because the benefits of cooperation outweighed the national
concerns involving independence (Doulman 1987c). This
regional grouping offers advantages in administration, en-
forcement, revenue ~aximization and data collection .(Doulman
1987c).
Indivi~~al Coastal State Approaches
In the South Pacific, regional institutions such as the
SPFFA and the Nauru Group are continuing to evolve espe-
cially in the areas of cooperation and coordination of
policies. However, a balance under which rights have been
retained within respective island state EEZs has been one of
the bases from which the current system works. License fees
are collected and used by each island state for its own
development. In the case of the South Pacific, resource
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distribution and beliefs in state sovereignty are two
factors which are barriers to complete integration.
In the South Pacific, individual states have more
flexibility because tuna resources are generally below
maximum levels of exploitation. This is the case in Papua
New Guinea where the results of stock assessment programs
indicate that "the potential annual yield from its Declared
Fisheries Zone (DFZ) significantly exceeds the quantity of
tuna currently being harvested" (Doulman 1987e, 16). Papua
New Guinea has the third largest EEZ in the Pacific Islands
region covering 2.3 million square kilometers (Doulman
1987e). It also contains rich tuna resources with an annual
harvest of 100,000 tons (Doulman 1987e). The domestic
harvest averages approximately 28,000 tons, with the rest
taken by foreign fishing operations (Doulman 1987e). The
case of Papua New Guinea is a good example of the access
arrangements which have been evolving in South Pacific
states of the region.
The policy of granting foreign fleet access to the Papua New
Guinea DFZ is encouraged because domestic harvesting capac-
ity cannot fully exploit the tuna resources occurring in its
zone, and because the payment of access fees generates
government revenue (Doulman 1987a). The government will
license any foreign fishing vessel as long as it is listed
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on the Fisheries Forum Agency register; and it has not
previously infringed on licensing conditions in Papua New
Guinea (Doulman 1987e). All access agreements are based on
the Papua New Guinea/Japan Fishing Agreement. The general
conditions are "the payment of a prescribed fee and the
observance of terms and conditions of access specified in
the Papua New Guinea/Japan Fisheries Agreement" (Doulman
1987e, 18). Access fees are: "designed .to extract the
resource rent of the resource; foster· operatiorial efficiency
in the use of the resource; and provide an instrument for
the government to regulate, develop and conserve and
generally manage the resource" (Doulman 1987e, 19).
The Papua New Guinea Fisheries Act specifies that fees
consist of a Fisherman's licensing fee and a Boat Licensing
Fee, which are nominal, and an Operation~ee ~hich is meant
to extract ~ financial return for fisheries resources which
are exploited (Doulman 1987e). In the Papua New Guinea
case, foreign aid is not accepted as part of the payment for
access, but must be fully independent of the provision of
fisheries access. Papua New Guinea has taken the position
that access must rely strictly on commercial terms (Doulman
1987e). Fees are related to a somewhat complicated formula
which is dependent on the type and size of the vessel,
duration of time of fishing trips and the type and market
price of species targeted (Doulman 1987c).
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In addition to the payment of access fees, foreign vessels
have certain obligations "to minimize administrative costs,
provide a basis for scientific monitoring and management and
to promote the orderly exploitation of the fishery" (Doulman
1987e, 22). This is accomplished through the establishment
of conditions of entry. Prohibited areas were established
within the Papua New Guinea territorial sea to protect
domestic pole and line fishing operations. Vessel owners
. must report entry and exit from the Papua New Guinea DFZ
with the exact location, time and quan~ity of fi~h on board.
Catch records must be maintained and forwarded to the
director of fisheries after each trip. The radio call sign
of the vessel must be displayed on the top of the vessel and
recognizable from the air. Foreign fishing vessels are
obligated to take on government-nominated observers who must
have access to all facilities and equipment. Foreign
fishing vessel owners must base an agent in the country to
handle licensing and arrangements to reduce administrative
costs. These conditions assist Papua New Guinea in en-
forcing and administering the program. These conditions are
also terms which the Nauru group has adopted for the
harmonization of terms of access throughout the region
(Doulman 1987e).
Papua New Guinea received $4.5 million in revenue from
foreign fishing in 1985 (Doulman 1987e). In 1984, revenues
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obtained by licensing foreign fleets exceeded the Fisheries
Division's budget by 20% (Doulman 1987e). It might be
inferred that these revenues have a significant impact on
available funding for domestic development and management of
the nation's fisheLies (~oulman 1987e). However, this must
be gauged against administrative, enforcement and surveil-
lance costs to administer the program. In 1982, administra-
tion and enforcement costs incurred by the Fisheries
Division were $0.6 million (Doulman 1981e) . Costs associ-
~t~d with befense Department surveillance and the Department
of Primary Industry would result in a significantly higher
figure (Doulman 1987e). Costs of administration and en-
forcement illustrate that actual benefits accrued by the
country in question are related to the behavior of foreign
fishing operations within their zone. Compliance with the
Japanese fleet has been good although patchy in the case of
other flag states (Doulman 1987e). As voluntary compliance
drops, the cost of surveillance and enforcement increases
(Doulman 1987e). This will put upward pressure on access
fees and selective limitation on entry (Doulman 1987e).
This is an example where a mutual relationship with volun-
tary compliance is in the interest of both foreign and
domestic parties.
Most of the Pacific Island states have made similar arrange-
ments in respect to conditions and access fees required for
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the entry of foreign fishing vessels. In addition, joint
venture agreements and foreign aid are other benefits
provided to island states to satisfy entry requirements.
For relatively small island states, access fees can be of
considerable size relative to their domestic economies. In
1986, license receipts from foreign fishing operations
accounted for 25% of Kiribati government revenue (Doulman
1987a). In the case of Kiribati, Japanes~ access fees were
usually a combination of cash payments and goods and ser-
vices for domestic fisheries development (Teiwaki 1987).
The Kiribati government had reservations with this method of
payment because it felt that access arrangements should be a
purely commercial transaction (Teiwaki 1987). The Kiribati
government felt that Dthe.value of fish harvested should be
measured and ~ompensated for in cash and not confused with
the aid inclinations of the foreign state" (Teiwaki 1987).
Development aid as a method of payment, especially in the
case of a small island nation, is questionable in respect to
the benefits it produces. Foreign aid, some in the form of
subsidies, is a major segment of many of the economies of
the region's island nations. The injection of excess aid
can have negative effects in cases where the local economy
does not have the capacity to absorb and utilize it (Teiwaki
1987). Nations such as Kiribati need development which they
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can control at a pace with terms that are in their own
interests (Teiwaki 1987). Members of the South Pacific
Forum are in agreement that access should be based on com-
mercial considerations and that aid and access should be
delinked (Doulman 1987c). There have been instances where
aid has benefited countries and others in which inappropri-
ate and inadequate assistance were provided (Doulman 1987d).
Development aid is no.t inherently evil, but the motivations
behind it are ofteh mo~eself-serving on the part of the
donor than helpful to the recipient.
Domestic development of tuna fisheries is the goal of most
of the nations of the Pacific Region. However, most of the
Pacific Island states also lack the capital, expertise,
information, skills and" infrastructute to develop fishery
operations. Tuna prices have also stagnated in the 1980s
resulting in stiffer competition among participants (King
1987). The region's tuna fisheries are capital intensive
operations, especially purse seiners (King 1987). The
industry is also vertically integrated so that processing
and access to markets may be a necessary component depending
on national development goals.
The answer in some cases is joint ventures, where foreign
capital and expertise can be combined with domestic resource
endowments and local labor. The Solomon Islands have
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participated in this type of arrangement with Japanese
businesses since 1972 (Hughes 1987). Problems involving
skilled manpower needs, meeting time tables, depressed
market prices for tuna and the United States embargo were
setbacks encountered during this period (Hughes 1987).
However, localization of the industry has continued while
the Solomon Islands have benefited in the form of taxes,
commissions and fees, and employment while building industry
infrastructure (Hughes 1987). The Solomon Islands have also
benefited from Japanese "industrial know-how, access to
capital and to markets" (Hughes 1987, 221). The Japanese
company, Taiyo, benefited from access to the Solomon
Islands' Zone and a good working relationship with the
government. The following statement made by Anthony Hughes
expresses the positive side in the following: "It is un-
likely that the industry could have been established so
fast, on such a scale, and in such a permanent form by any
method but a joint venture" (Hughes 1987, 220). Joint ven-
tures can generate employment, foreign exchange and technol-
ogy transfer, but they must be based on mutual benefits and
careful planning by the participants. It must be recognized
that the motives of the foreign partner and island govern-
ment are often very different (Doulman 1987d).
Another area which may benefit the island nations involves
trans-shipment of tuna from island nation ports (Doulman
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1987d). Trans-shipment could benefit the concerned island
state through development of infrastructure and greater
integration with tuna operations.
The tuna industry is very competitive in all sectors such as
harvesting, processing, distribution and marketing. The
island nations must identify those areas where they possess
the greatest comparative advantage and where value is added
in the production system (King 1987). Dennis King stated
the following: "This end is best achieved by collecting
access fees or some other form of rent from foreign tuna
producers and using the proceeds to develop local industries
consistent with national goals" (King 1987, 295).
The United States Case
The presence of the United States tuna fleet in the South
Pacific Region became one of the major sources of conflict
and the impetus for greater cooperation and coordination of
fisheries policy among the South Pacific States.
The U.S. position, from the inception of extended jurisdic-
tion, was to exclude tuna from coastal state control. The
Magnuson Fishery Conservation Act expresses the U.S. legal
position in sections involving highly migratory species,
international fishery agreements and import prohibitions
146
(Van Dyke and Nocol 1987). The United States does not
recognize coastal state jurisdiction over tunas and requires
coastal nations to join with DWFNs to manage HMS (tuna)
through international fishery agreements (Van Dyke and Nocol
1987). If a coastal state seizes a U.S. tuna vessel "as a
consequence of a claim of jurisdiction which is not recog-
nized by the United States", then that nation's fishery
products may be embargoed (MFCMA 1976, Van Dyke and Nicol
1987, 109). These policies are a reflection of U.S. West
Coast tuna interests, the American Tunaboat Association
(ATA) and the United States Tuna Foundation (USTF (Van dyke
and Nicol 1987). The tuna industry wanted continued access
to other nations' fisheries zones on their own terms. As
extended jurisdiction with the inclusion of HMS became the
international norm, the United States found itself out of
step with the rest of the world. Increased conflict in the
Eastern Pacific encouraged migration of U.S. operations to
the South Pacific. However, they did not escape conflicts
and the inevitable need for compromise with resource
adjacent nations.
In 1985, the United States had 60 purse seiners registered
with the South Pacific Forum member nations. This is more
than any other country, and a significant portion of the
total of 147 which were operating in the region (Doulman
1987b). In some cases the ATA gained access with Pacific
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Nations under terms similar .to those negotiated by the
Japanese. This was the case in Papua New Guinea where u.s.
purse seiners were licensed under the Papua New Guinea/Japan
Fisheries Agreement (Doulman 1987e).
The U.S. fishing presence in the South Pacific was unpopular
from its beginning in the mid-1970's. During negotiations
leading to the formation of the Fisheries Forum agency, the
u.S. promoted its national inter~sts and those of the ATA
instead of interests of the territories it represented
(Gubon 1987). In respect to compliance, U.S. vessels had
one of the worst records in the region. In Papua New Guinea
a u.s. registered purse seiner, the "Danica" was arrested in
1982 for fishing without a license (Tsamenyi 1986). In
1984, another u.s. registered purse seiner, the·"Jeannette
Diana" was arrested for illegal fishing in the Solomon
Islands (Tsamenya 1986). In both cases, the U.S. government
invoked Magnuson Act provisions and embargoed fish products
from the two nations (Tsamenyi 1986). The embargos were
lifted in both cases after sanctions imposed by the con-
cerned island nations were modified. The illegal fishing
problem continued in 1985 and 1986 with the fishing vessels
"Ocean Pearl" and "Priscilla M" in the EEZ of the Federated
States of Micronesia (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987). In both
cases, negotiated sanctions were paid by owners of the
offending vessel and the U.s. did not proceed with an
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embargo, possibly due to ongoing treaty negotiations (Van
Dyke and Nicol 19876). These cases undermined the normally
strong relationships between the South Pacific nations and
the United States (Tsamenyi 1986).
As early as 1982, Congressman Paul McCloskey, Jr. advocated
negotiation with the South Pacific states (Tsamenyi 1986).
He stated that the U.S. needs to show the concerned South
Pacific states that it is willing to deal justly with
matters of stock management and conservation (Tsamenyi
1986). This could thwart Soviet penetration within a region
which is of strategic value to the security interests of the
United States (Tsamenyi 1986). The South Pacific nations
also had both economic and political motivations for agree-
ment ort fi~heries issues related to tuna (Tsamenyi 198~).
The U.S. is both the largest consumer of tuna in the world
and the largest market for tuna products of most South
pacific states {Tsarnenyi 1986}. U.S. policy, as stated in
the Maguson Act, had negative effects on the region's econ-
omy in the form of embargos and difficulties in granting
access (Tsamenyi 1986). The South Pacific states also have
strong ties with the capitalist world and its financial
institutions (Tsamenyi 1986). These reasons encouraged
negotiation because agreement could be potentially benefi-
cial to both sides.
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Although both sides recognized the need for compromise,
negotiations did not progress smoothly or at a fast pace.
In initial talks, according to one Pacific commentator, the
U.S. delegation displayed a good deal of "ignorance, illsen-
sitivity and more than a touch of arrogance concerning Forum
Fisheries aspirations" (Islands Business 1985, 27; Cited in
Van dyke and Nicol 1987, 118). The one factor which changed
the U.S. willingness to compromise and accelerated the pace
of negotiations was the Kiiibati-Soviet fisheries agreement.
In August of 1985, 16 Soviet fishing vessels were allowed
access to fish for 12 months in the Kiribati EEZ for access
fees totaling $1.5 million (Teiwaki 1987). The strategic
considerations which arose prompted greater u.S. concern as
illustrated by participation of the State Department and
moderation of the u.S. negotiating position. After 10
rounds of negotiation, in October of 1986, the United States
and Pacific Islands nations reached agreement on a regional
fisheries treaty (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987).
The treaty gave the U.S. access to 10 million square miles
of fishing grounds. Perhaps of greater importance, it
served U.S. strategic interests by promoting a positive U.S.
presence in the region. The Pacific Islands made economic
gains of about $60 million over a five-year period (Van Dyke
and Nicol 1987). Payments are broken down in the following
manner: $9 million in cash annually to the FFA.paid by the
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u.s. government; $1 million per year in development aid in
addition to current programs for projects formulated by the
FFA and administered by USAID; $50,000 per vessel paid by
the ATA with a minimum of 35 vessels totaling $1.75 million
per year; and $250,000 per year paid by the USTF to provide
in-kind technical assistance (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987). The
FFA cash payments will be divided among the 16 concerned
South Pacific nations. It will consist of a minimum guar-
anteed payment for each nation, with the other 85% paid
according to fishing vessel catch locations (Van Dyke and
Nicol 1987).
In addition to license fees, there are other terms of entry
which generally reflect existing conditions that individual
states require of all foreign vessels. In order to be
eligible, a vessel must be in good standing on the Regional
Register (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987). The island nations also
wanted independent control over closed and limited areas
within individual EEZs (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987). In the
cases of Australia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon
Islands, closed areas within their EEZs were left to bi-
lateral negotiations (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987). U.S.
vessels are required to report catches under the South
Pacific Commission standard reporting procedures (Van Dyke
and Nicol 1987). This includes the completion of a catch
report form and weekly reporting. In addition, vessels must
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report at the time of entry or departure from waters under
jurisdiction and at least 24 hours before entry into any
port. Foreign vessel operators must also allow observers on
board for scientific and compliance monitoring functions.
The observer has the right to inspect any part of the vessel
and ships' logs, and the right to gather information related
to fisheries within the Licensing Area (U.S. State Dept.
1987).
One of the most important parts of the Treaty involves the
responsibility of the U.S. government to enforce the pro-
visions of the Treaty. The treaty states that the United
States government will cooperate in the investigation of
alleged violations, report to the concerned Pacific Island
States and take steps in the sanctioning of offenders (U.S.
State Dept. 1987). Government-to-government agreements are
to the Island Nations' advantage because "diplomatic
measures can be used to help ensure compliance" (Doulman
1987d, 302). This treaty spreads responsibility for vessel
operators' actions directly to the United States government.
The Pacific Island States-United States Fisheries Treaty
recognized coastal state jurisdiction over highly migratory
species and the terms under which the entry of U.S. vessels
is allowed. The departure from the former U.S. policy,
reflected· in U.S. law under the MFCMA, was in large part due
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to the importance of political concerns outside the sphere
of fisheries policy. In reality: the United States govern-
ment paid for the strategic value of the region in addition
to the value of fishing access. To accomplish this feat,
the U.S. tuna industry was subsidized in part through U.S.
government payments, and U.S. law under the MFCMA was
ignored. It is questionable whether fee payments actually
reflect the commercial value of fishing access, whether
higher tir lower, due to these factors.
The treaty is also an important step for cooperation and the
coordination of fisheries policies among the region's island
nations. The island nations gained economic benefits while
retaining good relations with the United States. Therefore,
the Treaty appears to be mutually beneficial in meeting the
goal of benefit distribution among participants.
Regional Comparisons
There are many similarities and differences between the
Eastern Caribbean and South Pacific situations. Perhaps the
most important factor is the illustration that regional
cooperation for the advancement of common goals is possible.
However, there are many site specific factors which must be
recognized before direct application to the swordfish
management in the Eastern Caribbean.
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The Eastern Caribbean and the South Pacific Islands regions
are generally made up of small island states. However,
differences in size and configuration of projected zones of
jurisdiction are huge. The Pacific Islands Region is vast
in respect to total area and the size of individual Fishing
or Exclusive Economic Zones. Although many of the EEZs in
the Pacific Islands Region are contiguous, they are widely
spread and therefore huge relative to land area. The entire
South Pacific Islands Region is approximately 30 million
square kilometers in size. All of the states in the region
have EEZs greater than 100,000 square kilometers in area
with a range between 160,000 sq km for Western Samoa to
746,000 sq km for the U.S. trust territories (see Table
The islands of the Eastern Caribbean Region are also sur-
rounded by relatively large zones of extended jurisdiction,
but these zones are characterized by the structure of the
450-mile arc of islands which extend out into the Atlantic.
The islands occurring along this arc are much more closely
packed, resulting in an interlocking puzzle of adjacent
zones. All of the GECS countries except Antigua are cut off
by adjacent states' potential zones well before the 200-mile
limit (see Figure 9). The Greater Caribbean has an area of
1.5 million square kilometers while the area of the Eastern
Caribbean is approximately one-third of this figure. Poten-
tial national zones of extended jurisdiction range between
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approximately 10,000 to 110,000 square kilometers in area.
These geographic differences between zones hav~ implications
for fishing operations which target on wide-ranging pelagics
such as swordfish. Forty-mile sets could easily span two
national zones while movement during a given season could
mean that operations will span several zones.
The resource endowments of the two regions are quite dif-
ferent both in respect to magnitude and composition. The
tuna resources of the South Pacific Islands Region are among
the richest in the world. An estimated 650,000 tons, with
an ex-vessel value of $700 million, was harvested in the
region in 1984 (Doulman 1987a). This consisted primarily of
skipjack and yellowfin tuna, the bulk of which is taken by
purse seine. About 1,000 tons of swordfish with an ex-
vessel value of approximately $6 million was landed by U.S.
vessels operating in the proximity of the Eastern Caribbean
region during the 1987 season (SAFMC 1987). An additional
1,000 tons of tuna species may have also been taken in the
prox~ity of the Lesser Antilles region by other foreign
longline vessels (Marcille and Caddy 1985). However, this
figure is highly speculative. The swordfish longline
operations of the Caribbean produce a high-valued product
which is sold fresh in u.S. markets. Purse seined tuna is
of lower value and is usually used for a canned product.
The United States is the largest single consumer of both
Pacific tuna and Caribbean swordfish.
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Politically, the regions share a history of foreign in-
fluence and dominance. Both the Eastern Caribbean and the
South Pacific Island nations are generally made up of newly
independent states. The South Pacific generally escaped the
legacy of slavery, possibly due to 'its distance from metro-
politan powers and small land areas. The states of both
regions are generally made up of developing nations with
characteristics such as: relatively low per capita income;
limit~d resource and industrial bases; r~liance on imports;
foreign aid recipients; and close economic and political
ties with the western capitalist world. The nations of both
regions view economic development and self-reliance as two
of their major goals as independent states. The United
States has major interests in both regions including eco-
nomic and strategic concerns.
Although there are major differences between the two
regions, experiences in the South Pacific tuna fishery have
the capacity to be instructive as the Caribbean attempts to
manage the highly migratory species occurring within their
zones of extended jurisdiction. Issues concerning regional
groupings, access negotiations, conditions of entry and
political concerns have relevance to the Eastern Caribbean.
The next chapter attempts to outline the management alter-
natives which might be applied to the Eastern Caribbean
swordfish fishery.
157
CHAPTER VII
SWORDFISH MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES IN THE
CARIBBEAN
The extension of coastal state jurisdiction in the form of
200 nm Fishing or Exclusive Economic Zones has become an
accepted practice of international ocean law. under this
regime, the coastal state has gained "sover~ign rights" over
the living resources occurring adjacent to it by virtue of
its location. International practice has also dictated that
highly migratory species are not exempt from coastal state
jurisdiction. Therefore, accor.ding to international cus-
tomary law and UNCLOS III, the island nations of the Eastern
Caribbean have the right to claim jurisdiction over the
highly migratory species, including swor.dfish, within their
200 nm jurisdictional zones. However, the right to declare
jurisdiction over the resource, and the realization of re-
source management goals such as a more favorable distribu-
tion of benefits to the coastal state, are not synonymous.
Practic€s in the South Pacific and fisheries management
principles are drawn upon in this chapter to formulate
management alternatives for the Eastern Caribbean. The five
basic management objectives examined in Chapter V are used
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to organize principal areas of concern. It should be
recognized that all of the objectives are interrelated.
These objectives in order of presentation include:
(1) Maintenance of swordfish stocks at levels that provide
high sustained yields;
(2) Appropriate distribution of benefits;
(3) Measures which afford the opportunity for countries not
yet participating in HMS fishing to build up their
fishing industries;
(4) Improved economic efficiency;
(5) Conservation measures which can protect stocks ta~ght
incidentally (recreational stocks) while creating as
little disruption as possible to the primary fishing
operation (swordfish longlining).
Benefit distribution is treated in the greatest depth
because this is curiently the area of greatest concern to
the Easter~Caribbean, although other areas deserve
attention because of their potential future impact.
Maintenance of Swordfish Stocks
All participants would agree with the objective of main-
taining swordfish stocks at high levels. However, the
definition of what level is best, how this level can be
maintained and the current status of stocks are all dis-
puted. With the information currently available and our
present understanding of swordfish stocks, it is nearly
impossible to answer these questions. It is possible to
examine what we do know and how management might be
improved.
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The question of stock conservation is more complicated in
the Eastern Caribbean than in the South Pacific Islands
Region. It is generally agreed that stocks in the South
Pacific are below maximum sustainable levels of exploita-
tion. Although South Pacific tuna stocks are highly mobile,
their range generally encompasses the South Pacific Islands
Region. In the case of swordfish in the Western Atlantic,
the only real agreement is that stock status is uncertain.
The range of swordfish extends far beyond the Eastern
Caribbean to the Grand Banks and perhaps beyond. Therefore,
it is probable that the principles concerned with main-
tenance of stock abundance must be applied well beyond the
Eastern Caribbean Region.
As noted in Chapter III, the current status of stocks is a
very controversial subject. It is known that fishing
pressure has resulted in growth overfishing, or smaller
average carcass size, in the Atlantic management areas of
the United States. It has been argued that this has not
affected productivity of the Northern or Western Atlantic
swordfish population. There is general agreement that the
current rate of exploitation is near maximum sustainable
yields.
Given that the range of swordfish includes most of the
Atlantic Ocean, the question of interest to the Eastern
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Caribbean becomes: Will effort levels and exploitation
patterns in other regions of the Atlantic, especially the
Northwest Atlantic, affect production in the Eastern
Caribbean? If swordfish are as highly migratory as
reported, the answer is affirmative. However, swordfish
migration is not a simple matter of fish leaving for
northern areas in the summer and returning in the winter.
There appears to be a residential population, or at least a
year-round presence, of the species in the Eastern Carib-
bean. The Caribbean may also be a spawning area for sword-
fish. Ray Hilborn and John Sibert indicate that the highly
migratory label has been overused and poorly defined in many
instances (Hilborn and Sibert 1988). Questions concerning
the relationship of South Atlantic stocks to Caribbean
stocks and the actual range of swordfish appearing in the
Caribbean remain to be answered.
As seen in cases such as Atlantic Bluefin tuna, the Eastern
Pacific and Southern Bluefin Tuna, it is likely that sword-
fish management is dependent on cooperation and coordination
of policies throughout the stock's range. The argument that
HMS are not always as migratory as they seem may be more
true than previously thought, but current evidenc~ points
toward wide movement and ranges for swordfish.
Effort levels in the Western Atlantic are increasing while
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the condition of the resource is in doubt. All biologically
driven systems have limits in respect to potential yields.
Although the available information is far from perfect,
there are basic principles concerning effort and catch and
population age structure which indicate that, regardless of
the present status of the resource, exploitation limits
exist. Although fishery systems are biologically driven,
our only control over 'potential yields is dependent on the
management of human activities. Therefore, the starting
point is not necessarily biological, but a better under-
standing of human activity associated with it. Without
cooperation among the concerned participants, it is
extremely difficult to collect the data required to under-
stand the biological system involved. The question then
becomes: What management process can be initiated to gain
the required data, trust of participants, and understanding
of the fishery which will result in a strategy aimed at the
protection of the resource from a potential decline in
yields?
This question is difficult to answer on a national, much
less international, level. For over six years, the United
States Atlantic Fisheries Councils and Regional Centers have
struggled with this problem. They have succeeded in col-
lecting valuable information but, like most fishery investi-
gations, definitive answers have not been agreed upon.
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During the intervening years, u.s. fishing operations have
spread beyond traditional fishing grounds to the Grand Banks
and the Caribbean. The fishery has become more interna-
tional in nature as u.s. boats ranged beyond the united
States EEZ. It has been reported that 50% of current East
Coast U.S. landings originate outside the u.s. EEZ (Pollack
1988). Spanish vessels are now ranging further west while
their presence is anticipated in the Caribbean. Therefore,
management requirements such as information collection,
scientific research and regulation are becoming more
important on the international level (see Figures 10 and
11).
The relevant international organization for HMS, as referred
to in Article 64, is the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). The u.s. supports
the ICCAT Convention through the reporting of u.s. fishery
statistics and research carried out at the Southeast Fish-
eries Center. The recommendations of the ICCAT biennial
report for 1986-87 expressed the need for statistics and
research, but no management recommendations were presented.
Statistics recommendations included: national reporting of
catch and effort; adequate levels of size and sex sampling;
and standardization of statistics (ICCAT 1987). Research
recommendations included: intensification of tagging
efforts; standardization of CPUE; identification of stocks;
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Figure 10 Swordfish Exploitation in the Caribbean and Adjacent Areas
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better growth estimates and analysis of fishing effort
effectiveness to improve indices of abundance (ICCAT 198?).
The effectiveness of ICCAT has been questioned because each
member state conducts research, interprets recommendations
and enforces management on its own (Devnew 1981). There-
fore, there are wide differences in opinion concerning the
need for management, ,difficulties in standardizing informa-
tion and differing levels of compliance in accordance with
management recommendations. The self-regulating character
of the convention is not sufficient for the difficult man-
agement and conservation issues which must be dealt with in
the future. The utilization of ICCAT as a scientific
institution concerned with research and data collection may
be the feasible limit of its role in the management process.
The separation of ICCAT scientific functions from the polit-
ical realities of nation state self-interests is a possible
alternative. Management in the areas of regulation and
enforcement might be carried out by negotiation of multi-
lateral treaties. This might help to minimize the impact of
political bias on scientific investigations. It is not
realistic to expect a timely and effective international
regulatory strategy for swordfish management under the
current ICCAT convention. The U.S. experience in swordfish
management highlights the proposition that, until the situa-
tion worsens, there is little political will to move
forward.
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The examination of principles in Chapter V concerning stock
abundances are important, yet their actualization will
require cooperation which does not exist. However, the
following management tools may be utilized in the future.
The use of national quotas is a possible alternative,
although management within the u.s. context alone makes this
alternative seem unlikely. In addition, the international
compromises required for allotment of national quotas are
beyond the level of cooperation which can be reasonably
expected at the present time. Variable season closures,
size limits, effort restrictions, or a tax on small fish to
cut profitability in their targeting are other management
measures which could be helpful. Presently, there is no
swordfish regulation for the Atlantic on the international
level. On the national level, only Canada has limitations
of effort and landings.
The states of the Eastern Caribbean can do very little if
stocks begin to decline due to fishing outside their waters.
Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS III indicate that international
cooper.ation is required among participants under these
circumstances, but this seems unlikely when confronted with
the current state of cooperation of participants within the
swordfish range. However, the Eastern Caribbean states
should be aware of ICCAT proceedings and participate through
OECS to the greatest degree possible. The information
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obtained from vessels operating in the Eastern Caribbean
waters could be valuable in gaining a better understanding
of the resource, while the Eastern Caribbean Nations could
benefit from current research taking place outside their
immediate region.
Previous discussion of this objective illustrates the
inherent uncertainty which is implicit in the investigation
of fisheries population dynamics. The goals in this area
must include cooperation in information collection and
coordination of regulatory policies on an international
scale. Although these goals may not be met in the forsee-
able future it is important for the Eastern Caribbean
Nations to be recognized as concerned parties which have a
stake in the conservation of the resource. This includes
their inclusion in the management process which has the
potential to be in everyone's interest. Without progress in
international cooperation and coordination of policies, the
eventual decline in swordfish production of the Western
Atlantic is likely within the next decade.
Benefit Distribution
The appropriate distribution of benefits is the most
important economic and political issue related to the
Eastern Caribbean swordfish fishery. The recent emergence
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of a longline swordfish fishery has proven that commercialJ.y
viable concentrations of swordfish are present in the
region. However, the fishery is dominated by foreign opera-
tions, and the economic value of the resource does not
benefit the region. This section explores some alternatives
directed toward a distribution of benefits which are poten-
tially acceptable and mutually beneficial to both u.s.
fishing interests and the Eastern Caribbean Nations.
International Legal Aspects
Under Article 56 of UNCLOS III and customary international
law, the Island Nations of the Eastern Caribbean have the
right to claim "sovereign rights" over the living resources
within their EEZ. Swordfish is considered a highly migra-
tory species by definition in the UNCLOS III text; there-
fore, Article 64 applies. In the Atlantic, the relevant
international organization referred to in Article 64 is
ICCAT. Since ICCAT has not proposed any management recom-
mendations for swordfish, coastal states within its range
are free to adopt any management measures they consider
appropriate under the "sovereign rights" granted in Article
56. Even if management recommendations are adopted by
ICCAT, none of the independent Eastern Caribbean States are
party to the convention. It is also reasonable to believe
that without the region's input there would be little incen-
tive to abide by recommendations concluded in part by the
169
United States, the largest participant in the Eastern
Caribbean swordfish fishery.
Article 62 of UNCLOS III is concerned with access to coastal
state waters for the harvest of underutilized stocks.
Swordfish occurring in the EEZs of the Eastern Caribbean
would fit this description because they are presently under-
utilized by the region's fishermen. Article 62 allows the
coastal state to: license foreign vesselsi establish fees
and other forms of remunerationi and determine conditions of
entry. Article 62 also states that coastal state must
promote "optimum utilization" by determining its harvesting
capacity and granting the surplus of the total allowable
catch to other nations (United Nations 1983). Since the
local harvest of swordfish is near zero, it is the duty of
Eastern Caribbean states to grant access to foreign har-
vesters. The Caribbean nations have the right to control
access of foreign fishing operations within their zones of
jurisdiction under both customary international law and the
provisions of UNCLOS III. However, it is also the duty of
the Eastern Caribbean states to grant access under the
objective of "optimum utilization" as stated in the UNCLOS
III treaty.
The Role of the OECS
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (GECS) is
presently taking action on the issue of illegal fishing
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within the waters of the OEes nations. All of the OEeS
nations have declared 200 nm zones of jurisdiction in which
they declare rights over the management of living resources,
including swordfish (see Table 15). They have also initiat-
ed attempts at the harmonization of the legal regime govern-
ing foreign fishing access in the region. The relative size
and resources of each nation make such a step imperative for
management of transboundary stocks such as swordfish. A
unified political voice may also have greater impact on
negotiations with foreign fishery participants, especially
the United States. Negotiation of fishing access terms may
also be enhanced because island nations will not be played
off against each other. Harmonization of regional fishery
law will set a standard which could also work to the
advantage of the foreign fishing operation. In this way,
laws will be consistent as operations move from zone to
zone.
There are definite advantages to a regional approach, but
also many questions concerning the degree of management
integration and membership in the organization. The OECS
membership has geographic limits in relation to the probable
range of the swordfish resource in the Eastern Caribbean.
The configuration of potential 20D-mile jurisdictional zones
leads to potential limitations in effectiveness of manage-
ment. The OECS zones are not contiguous while all zones
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'l'ABLE 15
Eastern Caribbean Juri.sdictional Claims
Country
Anguilla
Antigua
Barbardos
British Virgin
Islands
Dominica
French Islands
Grenada
Montserrat
St. Kitts
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Trinidad and
'Ibbago
U.S.A. terr.
Venezuela
Territorial
Sea
3 mile
12 mile
12 mile
3 mile
12 mile
12 mile
12 mile
3 mile
12 mile
3 mile
3 mile
12 mile
3 mile
12 mile
200 nm zone and
~r declared
Fishing (1981)
Fishing and EEZ
(1982)
EEZ (1978)
Fishing (1977)
Fishing and EEZ
(1981)
EEZ (1977)
EEZ (1978)
EEZ
EEZ
EEZ
EEZ
EEZ (1976)
EEZ (1978)
Maritime
Boundaries
undetermined
undetermined
undetermined
undetermined
undetermined
wjMartinique
undetermined
wjVenezuela
wjVenezuela
w/U.S./Trin.
- indicates tmknown, undetermined maritime boundaries
indicates that delimitation of EEZs has not taken place
Sources (Edeson and Pulvenis 1983, Ross and Landry 1987)
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except Antigua are cut off by other nations' zones before
they extend 200 miles in any direction (see Figure lO)~ The
subregional Nauru group of the South Pacific was formed due
to common fisheries concerns such as contiguous geographic
factors and resource endowments. The origins of the OECS
are rooted in economic and political factors related to
common characteristics such as to geographic location,
colonial past, relatively small size and similar political
and development goals. OECS, unlike the Nauru group, was
already in existence when the common concern with the
swordfish issue surfaced. For this reason, geography and
resource endowment played a smaller role, in relation to the
current formulation of responses to the problem, than in the
case of the Nauru g(oup.
Although there are geographic disadvantages to Caribbean
swordfish management carried out through only the OECS
states, it must be seen as a positive development. The
Nauru group has had a progressive influence on the FFA.
Measures such as a regional registry were quickly adopted by
the FFA after the Nauru group initiated the practice
(Doulman 1987c). Consensus at the subregional level is more
easily reached and could be spread on a wider scale as other
nations recognize the benefits of such an association. A
wider association would give the region greater political
leverage with the distant water fishing nations and simplify
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management through the standardization of policy over a
greater and more contiguous geographic area. However, it
would also require a willingness to compromise in areas
involving individual state sovereignty, the degree of
management integration and the makeup of the management
organization. Beyond the OECS, the remaining British
territories (the British Virgin Islands and Anguilla) are
the most immediate possibilities for expansion. They have
common concerns because illegal swordfish 10ng1ining is
currently suspected in their waters, and permitting of U.S.
vessels has been carried out in the BVI fishing zone for the
last three seasons. Their fishing zones are relatively
large due to their projection into the Atlantic Ocean and
contiguous with other OECS states. Their common colonial
past and the BVI association with the OEes associate member
make this a practical possibility.
Cooperation and coordination of politics with CARICOM could
add bargaining power to regional swordfish management.
Barbados and Trinidad have contiguous and relatively large
zones in the Southern part of the region. Their inclusion
would be a significant addition to the potential management
area.
The French Islands lie in the middle of the region, separat-
ing the Northern OECS nations from those in the south and
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isolating Dominica in the middle. Although there are inher-
ent difficulties with their integration due to their associ-
ation with France, some degree of cooperation would be
beneficial due to their location. Their participation
during the 1985 WECAFC meeting was positive in relation to
views expressed concerning enforcement and regional data
collection (WECAFC 1985). Venezuela is another important
factor in a regional response due to both the EEZ it pro-
jects into the Caribbean Sea, and its developing longline
fishery. Venezuelan Aves Island claims cut off the exten-
sion of several GECS states' EEZs within the Caribbean Sea.
Therefore, negotiation concerning boundary delimitation and
fishing rights with. Venezuela is an important consideration
for the region.
A regional association has the potential of providing
greater benefits at less cost than the development of
independent institutions. Duplication in the areas of
administration, surveillance and enforcement and data
collection could be avoided through the development 6f one
regional agency. This would be ~ great advantage to the
Eastern Caribbean states which lack resources and skilled
personnel. However, the management organization will rely
on the sharing of costs and benefits of resource management
in a manner which is acceptable to all parties. Initial
problems might involve the strengthening of the organization
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as the vehicle through which political compromise can be
accomplished for the division of tasks as the region
attempts to maximize benefits.
The OECS is fortunate because a regional fisheries unit was
recently established on St. Vincent. This OECS institution
is acting as an administrative and support center for
information collection and dissemination, and a focal point
from which policy can be formulated. Subsequent steps in
the areas of enforcement, training, and development are
either in the planning stage or near implementation. The
Canadian government has provided $250,000 in the first year
for the establishment of an enforcement unit (Joseph per.
com. 1988). The program will consist of a regional informa-
tion unit to facilitate communication between member states
concerning foreign fishing. Funding will also be utilized
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for renting light aircraft and vessels from the coast guards
of member states for air and sea patrols (Joseph per. com.
1988).
The OECS has several alternatives in respect to: the entry
of foreign vessels; the expansion of programs beyond the
immediate OECS nations; and the direction of possible local
development. The degree of integration, expansion of
regional cooperation and eventual success will depend on the
mutual gains in benefits among those nations or territories
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included. If these gains outweigh the benefits of initiat-
ing individual management strategies, then regional coopera-
tion has a chance at success. However, if the region's
political entities perceive infringement on sovereignty,
high administrative costs or an inequitable division of
costs and benefits, then the purpose ot the association is
lost. One of the greatest potential strengths is the united
political stand which could be taken against the outside
presence of both foreign fishing operations and their gov-
ernments. Recent developments indicate that the OECS
nations are moving in this direction. The planned political
union of the Leeward Islands will almost certainly result in
a common program among the GECS members in the southern part
of the region (The Daily News 1988). The consolidation of a
common fishIng zone for the purpose of foreign entry has not
been achieved for the corning season, but a harmonized fee
structure will go into effect (Joseph per. com. 1988).
Although further integration will be required in the future
in the areas of enforcement, the common fee structure and
political ties, positive steps have been taken.
Further integration of nations outside the GECS is merely
speculative at present, but it is an alternative which could
be to the region's benefit. The OECS still has a long way
to go; however, it is probably the best starting point from
which wider regional cooperation and coordination can
evolve.
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Access Agreements
One of the most promising immediate alternatives is the
licensing of foreign vessels wishing to fish in the zones of
Eastern Caribbean Nations. The development of a domesetic
longline fishery would demand capital, skills and access to
markets which are beyond the present capabilities of the
island states of the region. Therefore, the granting of
entry to foreign vessels in exchange for access fees is a
strategy by which revenues could be gained by the region's
island states. However, there are many factors related to
foreign fishing entry which must be examined, such as the
best way to maximize revenues, conditions of entry, and
enforcement and surveillance.
R~Q.r:!..aIr e.sJ s t-.£Y.
A regional response is preferable to individual state
actions in carrying out a program of this type. It has the
advantage of presenting a united front to the distant water
fishing nations. A useful regional management practice in
the South Pacific has been the establishment of a regional
registry. The Eastern Caribbeari Nations could utilize this
system by requiring that all foreign vessels operating in
the region appear on the register. If a vessel is found to
be operating illegally, it could be removed from the
registry. This would make the vessel ineligible for access
to any nation's zone in the region. A vessel could be
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returned to the registry only after paying required fines
and illustrating that it will comply with conditions of
entry in the future. The register would act as a self-
regulating strategy for those vessels which value continued
access to the fishery.
Access fees
The coastal state can obtain benefits from the resource
without extensive domestic development of the fishery
through the charging of entry fees. Ideally, these revenues
can be utilized to provide an instrument for government to
regulate, develop, conserve and generally manage the
fishery (Doulrnan 1987a). The coastal state wants to capture
as much of the resource rent as possible, "the return beyond
the profits and wages necessary to keep capital and labor
employed at normal levels of remuneration" (Copes 1987 ,10).
Therefore, the resource rent can be captured through license
fees or taxes without endangering the viability of fishing
operations (Copes 1987). Fees should be set at levels which
capture the vessel operator's willingness to pay which will
be determined by his next best alternative, but not so high
as to discourage entry into the fishery. Therefore, vessel
entry is a mutualistic arrangement under which an optimal
number of vessels can maintain adequate returns on capital
and labor while the coastal state collects the resource
rent.
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Fees can be linked to the prevailing prices of swordfish,
species composition of landings, type and size of the
vessels and the length or number of trips, or all of these
factors. The method of fee collection will depend on the
amount of information available, the costs of implementing
the particular program and the related surveillance and
enforcement requirements of the program. Therefore,
choosing a method of fee determination and collection will
depend on constraints of the Eastern Caribbean nations and
the nature of fishing operations.
In 1984, the market value of landings taken by distant water
fishing fleets in the South Pacific was $662.7 million, with
total access fees paid to South Pacific countries of $15
million which is 3% of the total value of landings
(Kotobalavu 1987). In Papua New Guinea the operational fee,
which makes up the bulk of fee payments, is based on 5% of
the fishing ground value of catch (Doulman 1987e). This
percentage is equal to the domestic export tax on tuna and
designed to extract a financial return to the resource owner
(Doulman 1987e).
Under the U.S. government Pacific Islands Treaty, the
fee/aid package will represent approximately 9% of the total
landed value of tuna taken by U.S. vessels in the region
(Kotobalavu 1987). However, these U.S. fees at least in
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part reflect the strategic value of the resource or the U.S.
government's, as opposed to the tuna fisherman's, willing-
ness to pay. In the case of the Japanese, access fees equal
about 4% of total landed value although, if direct fisheries
grants are added, this figure is somewhat higher (Kotobalavu
1987).
South Pacific examples are not directly transferable to the
Caribbean because of different fishing methods, species
composition, and the complex processing and marketing
systems present in global tuna markets. However, it
illustrates the potential variability of access fees, from
3% to 9% of landed value. The determination of fees is not
always based on the economic rent of the resource, but
according to convenience, former practices, negotiations or
political agreements. This is because the information and
skills required to obtain a figure based on economic values
are not always available or relevant to the issues sur-
rounding the fishery. However, a foreign vessel or fleet
will not normally operate in a fishery if fees are set at
levels which result in greater costs than revenues.
The British Virgin Islands is the only case in which entry
has been granted for access fees of $7,000 per vessel
annually. In 1986, 13 vessels reported swordfish landings
of approximately 400,000 pounds with a 1986 landed value of
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approximately $1.1 million. The $91,000 paid in access fees
was about 8% of landed value. In 1987, two vessels were
permitted with landings of nearly 100,000 pounds of sword-
fish with a 1986 value of appr.oximately $276,000 (Blok per.
corn. 1988). The $14,000 paid in access fees was approxi-
mately 5% of landed value. The possible reasons for
increased landings in 1987 were better reporting and a good
fishing year (Blok per. corn. 1988). The value of total
benefits also includes the landing of by-catch in the
British Virgin Islands free of charge. Its value is diffi-
cult to calculate, but the estimated value of over 5,000
pounds of billfish, tuna and sharks landed by two vessels in
1986 was approximately $7,500. Therefore, the total bene-
fits obtained by· the BVI in 1987 may have approached 8% of
the total value of swordfish harvested.
The BVI case highlights two questions: By what method and
how much do you charge; and how many vessels do you allow to
enter the fisheries zone? The BVI case illustrates that by
charging a flat fee for entry, the island government is
assured of known returns regardless of fishing conditions.
However, without a link to the value of swordfish landed, as
fishing vessel success increases, the island government will
gain a lower percentage in returns in relation to the total
value of the harvest. In a bad year the foreign fishermen
will be the losers since they pay a corresponding high
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percentage for access in relation to the total value of
their catch. Therefore, for greater stability and sharing
of benefits, it may be in the interest of both parties to
relate access fees to the quantity and value of swordfish
taken in a season. This might be accomplished through
charging a percentage of total landed value.
Cato and Lawlor studied the economics of a 36-foot Florida
longline vessel which earned $142,327 (Cato and Lawlor
1981). After accounting for fixed costs, variable costs and
the captain's share, $16,255 remained - or approximately 12%
of the total revenues earned by the boat through swordfish
landings. The application of this percentage to the Eastern
Caribbean could be deceptive due to a variety of factors.
The vessels operating in the Eastern Caribbean are generally
larger and make longer trips than a Florida vessel of this
type. Therefore, they probably. take advantage of greater
economies of scale with potentially higher revenues in
relation to costs. Swordfish stock characteristics are also
different in the Caribbean with different catch rates and
greater average carcass sizes. There are also additional or
higher costs associated with operation in a foreign region
such as repair costs, transport, resupply and fuel. There-
fore, it is highly speculative to associate a percentage
value with access fees, but given the BVI case and the
margin given above, it is likely that 10% of landed value is
probably a reasonable starting point.
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There are problems in linking access payments to the value
of swordfish harvested. Administrative costs might be
increased due to information and reporting requirements.
The information required to formulate fee structures is
complicated by differing resource endowments, stock fluc-
tuations, price volatility and the required economic
expertise to carry out the program. Foreign vessel re-
porting must be truthful and timely. This will put greater
demands on personnel and enforcement capabilities to ensure
compliance.
In the British Virgin Islands, problems concerned with
compliance in the areas of reporting and by-catch landings
contributed to their d~cision to .lower the number of vessels
licensed to operate in their fishing zone. An improvement
in cooperation was illustrated by an increase in by-catch
landings per vessel from 10,000 pounds landed by 13 vessels
in 1986 to 5,000 pounds landed by two vessels in 1988 (Blok
per. com. 1988). Therefore, the number of vessels permitted
is in part dependent on practical limits of island state
administration and enforcement. It is important to note
that the illegal fishing of unlicensed vessels is suspected
in BVI waters.
To maximize revenues, it would seem that a given state
should allow the entry of as many vessels as possible. The
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question then becomes: Assuming d~velopment of sufficient
enforcement and administrative capabilities, what is the
limit on the number of vessels that a given state or region
can license? Conventional wisdom would link this question
to stock abundance and maximum economic yield. Fishing
effort, or the number of vessels, should be set at MEY where
the greatest economic rent could be obtained from the
foreign fishing vessels. This could be accomplished by
setting fees at the difference between costs and revenues at
MEY (see Figure 6). At effort levels higher than MEY, the
combined costs of access fees and of fishing operations will
be greater than total revenues. This will result in vessels
leaving the fishery until equilibrium is reached (Copes
19a7). This economic approach would: limit the number of
vessels in the fishery; maximize coastal state revenues;
maintain economic efficiency; and keep rates of exploitation
below levels which might contribute to a decline in stocks.
Unfortunately, the use of this model is hampered by the
characteristics of fisheries resources. Initial problem~
involve the large and costly information requirements of
this model. The use of already imperfect information is
further complicated by constant variations in stock abund-
ances and economic data. Of greatest importance is the
character of the highly migratory swordfish resource. Due
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to its large range and natural variations in stock abund-
ance, it is unlikely that effort levels in the Eastern
Caribbean Nations Region can be fine-tuned to the MEY level.
Excessive exploitation levels in any region within swordfish
range have the potential to impact stock abundances.
The Eastern Caribbean states have an interest in limiting
effort below those levels which would contribute to over-
exploitation of the species. However, considering the
current lack of cooperation and regulation, one alternative
is to permit as many vessels as possible to maximize
revenues in the short run. There are also limits to the
number of vessels which can operate in a given zone due to
the ar~a required to m~ke 40-rnile sets and potential gear
conflicts. To some degree, the vessel owner's willingness
to pay becomes lower as the number of vessels permitted to
fish in a given zone increases (Merrit per. com. 1987).
Until greater international cooperation can be reached, the
setting of the optimal level of fishing effort throughout
the species range, including tll~ Caribbean, will not become
a factor in its management. This relies on the assumption
that it is possible to arrive at an optimal figure, given
the difficulties in understanding fish populations and the
human activities associated with them. The current manage-
ment constraints, and potential negative effects, dictate
that the best alternative may be to continue to allow entry
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near current levels of effort until there is a better
understanding of swordfish stocks in the Eastern Caribbean
region and throughout the Atlantic range of the species.
The OECS nations recently implemented a unifor.m fee
structure as a first step in attempting to answer these
questions. Fees consist of three basic components: a
$25,000 payment for vessel entry for eight months and
landings of up to 100,000 pounds of swordfish; payment of 10
cents per pound for landed swordfish; and payment of $14,000
per vessel for an observer program (Joseph per. corn. 1988).
Each OECS member is limited to permit only two vessels to
operate within its zone. Agreement on the ,application of
uniform fees in the region is a positive development. ,
However, it does not recognize the unique characteristics of
individual zones such as size. configuration and resource
endowments. Therefore, the value of entry to each zone will
be different. This may r.esult in a lack of applications for
fishing in those zones which offer less attractive fishing
opportunities, or the wandering of vessels into other zones
where fishing is more favorable. In addition, the fees may
be unrealistically high regardless of the national zone
being considered or for the region as a whole. The OECS
fisheries unit is still attempting to formulate a strategy,
based on a common fisheries zone, which could resolve some
of these problems.
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In 1986, the value of the U.S. longline landings in the
Caribbean was $5,259,335 for swordfish, $541,811 for tuna
and $16,394 for billfish, totalling $5,816,540 (SAFMC 1987).
The percentage of landings taken outside the U.S. EEZ is
unknown, although it could be substantial in light of BV~
landings which were approximately 400,000 pounds in 1986 and
the reported interest of longliners in entry to waters
adjacent to Grenada (Blok per. com. 1988, Joseph per. com.
1988). If it is assumed that half of U.S. swordfish land-
ings were caught inside other Caribbean Nations' fishing
zones, and 10% of the landed value could be paid to the
Caribbean nations in access fees, then nearly $300,000 coul~
be gained in revenues. This figure is only a gross approxi-
mation which is given to indicate the order of magnitude of
possible revenues, not an actual figure. 1ota1 benefits
could be higher if by-catch is landed in the island states
and other conditions are required of foreign vessels.
However, given the configuration and sizes of the OECS 200-
mile fishing zones, some vessel owners may reason that GECS
entry is not iri their interest. Without a doubt, a more
wide-spread regional fishing area will be of greater value
to the foreign fisherman. Without knowledge of resource
concentrations, it is impossible to state where fishing is
concentrated and access is most valued.
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It.is important to realize that in the South Pacific situa-
tion revenues are in the tens of millions, whereas in the
Eastern Caribbean benefits from the swordfish fishery are
not likely to be greater than in the hundreds of thousands
of dollars. Potential revenues are important for under-
standing the relative costs of program implementation. The
costs of administration, enforcement, data collection and
general management activities could easily outweigh the
benefits accrued through fees. Care must be taken to
operate within the limits of the fishery and resource.
If a regional strategy is adopted, the allocation of
benefits among member states is another important factor.
In the case of the United States-South Pacific Islands
Treaty, a minimum payment is guaranteed to each FFA member
with the rest divided among members according to harvest
locations. This is a possible method of dividing revenues
among members of the OECS which have different resource
endowments and EEZ sizes and configurations. This assumes
that an excess will be available after manag~ment activities
have been undertaken.
Other benefits
The requirement of landing foreign longline by-catch in
island nations is another potential benefit for Eastern
Caribbean Nations. It produces benefits by providing an
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additional source of protein for domestic consumption or, in
the case of tuna, a high-valued product for tourist hotels.
Initially, longliners cooperated by some degree in local
landing of by-catch in the BVI, except in the case of
"shack" landed in the US VI and Puerto Rico. Recently the
increase in tuna prices, due to fresh u.s. markets and
bigeye demand in Japanese markets, has encouraged retention
of tuna species. In these cases, island nations must decide
which is in their best interest: to obtain greater revenues
through linking tuna landings with access fees, or to
require the landing of tuna and other species, including
perhaps a portion of the swordfish catch.
It may be in their best interest to retain a portion of
longliner catch for domestic consumption although, as is the
case with access fees, it cannot be so large as to discour-
age longliner entry. Another problem relates to the case of
the u.s. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, where by-catch has
competed with local fishermen's landings. According to the
Fisheries Officer in the British Virgin Islands, by-catch
landings had no negative side effects (Blok per. com. 1987).
Care must be taken to assimilate the added fishery supply
without disruption of traditional markets. Most of the
Eastern Caribbean Island Nations are net importers of
fisheries products. Therefore, the landing of longliner
catch could have potential beneficial effects if planning
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and markets are identified in advance. Ultimately, it is up
to the specific island nation whether or not longliner
landings could have a beneficial effect under site specific
conditions. On a wider level, perhaps a portion of long-
liner catch could be distributed, on a regional basis, to
those areas of greatest need through a regional agency such
as the OECS or wholesalers. As in the case of the individ-
ual island states, careful planning and consideration of the
local fishery and markets must be recognized. The OECS plan
for the earning season will require the landing of by-catch
subject to certain conditions.
Transshipment of longliner catch through Eastern Caribbean
Nations is another possibility which could provide employ-
ment and improve infrastructure for other fishery exports as
the local fishing industry develops. Doulman identified
this as one area of potential benefits to the island states
of the South Pacific for these reasons. Presently, most
swordfish are transshipped through the U.S. territories of
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. "The Law of the
Sea Convention (Article 62) permits a coastal state to
require DWFN fleets to offload or to transship their catches
made in its EEZ at domestic ports" (Doulman 1987d, 304).
The landing of catches in domestic ports could also facili-
tate data collection and enforcement activities. One
problem involves U.s. Mercury restrictions of 1.0 ppm.
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Swordfish landed in the United States are seldom checked,
but imports can be held up in customs or held for a period
of time for testing (Kramer 1984). Transshipment to the
United States has been reported from Grenada and Curacao
(Joseph per. com. 1988), but com~unication and agreement
with Federal Food and Drug Administration procedures should
be made before further plans are made in this area.
Another potential benefit which is sometimes linked to or
considered as a part of access payments is the provision of
development aid by the distant water fishing nation. The
general view of South Pacific Nations stressed that access
agreements should be a purely financial transaction based on
the commercial value of the resource (Doulman 1987e). In
many cases, development aid does not produce the desired
result because of failure to understand development within
the proper environmental, economic, political and cultural
context. Development projects initiated by outside inter-
ests are sometimes rapidly implemented and inappropriately
scaled (Towle 1985). The introduction of inappropriate
technologies or development models can result in projects
which cannot sustain themselves after the aid is stopped,
degrade the environment, break down traditional systems and
create a greater dependence on imports. These factors can
be magnified by the unique characteristics of small tropical
island states such as dependence, insularity and a fragile
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environment (Towle 1985). In addition, the motivations and
perceptions of the donor nation may be very different than
those of the island nation. It should also be noted that a
large percentage of total aid budgets are usually spent in
the donor nation for personnel, equipment and institutional
support. This is not meant to indicate that development aid
is inherently evil, but that extreme care should be taken if
actual benefits are to accrue from this alternative. The
host country needs to carefully study and identify those
areas in which development aid can result in benefits that
will contribute to the goals of economic development and
self-sufficiency.
Conditions of Access
The purpose of setting terms and conditions of foreign
fishing vessel access to the Eastern Caribbean Nations
fishing zones are similar to those of the South Pacific
States. It is meant to: "promote the orderly exploitation
of the fishery; minimize administration costs associated
with licensing FFVs; and provide a basis for scientific
monitoring and management of the 'fishery" (Doulman 1987e,
22). The main conditions include, but are not limited to:
establishment of prohibited areas; license application
procedures; reporting requirements; maintenance of catch
records; vessel identification; domestic observers; and
agents to handle administrative matters (Doulman 1987e).
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The island nations may require closed areas to prevent
conflicts with domestic fisheries and to protect local
fishermen from competition with longliners. In areas where
local fishermen target large pelagics in nearshore areas,
longliners may have potentially negative impacts. However,
closed areas cannot be so extensive as to needlessly com-
plicate or significantly reduce the profitability of fishing
operations because this will lower the value of access fees.
One possibility is to require additional conditions for
foreign fishing within the l2-mile territorial sea where
conflicts are most likely to occur. Additional information
regarding swordfish concentrations and local fishing pat-
terns are required if the option of closing areas is carried
out.
Licensing procedures should be kept as simple as possible to
reduce administrative costs and potential conflicts while
supplying required information and facilitating communica-
tion between parties. One option is to require the assign-
ment of a FFV agent, or agents, in the region to handle
licensing arrangements (Doulman 1987e). This could expedite
administrative requirements for the FFV owners while reduc-
ing administrative costs for the Eastern Caribbean Nations.
If, when a vessel enters the management area, it reports
information such as time, position and the amount of fish on
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board, this will assi~t compliance monitoring for the
region. Weekly radio reports, which include position and
catch, are other possible requi~ements for vessels operating
within the Region's fishing zones. In addition, the main-
tenance of fishing logs which record time, fishing location,
catch and cumulative catch should be required. The comple-
tion and timely delivery of logs to regional and national
authorities at the conclusion of fishing activities could be
a condition for future access. Domestic observers and
agents could be used to facilitate this process.
Fishing vessels may also be required to display their radio
call signs or international signal letters on the vessel so
that they are visible from the air. This could assist
identification of vessels by air patrols.
Another condition of entry could include the obligation for
foreign fishing vessels to take on observers for compliance
monitoring, biological data collection, and possibly
training. An onboard observer would be in the unique
position of observing fishing operations in areas where the
greatest concentration of fishing activity is taking place.
This would have the additional benefit of documenting
operations of other vessels which may not be registered for
operation within the area. The observer could collect data
concerned with catch rates, species composition of landings,
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and biological data such as sex and size. This information
could be helpful for subsequent local development, as well
as a valuable contribution to regional and international
scientific agencies. The observer could also acquaint
himself with technical aspects of the operations such as
electronics, hydraulics and strategies used for gear sets.
First-hand examination of these operations and supplemental
training programs could allow the observer to gain the
expertise required for extension programs or to establish
his own fishing operation. The first-hand knowledge gained
by observers has potential benefits which could range beyond
the function of compliance monitoring. The BVI requires
observer. coverage as a condition of entry to its fishing
zone. It has been considered as helpful in gaining a better
understanding of the swordfish fishery in the area (Blok
per. com. 1987). The new OEeS program includes observers as
a condition of entry.
The conditions and terms of foreign fishing vessel access
will be instrumental in gaining potential benefits from the
resource. Administrative requirements should be tailored to
minimize costs for the Eastern Caribbean Nations while
maximizing benefits. However, requirements should be
reasonable to foreign fishing operations in respect to cost
and compliability to foster a mutualistic relationship.
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Compliance
Foreign fishing vessel compliance through the payment of
access fees and observance of access terms and conditions is
a necessary ingredient for success in obtaining the benefits
associated with resource exploitation. Adequate surveil-
lance and enforcement will be necessary as a deterrent to
the violation of regulations or laws (Lepiz and Sutinen
1985).
"The four main modes of fishing surveillance and en-
forcement include: air patrols; sea patrols; special
observers on fishing vessels; and inspection in
harbors... The proper mode of enforcement depends on
the available resources, the type of regulations or
terms of access and the characteristics of the fishery"
(Lepiz and Sutinen 1985, 313).
The behavior and eventual decisions made by fishermen are
motivated by their interests in the fishery. Their reaction
to a set of regulations will depend on the probability of
violating without being detected; the benefits associated
with such undetected activities; the probability of being
detected, but avoiding sanctions and the benefits associated
with it; and the probability of being detected and
sanctioned" (Becker 1968).
Each individual considers the probability of being caught
and sanctioned against the potential returns which are
associated with the illegal activity. It is expected that
the fishermen will then compare the value of returns
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associated with illegal activity against the value of
returns associated with compliance to regulations (Hennessey
and Kaiser 1986). If the chances of being caught and
sanctioned are very small and the potential benefits are
relatively large, fishermen will operate illegally. This
has been the case in the Eastern Caribbean where fishermen
have operated illegally because there has been a very small
probability of being caught. In many Eastern Caribbean
zones there was no mechanism in place to permit access
although it has been reported that local governments were
approached by U.S. fishermen. Given the choice of operating
illegally or being excluded entirely, foreign fishermen have
generally chosen the latter.
One important factor beyond th~ cost-benefit approach men-
tioned above'involve~ wheth~r foreign swordfish fi~hermen
are risk takers or risk adverse. If they are generally risk
adverse, some fishermen may follow entry requirements even
when the chances of being caught and sanctioned are very
small. Goodwill fostered by communication, explanation of
island nation policy, attitudes which voice mutual concerns
instead of differences and reasonable terms of entry, could
help to create a mutualistic, instead of adversary, rela-
tionship. Some fishermen have indicated that they would be
willing to participate in an entry program if one existed.
However, on the other hand, most fishermen may be risk
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takers. In this case, greater surveillance and enforcement
activities will be necessary to produce an adequate
deterrent.
An access program is currently being considered in the
Eastern Caribbean. The question now becomes: How can
fishermen's behavior be modified to obtain the compliance
necessary for program-success? According to Stigler,
government authorities have the following means t~ improve
compliance: minimize the chances that violations will go
undetected; maximize the probability that sanctions will
follow the detection of violations; speed up the process
from the time of detection to assignment of sanction; make
the sanction large (Stigler 1970).
The Eastern Caribbean nations will use some combination of
these alternatives to achieve the greatest amount of
compliance for the least cost. The high cost associated
with the detection of violations through sea and air patrols
indicates that concentration on measures 2 through 4 may be
more cost effective. Therefore, one alternative is to
increase the probability that sanctions will follow viola-
tions, sanctions are processed quickly and sanctions will
consist of large fines. It should be noted that a very high
level of compliance is not necessarily the goal of a cost
effective enforcement program (Sutinen and Anderson 1985).
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The cost of detecting all or most violations could be
greater than the value of the resource.
The following factors will determine the approach Eastern
Caribbean nations might take in making detection of
violations more likely:
1) the available enforcement modes;
2) the relative costs of each enforcement mode;
3) and the relative effectiveness of each enforcement
mode.
The principle which must be recognized by Eastern Caribbeah
Island Nations is that the marginal benefits must exceed the
marginal costs of added units of enforcement ~apability.
The most important and likely violations are foreign vessel
entry to the region without payment of access fees and
under-reporting of catch if fees are linked to the value of
landings.
A combination of all four enforcement modes can be effective
in curtailing this type of activity. Air patrols are
effective in locating concentrations of fishing vessels and
tracking their movements (Lepiz and Sutinen 1985). This can
be valuable information for surface patrols which can follow
up on air patrol reports. The use of a large aircraft for
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this purpose was too costly according to French experiences
in the region (WECAFC 1985). Small commercial aircraft or
commercial flights might be a more cost effective alterna-
tive, although it is likely that the benefits from present
swordfish fishery alone are insufficient for regular
operations. Sea surface patrols are necessary as an actual
deterrent to violations on the fishing grounds. This is
accomplished through ~ctions such as boarding and inspection
of vessel holds, logs and radio reports (Lepiz and Sutinen
1985). Although this mode of enforcement is effective, it
is also potentially expensive. Additional capital outlay
for more vessels is probably inappropriate considering the
limited resources of the region's island states. Therefore,
the complementary use of existing air and sea patrols
through cooperation with coast guards and police may be the
best alternative until a more reasonable estimate of the
fishery's value can be calculated. The recent Canadian
funding for the establishment of an enforcement unit wiJ.l be
used for this purpose.
The placement of observers on at least a percentage of
vessels operating in fishing zones or the management area
could be an important deterrent to underlogging. An
observer program can be an expensive alternative when
administration, salaries and training are included. There
is also some apprehension on the part of the Eastern
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Caribbean Nations concerning observer treatment and onboard
conditions. The use of a combination of air patrols, sea
patrols and observers could reduce the cost of anyone
enforcement component. If concentrations of fishing effort
can be followed by observer reports and occasional air
patrols, then sea surface patrols could be used with the
greatest potential impact. Instead of spending long periods
of time on the fishing grounds, sea surface patrols could be
used only in the case of strongly suspected violations.
Sanctions will be another benefit which could then be used
to help finance operations.
Harbor inspection is probably the mode of the least cost
although it will usually be effective for those vessels
cbmplying with conditions of entry. It could still be
useful for calculating landings and biOlogical data,
especially if vessels are required to land catches to be
transshipped from eastern Caribbean terminals.
Probably the two most important factors concerned with
enforcement relate to keeping costs down while using all
available resources in the most effective manner through
regional cooperation. Air patrols, sea patrols and
observers will work best if they are used on a regional
basis where costs are spread out among member states.
Another important area which mllst accompany this cooperation
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involves the harmonization of legal requirements concerned
with conditions of entry. Perhaps the best alternative to
improve compliance is the development of a regional
registry.
The U.S. Factor
The Eastern Caribbean swordfish fishery is dominated by the
United States both in ,respect to landings and markets.
Access agreements in the near future will depend primarily
on negotiations with u.s. entities. The Eastern Caribbean
Island Nations can negotiate directly with the U.S. govern-
ment, the private sector or some combination. The South
Pacific Island States-United States Fisheries Treaty indi-
cates that U.S. government cooperation can be a valuable
asset for the maximization of benefits.
In the South Pacific case, a major complicating factor
involved the U.S. legal stance concerning tuna jurisdiction.
The U.S. claimed that the coastal state should not have
authority over tuna resources because their highly migratory
character required an international management strategy.
Although this principle of HMS management is widely
accepted, the U.S. legal view was actually related to the
political pressure of west coast tuna interests. The ATA
wanted continued access to tuna stocks within other nations'
EEZs. Swordfish are also considered a HMS, but the U.S.
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legal definition does not include them in this category
(Wade 1986). Unlike the case of tuna, the bulk of U.S.
swordfish landings originated within the U.S. EEZ when the
MFCMA was drafted. United States law recognizes the right
of the coastal state to carry out management authority over
swordfish. Recent developments in the South Pacific indi-
cate that the united States can also recognize coastal state
authority over tuna within the coastal state EEZ when it is
in the interest of u.S. policy, everl when it is in conflict
with u.S. law. Therefore, Eastern Caribbean jurisdiction
over the region's swordfish fishery and growing tuna fishery
can be recognized by the United States, and u.S. access to
it is negotiable because of the precedent established in the
South Pacific.
A United States-Easter.n Caribbean Nations Treaty, modeled
to some degree after the South Pacific Treaty, has the
potential to be mutualy beneficial. The potential benefits
to be gained through government negotiations were realized
in the South Pacific where U.S. access fees rose from 4% of
landed value to 9% after the treaty. It is likely that when
strategic concerns are recognized by the United States,
higher returns can be obtained through government negotia-
tion than through dealing with individual companies and
fishermen. A treaty could also shift a portion of compli-
ance and enforcement responsibility to the united States.
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The enforcement of the Lacey Act could assist in the
sanctioning of violators who have returned to U.S. waters.
Guaranteed U.S. cooperation in following up suspected and
documented violations would also be a less costly method of
improving compliance in the waters of the Eastern Caribbean
Nations.
The United States would benefit in several areas if a treaty
could be drafted. It would guarantee access for U.S.
fishermen to fishing grounds during a period in which
expansion of swordfish operations is essential for continued
industry health. Continued access provides the benefits of
employment and a greater supply of swordfish destined for
U.S. markets. Because the bulk of swordfish consumed in the
United States is imported, the maintenance arid: growth of
U.S. production in the Caribbean should be seen as a posi-
tive development. Other national fleets from Venezuela and
Spain, which may be lower cost producers, may be able to
outbid the U.S. for access in the future. Therefore, it
could benefit U.S. fishermen to deal fairly for protection
of their future interests in access.
Perhaps the most important benefit which could result from
U.S. cooperation is not directly related to fisheries. The
Caribbean is often viewed as strategic to U.S. security
interests. The U.S. projection of power in the case of
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Grenada and development assistance and terms of trade
associated with the Caribbean Basin Initiative are two
examples which illustrate the willingness of the United
States to act according to its perceived strategic concerns.
In 1982 on the floor of the House while discussing the
Pacific Islands ~ituation, Congressman Paul McCoskey
indicated that the Pacific Islands Region is just as
important as the waters of the Caribbean (Tsamenyi 1986).
It is unfortunate that these concerns have not translated
into greater understanding and respect for the Eastern
Caribbean States as independent national entities instead of
satellite appendages.
The recent intrusion of U.S. draggers into the Canadian
portion of George's Bank has become a problem area. A
recent incident involving the New Bedford-based "Donna Lynn"
has resulted in a NOAA General Council's Office review of
the evidence for possible civil violations under the Lacey
Act (Dennison 1988). Unlike the Caribbean, there is greater
respect for Canada due to its greater enforcement capabili-
ties and relative importance to U.S. relations. This
incident indicates that prosecution under the Lacey Act is
possible in the Eastern Caribbean, if communication and
cooperation exist between the relevant government officials.
Illegal U~S. swordfish fishing is not a problem in Canadian
waters, although many U.S. longline vessels operate adjacent
to them.
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The problem of illegal swordfish fishing is a situation in
which the U.S. is in the position to promote goodwill by
respecting the rights of the region's nations under the
norms of international ocean law. Therefore, a fisheries
treaty would have the value of strengthening positive
relationships with the Eastern Caribbean. Both sides could
benefit from the understanding that mutual respect is the
key to the proper management and exploitation of the
fishery, and better international relations. This serves
the strategic interests of the United States government
better than a fisheries policy currently based on neglect.
Local Development of a Swordfish Fish~.
The Eastern Caribbean Nations currently exist under
constraints which make development of a s~ordfish· longline
fishery difficult at best. As King noted in the South
Pacific case, "A nation's proximity to major fishing grounds
is only one of the factors influencing its competitive
position in the industry" (King 1987, 280). The major
problem areas include the lack of capital, expertise,
trained fishermen and marketing infrastructure.
The swordfish fishery is a potentially risky and expensive
commercial proposition, especially in the case of developing
countries with scarce resources. Fishing operations require
vessels, equipment and fuel which must be imported. There
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is a danger that the greater import and capital requirements
of development in this sector could lead to greater depend-
ency rather than self-sufficiency (King 1987). Swordfish
longlining is not a traditional activity of local fishermen.
New skills associated with the use of longline equipment and
finding fish mean that initial operations will work at a
disadvantage. Local fishermen may also object to extended
periods at sea which they do not encounter in the inshore
fishery.
There are positive aspects associated with local development
such as employment, local supplies of fish products, and
potential foreign exchange earned from exports. Although
these factors make local development attractive, they should
be weighed carefully against the cost of undertaking this
type of program.
In reality, development is not an all or nothing proposi-
tion. It is the type of program which must take place over
years, or perhaps decades. The time to start is the present
- by recognizing constraints, identifying achievable goals,
carrying out cost-benefit analyses and perhaps initiating
pilot projects. Effective extension targeted on progressive
local fishermen with the adaptation of small-scale tech-
niques could be the first step. Methods and equipment which
are available locally may minimize import and foreign
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exchange requirements. Since the shelf edge is relatively
close when compared to fishing grounds such as the Grand
Banks, smaller vessels might be employed. Local development
must be a steady and methodical process. In this way,
mistakes can be turned into learning experiences without
catastrophic results related to expending too much capital
and resources too rapidly. The local sector can also learn
valuable information from the current foreign fishery such
as location, size and economic value of the resource.
Local development is an attractive alternative although,
given the curent constraints of the region's fisheries
operations, it is difficult if not impossible in the short
run. However, in the long run, it has the potential to
provide greater benefits and control over the region's
destiny. A long-term program with this objective might
include characteristics such as: relatively small but
steady annual expenditure; extension concerned with cooper-
ation and coordination with progressive local fishermen; and
the steady development of a data base concerned with
resource characteristics. International development
agencies could have a role to play in this development by
recognizing that it requires a long-term commitment of
decades rather than years and small but steady revenue
requirements.
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Joint ventures are often mentioned as a vehicle by which
foreign expertise, technology and capital can be employed to
stimulate development, while profits are shared by the
resource adjacent and distant water fishing nation. Joint
ventures can work, but the proper balance must be met on
both sides. This is a difficult proposition given that each
side's motivations for joint venture establishment are
usually different. A joint venture agreement is only as
good as the planning and communication between the two
parties. Possibilities under joint venture agreements
include transshipment facilities, by-catch or a portion of
swordfish landed in the island nations, and access fee
payments. Further cooperation in profit-sharing and local
development are possible, but careful future study and
negotiation will be required.
Economic EfficienSl
Economic efficiency is of concern to the Eastern Caribbean
Island Nations because greater economic rents mean that
greater access fees may be charged without endangering the
viability of foreign operations. However, a great amount of
information and expertise is required to fine-tune a fishery
to an optimal stock abundance level. This assumes that is
is possible to gain a high degree of understanding of stocks
and that cooperation between participants for the required
effort limitations can be achieved. The utilization of a
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strategy based on transferable national quotas could satisfy
the goal of economic efficiency. However, the cooperation
required for implementation of this type of program is most
likely impossible given the present lack of international
management of swordfish in the Western Atlantic.
One factor within the control of the Eastern Caribbean
Nations involves the entry of lower, or lowest, cost
producers. In the future, it is possible that nations such
as Venezue12 and Spain could enter the region's swordfish
fishery. If their costs of production are lower than those
of the u.S. producers, then potentially higher access fees
might be obtained by the Eastern Caribbean Island Nations.
In the future, the region could attempt to gain the highest
possible market value of its resource, perhaps through
competitive bidding between fishing nations.
Local development may also be a factor in relation to the
level of economic efficiency. As a local fleet develops,
other factors such as employment and local consumption may
become more important than profit maximization. This is a
difficult trade-off with potential dangers such as eventual
over-capitalization and state subsidies which become a
permanent fixture within the local industry. Nations of the
region may also grant preferential treatment for access
throughout the region to those regional nations which are
211
developing swo~dfish fishing operations. This would
increase the chances of success of local operations as they
follow swordfish concentrations regardless of national
boundaries.
~ulti-species Character of the Fishery
As mentioned in the case of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, there is concern over impacts of longlining on
species caught incidentally, especially other billfish
species such as marlin. The growth of the recreational
fishing industry and its possible benefits to the Eastern
Caribbean Nations could be an important consideration for
future regional policies. In the British Virgin Islands,
billfish tournaments have already become a segment of the
tourist industry. The Eastern Caribbean Nations must decide
whether the resource is of greater value as food or as a
recreational species in the future. It is beyond the scope
of this report to speculate on the potential benefits and
costs of recreational and commercial utilization of the
resource. However, it should be recognized that, unlike
commercial fisheries, the actual value of the recreational
resource cannot be measured by market values. Although
expenditures of recreational fishermen can indicate its
importance, the actual willingness of the recreational
fisherman to pay should be measured by non-market values.
Various techniques of economic measurement and actions taken
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by the United States might be an indicator of the potential
importance of recreational fisheries. The U.S. Billfish
Management Plan will prohibit the commercial sale of
billfish and implement size restrictions (SAFMC 1987). The
Eastern Caribbean Nations will have to consider the impli-
cations of billfish exploitation in the region and the
future importance of the species.
Further Considerations
It is apparent that the five major categories treated above
are interrelated. For example, benefit distribution through
foreign fishing access and local development or joint
ventures have direct effects on each other and future
developments. Stock abundance will affect the level of
access fees and benefits associated with local development.
These interactions must be recognized as the Eastern
Caribbean develops policies to manage the swordfish fishery.
This chapter examined some of the alternatives which are
available to the Eastern Caribbean states. The Eastern
Caribbean swordfish fishery is still filled with uncertainty
in respect to biological, economic and social characteris-
tics. All of these areas deserve greater attention as the
management process moves forward. Hopefully this chapter
has highlighted some of the important questions which must
be answered as the management process evolves.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Background
The Caribbean Situation
The swordfish fishery is one of the newest and most con-
troversial fisheries of the Eastern Caribbean Region. The
Eastern Caribbean Region, as referred to in this paper, in-
eludes the island nations of the Lesser Antilles including
their respective zones of ocean jurisdiction, extending from
Puerto Rico to Venezuela.
During the early 1980s, the Eastern Caribbean swordfish
fishery was initiated by longline vessels owned by U.s.
companies or individuals. Rising U.S. demand encouraged
longliners to expand fishing operations beyond traditional
fishing grounds near the United States mainland. Swordfish
.
landings reported for the United States Caribbean Management
Region in 1986 were nearly two million pounds, with a landed
value of approximately $5.5 million (South Atlantic Fisher-
ies Council 1987). This was approximately one-quarter of
U.s. domestic swordfish landings in 1986. The sudden influx
of foreign participants and technology have resulted in a
number of disputes and associated policy issues.
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The central problem hinges on two interrelated matters in-
volving international cooperation. Immediate concerns focus
on the distribution of benefits derived from resource
exploitation between foreign participants and resource adja-
cent island states. Meanwhile, the absence of a regulatory
strategy directed toward stock management through the range
of the swordfish resource is a concern of all interested
parties for conservation and maximization of benefits in the
future.
The island nations of the Eastern Caribbean are character-
ized by: small size; developing economies; limited resource
bases; negative trade balances; and a history of external
dominance and influences. The United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea and accepted nation state practice under
customary international law resulted in the expansion of
their zones of ocean jurisdiction.· The region's island
nations believe that the utilization of the resources of
this zone is one strategy by which they can further their
goal of economic development and self-sufficiency. Although
fisheries resources are limited in the region due to physi-
cal and biological factors, they have the potential to
contribute to this goal. However, development of the
swordfish fishery depends on technology, expertise and
capital which are beyond the present capabilities of Eastern
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Caribbean Island Nations.- Fisheries operations of the
region are characterized by artisanal fishermen who employ
traditional fishing strategies.
Swordfish is a high valued product with growing demand in
the United States. The bulk of Western Atlantic swordfish
is landed by U.S. longliners operating from the Grand Banks
to the Caribbean. Although swordfish were known to exist in
the Caribbean, the first fishing efforts which indicated
that they occur in commercially viable concentrations in the
Caribbean were made by U.S. longliners. In the mid-1980s,
U.S. longliners expanded beyond the EEZs which surround the
territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to
the fishing zones of the region's island nations. This
expansion of fishing operations beyond the U.S. EEZ is
illegal._ However, due to the lack of resources to carry out
enforcement and the absence of a unified regional manage-
ment plan, fishing has continued with little opposition.
The GECS is initiating action based on a regional enforce-
ment unit and uniform access fees. However, this is only
the first step which is required for the region to gain a
greater share of the benefits associated with exploitation
of the swordfish resource.
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Problem Investigation Findings and Constraints
Swordfish stocks
The status of swordfish stocks in the Western Atlantic is a
very controversial sUbject among both fisheries managers and
resource users. There is general agreement that growth over
fishing is indicated by smaller average carcass size; but
recruitment overfishing, evidenced by poor recruitment due
to a decline in spawning stock biomass, has not yet
occurred. The controversy centers around whether recruit-
ment overfishing will occur in the near future if at all.
Over-exploitation and a decline in stocks are possible due
to the expansion of fishing operations and increased effort.
However, in the U.S. case, no agreement can be reached on
how conservation could be achieved through regulation. The
inhe~ent unce~tainties associated with understanding the
biology and population dynamics of swordfish leaves no
definitive answers in respect to stock condition.
In both the Eastern Caribbean and the Western Atlantic in
general, management is further complicated by the huge range
of the species which includes nearly all of the national
zones of jurisdiction of the Western Atlantic and adjacent
high seas areas. The use of basic fisheries management
principles involving stock and bioeconomic models are con-
founded by the transboundary character of the highly
migratory swordfish resource. The stock cannot be managed
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without cooperation and coordination of national policies of
all concerned states. In order to initiate the management
process based on our current knowledge of fish stock
behavior and exploitation patterns, agreement must be
reached on a legal regime which can foster international
cooperation.
Management institutions
In the Atlantic, the International Convention for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas is the relevant scientific
institution for the international management of stocks such
as swordfish. ICCAT is an important organization for the
collection of scientific data, but its effectiveness in the
management of stocks is questionable. It is constrained by
funding and the capability to gain concensus and enforce-
ment for management recommendations.
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States is a sub-
regional organization made up of the Lesser Antilles Island
States which were former British possessions. The use of
this association as a united front in dealing with foreign
fishing operations is a positive development in gaining an
acceptable distribution of benefits from resource exploita-
tion. However, the size and configuration of their zones of
ocean jurisdiction limit their potential effectiveness as a
regional management agency.
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International legal aspects
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
and customary international ocean law, the coastal state has
gained the right to manage and conserve the living resources
adjacent to it. These rights were established by state
practice in the 1970s through the declaration of 200-mile
zones of extended ocean jurisdiction. Although the LOS
Treaty included several articles concerned with the
management of the living resources, including a special
provision related to highly migratory species, it was not
explicit in relation to specific management requirements.
Especially in the case of highly migratory species, this has
left the subject of international cooperation and stock
management open to evolving international norms defined by
state practices and international treaties.
Management in the Pacific Islands Region
In the South Pacific, a regional approach has been taken for
the management of the Region's tuna fisheries. The South
Pacific case is important in illustrating the gains which
can be made through regional cooperation and coordination of
policies. This has been accomplished through access agree-
ments with foreign fishing nations culminating in the
Pacific Island Nations-United States Treaty. Regional
entities such as the Fisheries Forum Agency and the Nauru
Group are the first step toward building the institutions
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which will be instrumental for future management challenges.
The underlying ingredients of a highly migratory resource,
developing resource adjacent island nations without suf-
ficient harvesting capacity and foreign fishing nations are
common to both the South Pacific and Eastern Caribbean
Regions. Although differences in resource type and endow-
ments, jurisdictional zone sizes and configuration, and
history and culture are apparent, the South Pacific Region
has relevance to the Eastern Caribbean situation. Areas of
particular applicability to the Eastern Caribbean include:
Conditions of access such as reporting, observers, agents
and vessel identification requirements; the charging of
operational or access fees; compliance and enforcement
especially in the establishment of a vessel registry;
regional unity in dealing with distant water fishing fleets;
and the Pacific Islands Nations-United States Treaty.
Perhaps the factor of greatest importance involves the major
participant in both regions, the United States. In both the
Eastern Caribbean and South Pacific Islands Regions, the
United States has strategic interests which may be of
greater national concern than fisheries issues.
Principles of fisheries management related to biology,
economics and international law are integ~ated with
experiences in the South Pacific to formulate management
alternatives for the Eastern Caribbean Region embodied in
the recommendations given below.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations are a set of alternatives
which the region's states may use as the management process
moves forward. This list is not all inclusive, but should
be seen as a starting point or reference material from which
more detailed work can evolve. As more information becomes
available and a regional unit takes a more definitive shape,
these recommendations may be incorporated or discarded.
Hopefully, they will at least encourage discussion as the
Eastern Caribbean Island Nations decide the direction
management of highly migratory pelagics should take.
Conservation of Stocks
The nations of the Eastern Caribbean Region probably have
little control over swordfish stock abundance due to the
species' wide range. However, the Eastern Caribbean Region
can respond to conservation concerns through ICCAT and
WECAFC as a united entity. This could be a step toward the
international cooperation which is required for future
conservation efforts. Exploitation levels in the region and
biological information are important pieces of the pUZZle as
scientists try to gain a better undeerstanding of swordfish
stocks. The Eastern Caribbean Region could demonstrate that
it is an essential component of any future international
management strategy.
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Specific areas where research could be carried out include:
the reporting of effo£t and landing levels in the region; a
tagging program carried out by local observers in coopera-
tion with ICCAT; standardization of data reporting; the
reporting of other biological data such as length, sex and
by-catch data. Funding for adequate training of personnel,
administration and salaries will be a problem especially in
light of ICCAT funding limitations. One potential source is
the United States due to the importance of the fishery in
that country. Another possibility which could cut costs
involves reporting requirements for foreign vessel entry.
Unlike the U.S. domestic fishery, some of the basic effort
and landings data could be maintained on a stricter basis as
a condition of entry.
The' future conser'vationof stocks will require more data,
international cooperation and the eventual coordination of
national policies throughout the swordfish species range.
The Eastern Caribbean Region should work as a united entity
in order to gain a larger voice in the eventual direction of
swordfish and other commercially important highly migratory
species management in the Atlantic.
Benefit Distribution
In order to gain a share of the benefits which accrue from
swordfish exploitatiort, the nations of the Eastern Caribbean
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may grant access to foreign fishing vessels. Access can.be
granted under certain conditions including the payment of
fees.
In the future, cooperation between Eastern Caribbean States
should stretch beyond the current OECS membership. This
would provide greater leverage in dealing with foreign
fishing nations and greater benefits. I would allow for a
larger contiguous zone of ocean jurisdiction in which legal
aspects of fishing could be harmonized to some degree.
However, there is also a danger of over-extending too fast,
especially in the case of the smaller island states of the
OECS. The larger island nations of CARICOM and the French
posess ions could overshadow the collective voices of OECS in
"negotiations with distant wat~r fishing nations. The key
~ay be gradual integration on the subregional leYelin key
areas such as a regional registry. The future goal of legal
harmonization on a regional level will evolve as individual
island states recognize the benefits of greater and
equitable cooperation. The OECS nation's first goal must be
a greater degree of integration related to a common fishing
zone and harmonization of legal aspects of the foreign
fishery.
Foreign vessels wishing to fish in Eastern Caribbean waters
should be char.ged access fees. Fees may be based on a
223
variety of factors such as vessel size, amount and value of
landings, time periods of operation or a combination of all
of the above. The payment method which is chosen should be
cost effective, relatively simple to enforce and fair to
both the island states and fishing concerns. Perhaps the
fairest method is to link access fees to the value of
landings if reasonable levels of compliance in reporting can
be attained.
To control vessels which have been granted access to island
nation jurisdictional zones, certain terms and conditions
should be required of the for.eign fishing operations. These
eonditionsshould aid in administration, enforcement and
information collection, but not become so cumbersome that
they unreasonably restrict fishing operations. Terms and
conditions involve the following: the use of observers;
reporting requirements; vessel identification requirements;
agents; and administrative procedures.
Surveillance and enforcement will be required to achieve an
acceptable level of compliance among vessels given access.
The four main enforcement modes include: surface patrols;
air patrols; observers; and dock inspections. Another
important technique which may be both inexpensive and
effective is the maintenance of a regional registry of
vessels allowed to operate in the region.
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If a vessel
violates agreements related to access, it could be withdrawn
from the registry. This could be effective for those
vessels which value continued access to the region's
resources. The four modes of enforcement are generally
complimentary to each other. Therefore, the Eastern
Caribbean nations will want to use the combination which
will result in the greatest compliance at the least cost.
Enforcement modes such as air and surface patrols will be of
greatest importance in respect to illegal entry of
unregistered vessels. However, these modes of enforcement
are also the most expensive and the development of greater
potential in these areas must be balanced against potential
benefits. Observers and dock inspections will be important
for the accurate reporting of total landings.
In addition to the use of enforement to improve compliance,
other factors can influence a fisherman's behavior. The
level or size of sanctions, time between apprehension and
sanctioning and the probability of actually applying
sanctions in addition to the probability of being caught
will affect fishermen's attitudes toward breaking the law.
The Eastern Caribbean Nations may want to set strict
standards in these areas, such as high fines, to influence
fishermen to act within the law.
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As the Eastern Caribbean nations endeavor to derive benefits
from their pelagic resources through access agreements, it
must be stressed that a basic goal must be the minimization
of costs. The value of the swordfish fishery alone is not
sufficient for capital investments in equipment and signifi-·
cant additions in personnel. The challenge will be to
create as much revenue as possible with the resources
currently available.
Direct government negotiation of a treaty between the U.S.
and the Eastern Caribbean Nations is one type of agreement
alternative. The treaty could define terms and conditions
of access, set access fees, and define responsibilities of
participating governments. This could result in benefits
for the island nations such as higher fees and a u.s.
government role in assuring compliance of U.S. vessels. The
U.S. would gain guarantees of access for its growing long-
line fleet. Perhaps of greatest interest to the United
States, a treaty perceived as fair by the region's nations
would result in political goodwill and potential cooperation
and communication involving other sectors. This would
indirectly, yet effectively, benefit U.s. strategic
interests in the region.
Both the Eastern Caribbean Island States and U.S. fishing
interests can gain benefits through access agreements.
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However, the proper balance must be attained to allow both
sides adequate returns to continue participation in the
program. Common concerns and needs must be stressed to
create a mutually beneficial rather than adversary
relationship.
Other Areas of Concern
Local development of a swordfish longline fishery is not
curently feasible in the Eastern Caribbean due to technical,
economic and institutional constraints. It is debatable
whether development in this sector will r.esult in tangible
benefits due to import, infrastructural and skill require-
ments of swordfish fishery development. However, a local
longline fishery could provide foreign exchange from
exports, fish for local consumption and emloyrnent. The
author feels that the region should begin to work in this
direction through information collection, planning and
research of strategies by which development can proceed.
Allhough progress may be slow, possibly better measured in
decades instead of years, it is questionable whether the
region can further the goals of self-sufficiency and
economic development unless local development is attempted.
Joint ventures are a commercial strategy or. agreement made
between the resource adjacent state and foreign fishing
nation. Although a joint venture can promote local
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development, the history of this type of agreement is
patchy. The motivations of each partner may be quite
different resulting in different expectations regarding the
agreement~ Joint ventures are potential vehicles of local
development, yet their value to both partners is only as
good as the communication between them and the agreement on
which the operation is based.
The incidental by-catch of other pelagic stocks can have
impacts on local markets and recreational fisheries. If
an agreement specifies that incidental by-catch should be
marketed locally, care should be taken to avoid potential
detrimental effects on the markets of local fishermen. The
recreational fishery for large pelagics may have greater
future value than ut.ilization through commercial landings.
These species, such as marlins and other billfish, may
deserve special regulations such as size limits or
prohibitions on commercial sales.
Further information will be required in all areas on an
ongoing basis. Current emphasis is required in: biologi-
cal studies such as tagging and better effort and landings
data to gain a better understanding of species distribution
in both the Atlantic and Caribbean; economic studies to
achieve greater efficiency in determination of access fees,
enforcemeht levels and modes and overall access program
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costs; and the continued study of a regional legal regime
which is both reasonable to all resource users and flexible
for adjustment to changing conditions. Studies and data
collection are limited by funding constraints yet any
progress toward the building of a data base is important to
subsequent development.
Summary
The two major management goals of the Eastern Caribbean
island nations involve resource conservation and the
distribution of benefits accruing from resource
exploitation.
The Eastern Caribbean will be an important component of any
international management regime for swordfish due to its
geographic placement and resource endowments. The conserva-
tion of highly migratory species such as swordfish is a
difficult proposition because it requires a large degree of
international cooperation and political compromise. The
region's nations will need to participate in international
organizations such as ICCAT. They must present a unified
voice for the region during these discussions in order to
gain some degree of balance with larger and more powerful
participants such as the United States. International man-
agement of the species is a continuous long-term process in
which the Eastern Caribbean nations must become participants.
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The issues concerning benefit distribution can be dealt with
in both the short and long term. The region's island
nations de not have the resources to exploit the swordfish
resource themselves. However, they can allow the entry of
foreign vessels to their zones of national jurisdiction in
exchange for fees. Foreign vessel entry could be allowed
under conditions or terms which help to guarantee compliance
and program administration for the least cost. There is an
inherent danger of program cost escalation which could
easily outweigh revenues gained through fees. It should be
recognized that perfect compliance, large data collection
requirements and large increases in fisheries personnel are
not necessarily the goals of the program. The program
should maximize revenues which can be used tp manage the
marine environment. Finally, the island nations must work
together to achieve these management and development goals.
Common regional conditions of foreign vessel entry are
essential to maximize economic returns from the fishery. A
unified regional response will also give the Eastern Carib-
bean Island States greater leverage in negotiations with
other nations, especially the United States. Perhaps of
greatest importance, political aspects of the relationship
far removed from fisheries can have important consequences
which are directly related to the terms of fishery
agreements.
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Applicability Beyond the Swordfish Fishery
Technical advances in the fisheries harvesting sector have
outpaced the development of the social and political coop-
eration required to manage world fisheries stocks. The
extension of coastal state jurisdiction embodied in the Law
of the Sea Treaty has been a step toward greater management
control on a national level. However, many fishery stocks
range beyond and between national zones of jurisdiction
requiring cooperation and coordination of management poli-
cies on an international level. These requirements are
especially important in the case of highly migratory stocks.
In addition to swordfish, other highly migratory stocks such
as tunas and billfish pass through the waters of the Eastern
Caribbean. These species are exploited by wide-ranging
fleets of Korea and Taiwan. It is suspected that these
fleets also operate at times within the jurisdictional zones
of the Eastern Caribbean Nations. The institutions and
regional cooperation developed to control the swordfish
fishery may be utilized to obtain benefits from these
fisheries. As in the case of swordfish, greater cooperation
is required between the resource adjacent and distant water
fishing nations to ensure that conservation and appropriate
benefit distribution can be achieved.
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Regional cooperation has been s~rengthened by the perceived
threat of U.S. operations within the region. This coopera-
tion can be built on for management of the r.egion's trans-
boundary pelagic stocks such as flying fish and dolphin
fish. The OEes fisheries unit has great potential in
developing a data base for regional fisheries. In the
future, its demonstrated value might be built upon for the
gr~ater Caribbean region through integration with CARICOM
and the French islands. The collection and dissemination of
information and management initiatives will have great value
for the future development of the region's fisheries.
The potential ~emonstrated benefits of regional responses to
fisheries management problems have relevance to regions in
other parts of the world. Transboundary stocks are a common
feature of most of the world's fisheries. As effort levels
increase beyond the carrying capacity of stocks, partici-
pating nations will continue to learn that objectives such
as the maintenance of stocks at high levels are dependent on
international cooperation. The appropriate distribution of
benefits between the resource adjacent nations and foreign
fishing fleets is an objective which is being worked toward
throughout the world. Many developing coastal states which
lack the capacity to exploit the stocks of their EEZs allow
distance water fishing fleets to enter their zones to
harvest the resource surplus. Strategies concerned with
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access fees, conditions of entry, compliance and bilateral
and multilateral treaties will continue to evolve.
Therefore, management responses in each region have the
capacity to be instructive through the evaluation of
successes and failures.
It is also important to recognize that cooperation in
fisheries can involve .issues and result in benefits which
involve areas far removed from the sector. As in the case
of the South Pacific and potentially the Eastern Caribbean,
common concerns must be built upon to achieve mutually
beneficial relationships which are in the interest of all
concerned nations. Martin Belsky stated that "constraints
on total ecosystem management are not legal, but rather
political" (Belsky 1985, 763). It might be added that
constraints are also not strictly biological or economic.
They are dependent on the ability of the world's nation
states to understand that political solutions must be sought
as man's technical ability to affect not only fisheries
resources, but the entire planet, continues to increase.
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